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2007年股东大会 · 当企业利润占GDP的比例太高时,可能有泡沫

63 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:55
M1
M10:00

我叫 Takashi Ito,来自日本。

My name is Takashi Ito from Japan.

除了全球流动性过剩之外,企业利润相对于劳动报酬的占比也非常高。

In addition to the global excess liquidity, corporate profits are very high compared to the share of labor.

这会不会让你们更难找到投资机会?

Does that make it extra challenging for you to find investment opportunities?

谢谢。

Thank you.
M2
M20:24

对,美国的企业利润,除了极少数几年之外,按占 GDP 的比例来看,都是创纪录的。

Yes, corporate profits in the United States are, except for just a very few years, a record in terms of GDP.

这个——我一直很惊讶,之前它们一直在占 GDP 百分之四到百分之六这个区间里,后来却一下子跳升上去了。

It's—I've been amazed that after being in a range between 4% and 6% of GDP, they have jumped upward.

而且你不会觉得这种情况长期来看是可持续的。

And you would not think this would be sustainable over time.

嗯,不好意思,稍等一下。

Um, excuse me just one second.

Charlie,你要不要先讲两句?

Charlie, want to talk for a second?

刚才这个话题你也已经听到了。

You've just heard him on the subject.

不过企业利润要是涨到占 GDP 百分之八以上,你知道,这就非常高了。

But corporate profits, when they get up to 8% plus of GDP, you know, that is very high.

而到目前为止,这还没有引发什么反应。

And so far it has caused no reaction.

一种可能的反应,就是提高企业税。

One reaction could be higher corporate taxes.

这个国家有非常非常多的企业。

You have lots and lots of businesses in this country.

在长期国债利率只有百分之四点七五、政府债券利率这么低的世界里,还能在有形净资产上赚到百分之二十到百分之二十五,这太不寻常了。

Earning 20 or 25% on tangible equity in a world where long-term bond rates are 4.75%, government bond rates, that's extraordinary.

如果你去看四十年前的经济学书,书里要是说这种情况会持续存在,那你大概根本找不到这样的书。

If you'd read an economics book 40 years ago and it talked about that kind of a situation persisting, well, you wouldn't have found a book like that.

我的意思是,按照纯粹的经济学理论,这、这说不通,但这种情况已经发生了一段时间了,而且事实上还变得更极端了。

I mean, that, that does not make sense under pure economic theory, but it's been occurring for some time, and as a matter of fact, it's gotten more extreme.

企业利润占 GDP 的比例还在继续上升。

Corporate profits continue to rise as a percentage of GDP.

这就意味着,GDP 里别人的那一部分占比在下降。

That means somebody else's share of GDP is going down.

而且你说得很对,GDP 里劳动这一部分的占比,实际上确实下降了不少。

And you're quite correct that the labor component of GDP has actually fallen fairly significantly.

这会不会变成一个政治议题,也许会在下一次竞选中出现;会不会变成国会要出手处理的事情,国会是有能力非常快地改变这个比例的。

Whether that becomes a political issue, maybe in the next campaign, whether it becomes something that Congress does something about, Congress has the power to change that ratio very quickly.

企业所得税税率在不算太久之前还是百分之五十二,现在是百分之三十五,而且有很多很多公司实际缴税只有百分之二十甚至更低。

Corporate tax rates not that long ago were 52%, and now they're 35%, and a whole lot of companies get by with paying 20% or less.

所以我会说,此时此刻,美国企业某种程度上是在享受最理想的环境。

So I would, I would say that at the moment, corporate America is kind of living in the best of all worlds.

而且历史已经表明,这样的条件不会无限期持续下去。

And, and history has shown that those conditions don't persist indefinitely.

至于它什么时候结束、又是什么让它结束的,如果真发生了,我也不知道。

What brings it to an end, when it, when it happens, I don't know.

但我不会预期,未来企业利润平均还能维持在占 GDP 百分之八点几这样的水平。

But I would not expect corporate profits to be 8 and a fraction percent of GDP, uh, on average in the future.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M32:52

对,当然了,很多利润其实也不是来自制造业或者零售业。

Yeah, of course, a lot of the profits are not in the manufacturing sector or the retailing sector either.

其中很大一部分是在金融板块。

A lot of them are in this financial sector.

所以我们看到大量利润流向了银行、投资银行,还有各种各样的投资管理机构,也包括各种类型的 private equity。

And so we've had a huge flow of profit to, to banks and investment banks and investment management groups of all kinds, including various kinds of private equity.

而且,呃,我觉得这个是前所未有的。

And, uh, that has, I think, no precedent.

我觉得以前从来没有像现在这么极端过。

I don't think it's ever been as extreme as it is now.

你同意这个看法吗?

Do you agree with that?
M2
M23:28

对。

Yeah.

Charlie 和我二十年前就会这么说了,我们这些年也时不时做过一些 banking 的事,包括持有过一家银行。

And Charlie and I would have said 20 years ago, we've done things in banking from time to time, including owning a bank.

但如果你当时问我们,在一个长期 government bond 利率只有百分之四点七五的世界里,一家又一家大型银行,做的基本上是 commodity,也就是 money 这种生意,居然还能在 tangible equity 上赚到超过百分之二十的回报,我们会说,这种情况是不可能持续的。

But if you'd said to us, in a world of 4.75% long-term governments, will one major bank after another be earning more than 20% on tangible equity dealing in what is basically a commodity, money, we would have said that that that condition just wouldn't persist.

现在,其中一部分原因是,银行的杠杆更高了。

Now, part of that is because the banks are geared up more.

所以如果你的 deposit 能赚百分之一点五,或者说 asset 能赚百分之一点五,而你的 asset 规模是 equity 的十五倍,那你的 equity 回报就会是百分之二十二点五。

So if you earn 1.5% on deposits, you know, and you have— or 1.5% on assets, and you have assets of 15 times equity, you're going to be earning 22.5%, uh, on equity.

而杠杆加得更高,嗯,确实会提高 equity 回报。

And by gearing up more, um, it does improve the return on equity.

但是你还是会觉得,这种情况最终会自我抵消。

But you would— you still would think that would be self-neutralizing.

你会觉得,一个人这么做了,另一个人也会这么做,再另一个人也会这么做。

You'd think that after one guy did it, another guy would do it, would do it.

然后你赚的就不会再是 asset 上的百分之一点五了,而会变成,比如说,asset 上百分之零点九或者百分之一。

And instead of earning 1.5% on assets, you'd earn, you know, 0.9% or 1% on assets.

但这并没有发生。

But it hasn't happened.

这种情况已经持续很久了。

That's gone on for a long time.

而且你知道,我们现在是处在——这个我得去看看图表,不过二战后可能有过那么一两年。

And, you know, we are, we are living at— I'd have to look at a chart on it, but there may have been a year or two post-World War II.

但我觉得——我敢打赌,在过去七十五年里,corporate profits 占 GDP 的比例这么高的年份,不会超过两三年。

But I don't think that— I would bet there haven't been more than 2 or 3 years in the last 75 when corporate profits as a percentage of GDP have been this high.
M3
M35:04

这里面有一部分来自 consumer credit,而我觉得,这已经被推到了我们这个国家历史上前所未见的极端程度。

Some of this has come from consumer credit, which I think has been pushed to extremes that we've never before seen in the history of this country.

有些其他国家以前也非常激进地推动过 consumer credit,结果都出现了巨大的崩盘。

Some other countries that pushed consumer credit very hard had enormous collapses.

比如 Korea 就有过一次,那次造成了两三年、也许更久的混乱。

Korea had one, for instance, that caused chaos for what, 2 or 3 years, maybe longer.

所以我觉得,现在不是那种该不顾一切猛冲的时候。

So I don't think this is the time to just swing for the fences.
M2
M25:32

还有一九九七年和一九九八年的那场混乱,当时 IMF 介入了,我是说,那段时间 Korea 的情况确实很糟。

And that chaos in 1997 and 1998, when the IMF stepped in, I mean, it was, it was bad in Korea for a while.

那造就了我这辈子见过的最离谱的低股价之一。

It produced some of the most ridiculously low stock prices that I've ever seen in my life.

事实上,我是说,就算你回看这个国家一九三二年的情况,也未必能看到更便宜的东西。

In fact, I mean, you could go back to 1932 in this country and you wouldn't have seen things any cheaper.

所以,呃,与此同时,那些公司也重建了它们的 balance sheet 和盈利能力。

So, uh, and in the meantime, the companies rebuilt their balance sheets and their earning power.

所以金融市场里的事情,的确是会翻转的。

So things do turn around in, in financial markets.

如果你够年轻的话,你会看到的。

You, you will, if you're young enough, you, you will see it.

你什么都会看到,而且还不止这些。

You will see everything and then some.

我在 annual report 里提到过,在寻找接替我的 investment manager 时,我们非常在意的一点是,要找到一个人,他不仅知道、也理解所有已经发生过的风险,还能够想象那些人们还从来没有经历过的事情。

I mentioned in the annual report, in looking for an investment manager to succeed me, that we care enormously about finding somebody who's not all— not only cognizant of everything risky that's already happened, but that also can envision things that have not yet been experienced.

这是我们做 insurance business 的职责,也是我们做 investment business 的职责。

That's our job in the insurance business, and it's our job in the investment business.

有很多人看起来就是——他们不是——他们非常聪明,但是,呃,他们的思维方式就是不会去考虑那些自己以前从来没亲眼见过的麻烦。

And there are a lot of people that just don't seem to— they're not— they're very smart, but they just, uh, they're just not wired to think about, about troubles that they haven't actually witnessed before.

不过你知道,Noah 当时也碰到的就是这个问题。

But, you know, that's the problem Noah had.

你知道,前四十天对 Noah 来说特别难熬,不过他最后还是扳回来了。

You know, first 40 days, it was tough sledding for Noah, but he got, he got revenge eventually.

我们来看第八个。

Let's go to number 8.