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2001年股东大会 · 巴芒:你很难靠卖空赚大钱

41 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 4:53
M1
M10:00

大家好,我是来自 New Hampshire 州 Hanover 的 Dave Staples,我有两个问题想请教你们。

Hi, I'm Dave Staples from Hanover, New Hampshire, and I've got 2 questions for you.

第一,我想听听你们对卖空证券的看法,还有你们最近以及整个职业生涯里的相关经验。

First, I'd like to hear your thoughts on selling securities short and what your experience has been recently and over the course of your career.
M2
M20:14

这是个很值得研究的话题,因为——我是说,它已经毁掉很多人了。

It's an interesting item to study because it's— I mean, it's ruined a lot of people.

这是一种你真的可能做到破产的事。

It is the sort of thing that you can go broke doing.

Bob Wilson,有很多关于他和 Resorts International 的著名故事。

Bob Wilson, there's famous stories about him and Resorts International.

他倒是没因为这个破产。

He didn't go broke doing it.

事实上,他后来还做得非常好。

In fact, he's done very well subsequently.

但是,做空一种亏损无限的东西,和做多一种你已经付过钱的东西,是完全不一样的。

But being short something where your loss is unlimited is quite different than being long something that you've already paid for.

而且这事很有诱惑力。

And it's tempting.

你在职业生涯里看到被严重高估的股票,会远远多于被严重低估的股票。

You see way more stocks that are dramatically overvalued in your career than you will see stocks that are dramatically undervalued.

我的意思是——证券市场的本性就是,时不时会把各种东西捧上天,所以证券经常会卖到它实际价值的五倍、十倍;但它们几乎极少会只卖到自身价值的百分之二十,或者百分之十。

I mean, they're— it's the nature of securities markets to occasionally promote various things to the sky so that securities will frequently sell for 5 or 10 times what they're worth, and they will very, very seldom sell for 20% or 10% of what they're worth.

所以,你会在高估这一边看到价格和价值之间大得多的偏差。

So therefore, you see these much greater discrepancies between price and value on the overvaluation side.

所以,你可能会觉得做空更容易赚钱。

So, you might think it's easier to make money on short selling.

但我只能说,对我来说并不是这样。

And all I can say is, it hasn't been for me.

我觉得对 Charlie 来说也不是这样。

I don't think it's been for Charlie.

这是个非常、非常难做的行当,因为你面对的是无限亏损;也因为那些拥有高估股票、而且是严重高估股票的人,很多时候都处在“推销者”和“骗子”之间的某个位置。

It is a very, very tough business because of the fact that you face unlimited losses and because of the fact that people that have overvalued stocks, very overvalued stocks, are frequently on some scale between promoter and crook.

这也就是他们为什么会走到那一步。

And that's why they get there.

而且一旦他们到了那个位置——他们还知道怎么利用那种高估值,反过来给企业“凭空垫高”出价值来。

And once they're— and they also know how to use that very valuation to bootstrap value into the business.

因为如果你的股票卖到一百美元,但实际只值十美元,很明显,对你最有利的事就是出去增发一大堆股票。

Because if you have a stock that's selling at $100 that's worth $10, obviously it's to your interest to go out and issue a whole lot of shares.

如果你这么做了,等一切都完成以后,这家公司的价值可能就变成五十美元了。

And if you do that, when you get all through, the value can be $50.

事实上,有很多那种链式信一样的股票炒作,某种程度上就是建立在一个默认前提上:管理层会一直这么干下去。

In fact, there's a lot of chain letter type stock promotions that are sort of based on the implicit assumption that the management will keep doing that.

如果他们先这么干一次——在实际只值十的时候,按一百去发大量股票,把价值堆到五十——那人们就会说,哎呀,这帮人太会玩这个了,那我们愿意出两百,或者三百买它;然后他们又可以再来一轮,如此反复。

And if they do it once and build up to 50 by issuing a lot of shares at 100 when it's worth 10, now the value is 50, and people say, well, these guys are so good at that, let's pay 200 for it or 300, and then they can do it again and so on.

通常他们脑子里未必想得这么清楚,但很多股票炒作背后的基本原理就是这个。

It's not usually quite that clear in their minds, but that's the basic principle underlying a lot of stock promotions.

如果你卷进了一个这种而且还做成功了的案子里,那你知道,你可能会在那个 promoter 想法用完之前,先把自己的钱耗光。

And if you get caught up in one of those that is successful, you can, you know, you can run out of money before the promoter runs out of ideas.

但到最后,它们几乎总是会应验。

In the end, they almost always work.

我的意思是,这些年来我们觉得应该做空的那些东西,从最终结果来看,命中率是非常高的——如果你能一路扛到最后,它们最终往往会很顺利地按预期发展。

I mean, I would say that of the things that we have felt like shorting over the years, the batting average is very high in terms of eventual— they would work out very well eventually if you held them through.

但这个过程非常痛苦,而且——以我的经验来看,做多那一边赚钱要容易得多。

But it is very painful, and it's— in my experience, it's a whole lot easier to make money on the long side.

我自己就遇到过一次这样的情况。

I had one situation.

其实那是一个套利交易。我当时在——嗯,是我一九五四年搬到 New York 的时候,所以大概是一九五四年六、七月——那笔交易属于一种十拿九稳、必须会成功的套利。

Actually an arbitrage situation when I was in— well, it was when I moved to New York in 1954, so it was in about June or July of 1954— that involved a surefire type transaction, an arbitrage transaction that had to work.

但里面有个技术性的复杂之处,而且我当时做空了某样东西。有那么一小段时间,我感觉自己——我感觉就像 Fahnestock 去年秋天那样。

But there was a technical wrinkle in it, and I was short something, and I felt like, for a short period of time, I was— I felt like Fahnestock was feeling last fall.

我的意思是,那会非常难受。

I mean, it was very unpleasant.

你赚不到——至少在我看来,你没法靠这个赚到真正的大钱,因为你不可能让自己暴露在那种损失里;如果你真的大规模去做,这种损失是会出现的。

You can't make—in my view, you can't make really big money doing it because you can't expose yourself to the loss that would be there if you did do it on a big scale.

Charlie,你怎么看?

And Charlie, how about you?
M3
M33:58

嗯,Ben Franklin 说过,如果你想让自己过得很惨,你知道,就像在 Easter 前后之类的时候,他说,去借一大笔钱,然后到 Lent 的时候再还。

Well, Ben Franklin said, if you want to be miserable, you know, during Easter or something like that, he says, borrow a lot of money to be repaid at Lent.
M2
M24:09

对。

Yes.
M3
M34:09

大概就是这个意思。

Something to that effect.

同样地,如果你去卖空一个一直在涨的东西,而这东西上涨是因为有人用一种半欺骗的方式在炒作它,你就会一直亏钱,他们还会不断通知你追加保证金。为了这种事,让你的人生里多出这么多烦躁,实在是不值得。

And similarly, being short something which keeps going up because somebody is promoting it in a half-crooked way, and you keep losing, and they call on you for more margin, it just isn't worth it to have that much irritation in your life.

在别的地方赚钱也没那么难,而且烦恼还少得多。

It isn't that hard to make money somewhere else with less irritation.
M2
M24:36

而且不管怎么说,这在 Berkshire 这样的规模上根本行不通。

It would never work on a Berkshire scale anyway.

我的意思是,以那种——那个,呃——要真正对 Berkshire 的整体价值产生实际影响所必需的资金规模来看,你根本没法这么做。

I mean, you could never do it for the kind of money that, that, uh, would be necessary to do it with in order to have a real effect on Berkshire's overall value.

所以这不是我们会去考虑的事情。

So it's not something we think about.