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1994年股东大会 · 巴菲特:任何预测企业前景的报告都是没有意义的。

32 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 2:53
M1
M10:01

你不需要做——这个我们以前说过——你不需要做什么了不起的事,就能拿到很了不起的结果。

You don't have to do— we've said this before, but you don't have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results.

有些人觉得,如果你跳过一根七英尺高的横杆,别人给你别上的那条绶带,会比你跨过一根一英尺高的横杆更值钱。

And some people think that if you jump over a 7-foot bar, that the ribbon they pin on you is going to be worth more money than if you step over a 1-foot bar.

但在投资世界里,这根本不是这么回事。

And it just isn't true in the investment world at all.

所以你完全可以做一些非常普通的事。

So you can do very ordinary things.

我是说,这里面到底有什么复杂的呢?

I mean, what is complicated about this?

对。

Yeah.

不过你知道,就因为这个,我们比几年前税前多赚了三十亿美元。

But, you know, we're $3 billion pretax better off than we were a few years ago because of it.

关于那个产品,我所知道的东西,不管是它的分销系统、财务,还是别的什么,真的没有哪一点是成千上万甚至几百万人做不到理解、或者他们本来就不知道的。

There's nothing that I know about that product, or its distribution system, its finances, or anything that really hundreds of thousands or millions of people aren't capable of— that they don't already know.

他们只是根本不去采取行动。

They just don't do anything about it.

同样地,如果你跑去碰一个很复杂的生意,你可以拿到一份厚达一千页的报告,还有一堆 PhD 在那儿研究它,但那并不说明什么。

And similarly, if you get into some complicated business, you can get a report that's 1,000 pages thick, and you've got PhDs working on it, but it doesn't mean anything.

你知道,你手里是有一份报告,但你——你还是不会真正明白那个生意,也不会知道它十年或十五年后会是什么样子。

You know, what you've got is a report, but you don't— you won't understand that business, what it's going to look like in 10 or 15 years.

最重要的事,就是别犯错。

The big thing to do is avoid being wrong.
F1
F11:20

有些东西从本质上来说就是非常危险的。

There's some things that are so intrinsically dangerous.

我的另一个偶像是 Mark Twain,他看着他那个时代的那些推销者,说过一句话:矿,就是地上的一个洞,归一个骗子所有。

Another of my heroes is Mark Twain, who looked at the promoters of his day and he said, a mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar.

我现在看待各种预测,大概就是这种感觉。

And that's the way I've come to look at projections.

我是说,基本上,我记得有一次 Warren 和我在收购一家企业的时候,人家给过我们价值两百万美元的一堆预测。

I mean, basically, I can remember Warren and I were offered $2 million worth of projections once.

哦,对。

Oh, yeah.

就在买一家企业的过程中,那本资料有这么厚。

In the course of buying a business, and the book was this thick.

白给的。

For nothing.

而且那东西是白送给我们的,但我们连打开都不想打开。

And we were given it for nothing, and we wouldn't open it.
M1
M11:56

你知道,我们几乎都愿意花两百万美元,只求别去看它。

You know, we'd almost pay $2 million not to look at it.

我是说,这太荒唐了。

I mean, it's ridiculous.

我实在不明白,为什么会有买企业的人去看一大堆由卖方整理出来的预测,或者——

I do not understand why any buyer of a business looks at a bunch of projections put together by a seller or—
F1
F12:13

或者他的代理人。

Or his agent.

或者他的代理人。

Or his agent.
M1
M12:16

你几乎都可以说,要是觉得那东西真有任何用处,那想法就太天真了。

You can almost say that it's naive to think that that has any utility whatsoever.

我们就是完全没兴趣。

We just are not interested.

如果我们自己对未来会是什么样都没有一点判断,那坐在那里听另一个想把企业卖给我们、或者想从中拿佣金的人来告诉我们未来会怎样——就像我说的,那太天真了。

If we don't have some idea ourselves of what we think the future is, to sit there and listen to some other guy who's trying to sell us the business or get a commission on it tell us what the future is going to be, it— like I say, it's very naive.

对,而且还是往后看五年。

Yeah, and 5 years out.

我们有一次在报告里写过一句话:别去问理发师你需不需要理发。

We had a line in the report one time, don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut.

这对那些卖企业的人做的前景预测,也同样非常适用。

And it's quite applicable to projections by sellers of businesses.

第三区。

Zone 3.