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2007年股东大会 · 芒格:风险是不能用来测算的

44 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:13
M1
M10:00

大家好,我是来自香港的 Stanley Koo。

Hi, I'm Stanley Koo from Hong Kong.

我的问题是关于投资里这种短期思维不断蔓延的现象。

My question is about the proliferation of short-term mindset to investing.

随着越来越多的钱被放到 absolute return mandate 这类委托之下,这些管理人就像你刚才说的那样,也会面临同样的反应模式和拥挤交易的问题。

As more and more money is being placed under absolute return mandates, these managers, as you just said, respond to the same response and crowded trades issues.

所以,当 credit spread——或者我应该说,各类产品的 risk premium 都在全面下降,而不同市场之间的相关性又在上升的时候,我们能不能据此判断,这对经济或者市场来说到底是健康还是不健康?

So with credit spreads on— I should say risk premium on various products declining across the board and correlation across markets increasing, can we read into it and say whether it's healthy or not healthy for the economy or the markets?

还有,我们是不是也可以说,portfolio insurance 的那种动态机制,今天其实已经存在了?

And can we arguably say the portfolio insurance dynamics is already in place today?
M2
M20:58

嗯,我觉得你说到点子上了,而且,怎么说呢,我们的确认为这并不健康。

Well, I think you put your finger on it, and I, you know, we do think it's unhealthy.

显然,如果你去看——这东西没法精确衡量,不过我相当确定我说得没错——如果你看一下,比如说,无论是债券还是股票,其中有多大比例是被这样一群人持有的:他们明天一早就可能因为某个刺激而改变主意,不管这个刺激是 Fed 的某个动作,还是金融市场里某种意外事件,这个比例都高得多了。

Obviously, if you take— there's no way of precisely measuring this, but I'm quite certain I'm right— if you take the degree to which, say, either bonds or stocks, the percentage of them that are held by people who could change their minds tomorrow morning based on a given stimulus, whether it be something the Fed does or whether it be, uh, some kind of an accident in financial markets, the percentage is far higher.

全世界有这么一个电子化的群体,在管理着巨额资金,他们觉得自己投资组合里的每一个决策,基本上都应该按天、按小时,甚至按分钟来做。

There is an electronic herd of people around the world managing huge amounts of money who think that a decision on everything in their portfolio should be made basically daily or hourly or by the minute.

这也提高了 New York Stock Exchange 的换手率。

And that has increased turnover on the New York Stock Exchange.

我不知道准确数字,但我记得大概在四十年前,这个比例还只有百分之十五到百分之二十左右,而现在我相信已经到百分之百,甚至更高了。

And I don't know the exact figures, but I think it was down around the 15 or 20% range 40 years ago, and it's increased to 100%, I believe, plus now.

所以,当然,在债券市场上,债券的换手率也大幅上升了。

So, and certainly in the bond market, the turnover of bonds has increased dramatically.

过去人们买债券,是为了持有它们;现在人们买债券,是为了交易它们。

People used to buy bonds to own them, and they buy bonds to trade them.

这本身没什么邪恶的地方,但这意味着参与者玩的已经是另一种游戏了,而这种不同的游戏,带来的后果可能会和 buy-and-hold 的环境很不一样。

And there's nothing evil about that, but it just means that the participants are playing a different game, and that different game can have different consequences than in a buy-and-hold environment.

而且我确实觉得,这意味着如果你是在按天跟别人较劲,想赢过对方,那你就会非常仔细地盯着新闻事件,也会非常仔细地盯着对手;如果你觉得他马上就要按下那个键了,那如果这就是你在玩的游戏,而且你的成绩又是按周来考核的,你就会想办法比他更快按下那个键。

And I do think it, it means that if it— if you're, if you're trying to beat the other fellow on a day-to-day basis, you're watching news events very carefully, you're watching the other fellow very carefully, and if you think he's about to hit that key, you know, you're going to try and hit the key faster if that's the game you're playing and if you're getting measured on results weekly.

所以我觉得,你描述的这些条件,正是会导向我们一直在说、并且预计某个时候会发生的那种结果。

So I think that you've described the conditions that will lead to a result that we've been talking about expecting at some point.

不过,这对市场来说也不是什么新鲜事。

It's not new to markets though.

我的意思是,市场隔一段时间就会干出一些疯狂的事。

I mean, markets do crazy things over time.

每次 Charlie 和我还在 Salomon 的时候,他们总会跟我们谈什么 five sigma event 或者 six sigma event。

Every time when Charlie and I were at Salomon, they'd always talk to us about 5 sigma events or 6 sigma events.

如果你是在讲抛硬币,那这么说当然没问题;但一旦把人的行为牵扯进来,这就没什么意义了。

And that's fine if you're talking about flipping coins, but it doesn't mean anything when you get human behavior involved.

人会做出那种——而且是聪明人,非常聪明、受过良好教育的人——完全不理性的事,而且他们还会成群结队地这么做。

And people do things that— and intelligent people do things, very intelligent, educated people do things that are totally irrational, and they do them en masse.

你在一九九八年看到了,二零零二年也看到了。

And you saw it in 1998, you saw it in 2002.

以后你还会再看到,而且当越来越多人试图按天去击败 currency、bond、stock market 的时候,这种事发生的可能性会更大。

And you'll see it again, and you'll see it— it's more likely to happen when you have people trying to beat currency, bond, stock markets day by day.

这——我觉得这是个傻瓜游戏,不过,呃,你知道的,这也许又正是吸引资金所需要的。

It's— I think it's a fool's game, but, but, uh, you know, it, it may be what's required to attract money.

当年我成立我的 partnership 的时候,我就告诉合伙人们,你们大概一年只会收到我一次消息。

When I set up my partnership, I told the partners, you know, you'll hear from me once a year.

我甚至还记得一九六二年,我把这些 partnership 组建起来之后,到了一九六二年五月,市场变得非常糟糕。

And I even thought in 1962, I put the partnerships together, and in May of 1962, the market got terrible.

我当时甚至想过,给所有合伙人寄一封信,然后把信先寄到 Brazil,再让那边转寄回来,算是试他们一下,看看他们对这些事情会是什么反应,不过——

And I actually thought of sending all my partners a letter and then sending it down to Brazil to have it reshipped back up, just to sort of test them out, but, uh, so how they felt about things.

不过,你知道,我那里面有几个合伙人心脏不太好。

But, you know, I had a few with bad hearts.

我就觉得不值得这么干了。

I decided it wasn't worthwhile.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M34:26

对,当人们用 sigma 来讨论市场里潜在的灾难风险时,呃,他们全都疯了。

Yeah, when people talk about sigmas in terms of disaster potentialities in markets, uh, they're all crazy.

他们当时有个想法,觉得市场里的糟糕结果可以用 Gaussian distribution 来预测,而他们之所以会得出这个结论,是因为这样一来一切都特别容易计算。

They got the idea that bad results in markets would be predicted by Gaussian distributions, and the way they decided on that outcome was it made everything so easy to compute.

但实际情况并不服从 Gaussian distribution。

They don't follow Gaussian distributions.

你要相信那套东西,就得先相信 tooth fairy 才行。

You have to believe in the tooth fairy to believe that.

而且那些灾难事件,比 Gauss 预测的要更大,也更让人头疼。

And the disasters are bigger and more irritating than Gauss would have predicted.
M2
M25:08

而且也更容易教。

It was easier to teach as well.
M3
M35:10

对,也更容易教。

It was easier to teach too.
M2
M25:12

对。

Yeah.
M3
M35:12

我有一次问一位很有声望的医学院教授,为什么他还在做一种已经过时的手术方式,他说,因为这东西特别适合拿来教。

I once asked this distinguished medical school professor why he was still doing an obsolete procedure, and he said it's so wonderful to teach.
M2
M25:23

这种情况在——这种情况在 finance department 里,比你想的还要更多。

There's more of that in the— there's more of that in finance departments than you might think.
M3
M35:29

对。

Yeah.
M2
M25:30

你学了高等数学,嗯,还学会了怎么做那些在你这个领域里,除了那帮 priesthood 之外谁都不会做的东西,结果最后却发现那套东西根本没有任何意义,你知道,这真是很让人泄气。

It's very discouraging to learn advanced mathematics and, uh, you know, how to do things that, that none but the priesthood can do in your field, and then find out it doesn't have any meaning, you know.

我是说,嗯,当你为了拿 PhD 已经投入了这么多年,面对这种认识的时候,你会怎么办,你知道,而且你——而且你可能还写过一本教材和一两篇论文,这时候突然醒悟到,那些东西根本毫无用处,甚至其实还有反作用,我不太确定,你知道,有多少人能把这件事处理好。

I mean, and, and what you do when confronted with that knowledge after you've invested these years to get your PhD, you know, and you're— and you've maybe written a textbook and a paper or two, having a revelation that that stuff has no utility at all and really has counter-utility, I'm not sure, you know, too many people can handle it well.

所以,嗯,我觉得他们通常就是继续教下去。

And, uh, and I think they just generally keep on teaching.

第二个问题。

Number 2.