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为何伯克希尔最终买了亚马逊,但又只买了一点点

51 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:33
F1
F10:00

这个问题来自 Indianapolis 的 Ken Scarbeck。

This question is from Ken Scarbeck in Indianapolis.

他说,完全明白 Warren 并没有参与买入 Amazon 的决定,而且相对 Berkshire 来说,这很可能只是个很小的持仓,但这笔投资还是让我有点意外。

He says, with the full understanding that Warren had no input on the Amazon purchase and that relative to Berkshire, it's likely a small stake, the investment still caught me off guard.

我在想,是不是应该开始用不同的角度来看 Berkshire 未来二十年的方向。

I'm wondering if I should begin to think differently about Berkshire looking out, say, 20 years.

我们会不会正在看到一种投资理念上的转变,慢慢偏离现任管理层这七十年来一直坚持的 value investing 原则?

Might we be seeing a shift in investment philosophy away from value investing principles that the current management has practiced for 70 years.

Amazon 是一家很棒的公司,不过在牛市都已经持续了十年、它的股价又这么火热的情况下,这看起来似乎和“别人贪婪时要恐惧”这句话有点冲突。

Amazon is a great company, yet it would seem its heady shares 10 years into a bull market appear to conflict with being fearful when others are greedy.

考虑到这笔投资,还有像 StoneCo 这样的其他近期投资,我们是不是该准备好接受一种变化:也就是在价格和价值之间做判断的方式,和当年打造 Berkshire 的那套方法不一样了?

Considering this and other recent investments like StoneCo, should we be preparing for a change in the price versus value decisions that built Berkshire?
M1
M10:47

挺有意思的是,你提到了 value investing 这个词,因为我可以向你保证,那两位经理——其中一位在上个季度买了一些 Amazon 的股票,这会在再过一周或十天左右披露——

It's interesting that the term value investing came up because I can assure you that both managers who— and one of them bought some Amazon stock in the last quarter, which will get reported in another week or 10 days.

他就是个 value investor。

He is a value investor.

所谓价值,和账面价值、低市盈率之类的东西必然挂钩,这种想法——就像 Charlie 说的,所有投资本质上都是 value investing。

The idea that value is somehow connected to book value or low price-earnings ratios or anything— as Charlie has said, all investing is value investing.

我的意思是,你现在拿出一些钱,是为了以后拿回来更多的钱,而你是在做一个计算。

I mean, you're putting out some money now to get more later on, and you're making a calculation.

这个计算包括:你拿回这笔钱的概率有多大,什么时候能拿到,中间这段时间利率会是多少;不管你买的是一家按账面价值七折交易的银行,还是买一只按已披露盈利来看估值非常高的 Amazon,背后做的其实都是同一种计算。

As to the probabilities of getting that money and when you'll get it and what interest rates will be in between, and all the same calculation goes into it whether you're buying some bank at 70% of book value or you're buying Amazon at some very high multiple of reported earnings.

至于 Amazon——做出 Amazon 投资决定的人,绝对和当年我到处寻找那些股价低于营运资本的公司时一样,也是 value investor。

Amazon— the people making the decision on Amazon are absolutely as much value investors as I was when I was looking around for all these things selling below working capital years ago.

所以这一点并没有改变。

So that has not changed.

那两个人——其中一个做了 Amazon 这笔投资——他们在看的是几百只证券,而且他们能看的比我还多,因为他们管理的钱更少,所以他们可选择的范围也更大。

The 2 people that— one of whom made the investment in Amazon— they are looking at many hundreds of securities, and they can look at more than I can because they're managing less money and their universe, possible universe, is greater.

但他们找的,都是那些他们认为自己能看懂的公司:从现在到 Judgment Day 之间,这门生意最终会产出多少现金。

But they are looking for things that they feel they understand what will be developed by that business between now and Judgment Day in cash.

看的不是销售额。

And it's not sales.

当然,当下的销售额可能会有一点影响。

Current sales can make some difference.

当前的利润率也可能会有一点影响。

Current profit margins can make some difference.

有形资产、过剩现金、过多债务,所有这些因素都会放进计算里,来判断他们该买 A、还是 B、还是 C,而他们绝对是在遵循价值投资原则。

Tangible assets, excess cash, excess debt, all of those things go into making a calculation as to whether they should buy A versus B versus C, and they are absolutely following value principles.

他们不一定彼此认同,也不一定认同我,但他们非常聪明。

They don't necessarily agree with each other or agree with me, but they are very smart.

他们对 Berkshire 是全心投入的,而且除此之外,他们还是非常好的人。

They are totally committed to Berkshire, and they're very good human beings on top of it.

所以我不会对他们做的任何事事后指指点点。

So I don't second-guess them on anything.

Charlie 也不会对我事后指点——六十年来,他从来没有对我的任何一笔投资事后干预过。

Charlie doesn't second-guess me on— in 60 years, he's never second-guessed me on an investment.

而且,不管你买的是 Amazon,还是比如说一只从账面价值、盈利之类的统计指标上看起来很便宜的银行股,考虑问题的方式其实是完全一样的。

And the considerations are identical when you buy Amazon versus some, say, bank stock that looks cheap statistically against book value or earnings or something of the sort.

归根结底,一切都可以追溯到 Aesop 在公元前六百年说过的那句话:双鸟在林,不如一鸟在手。

In the end, it all goes back to Aesop, who in 600 BC said that a bird in the hand is worth 2 in the bush.

当我们买 Amazon 的时候,我们会试着判断——或者说,买它的那位会试着判断——树林里到底是不是有三只、四只、还是五只鸟;要多久才能走到那片树林;他有多大把握自己能走到;以及会不会还有别人跑来把那片树林抢走,诸如此类。

And when we buy Amazon, we try and figure out whether— or the fellow that bought it tries to figure out whether there's 3 or 4 or 5 in the bush and how long it'll take to get to the bush, how certain he is that he's going to get to the bush, and who else is going to come and try and take the bush away, and all of that sort of thing.

我们做别的投资也是同样的道理。

And we do the same thing.

实际上,不管你在商学院会学到多少公式,最根本的那个公式还是 Aesop 的这个公式。

And it really, despite a lot of equations you'll learn in business school, the basic equation is that of Aesop.

而你投资能不能成功,取决于你有多擅长判断那片树林到底有多确定、离你有多远,以及最坏的情况会是什么。

And your success in investing depends on how well you are able to figure out how certain that bush is, how far away it is, and what the worst case is.

比如说,不是有两只鸟,而是只有一只;又或者有可能其实有四只、五只、十只,甚至二十只。

Instead of 2 birds being there, only one being there, and the possibilities of 4 or 5 or 10 or 20 being there.

这个会指引我,也会指引我在 Berkshire 负责投资管理的继任者,我觉得他们做对的时候会比做错的时候更多。

And that will guide me, that will guide my successors in investment management at Berkshire, and I think they'll be right more often than they're wrong.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M2
M24:52

嗯,Warren 和我比有些人年纪大一点,而且——对,差不多比所有人都大。

Well, Warren and I are a little older than some people, and— yeah, near everybody.

而且我们大概也不是这个世界上最灵活的那种人。

And we're not the most flexible, probably, in the whole world.

当然了,要是像互联网发展这种这么重大的变化发生了,而你又没抓住,那别人就会从你身边飞快超过去。

And of course, if something as extreme as this internet development happens and you don't catch it, why, other people are going to blow by you.

我倒不介意自己没有早早看出 Amazon。

I don't mind not having caught Amazon early.

那家伙某种程度上简直就是个奇迹创造者。

The guy is kind of a miracle worker.

这很特别。

It's very peculiar.

这件事上我可以放自己一马,但没能更早识别出 Google,我就觉得自己蠢透了。

I give myself a pass on that, but I feel like a horse's ass for not identifying Google better.

我觉得 Warren 的感受也一样。

I think Warren feels the same way.

对,我们搞砸了。

Yeah, we screwed up.

他的意思是,我们错过了。

He's saying we blew it.
M1
M15:42

对,而且我们其实对这件事是有一些认识的,因为我们那时候在 GEICO 用他们的服务,也看到了带来的效果。我们看到自己每次点击要付十美元,或者不管具体是多少,而对他们来说边际成本完全是零,我们也看到了这对我们确实有效。

Yeah, and we did have some insights into that because we were using them at GEICO, and we were seeing the results produced, and we saw that we were paying $10 a click or whatever it might have been for something that, at a marginal cost to them, was exactly zero, and we saw it was working for us.

所以——

So—
M2
M26:04

我们从自己的业务里就能看出来,Google 的广告效果有多好,可我们就是坐在那里干瞪眼。

We could see in our own operations how well that Google advertising was working, and we just sat there sucking our thumbs.

所以我们很惭愧。

So we're ashamed.

我们在赎罪。

We atone.

我们正努力赎罪。

We're trying to atone.

也许买 Apple 就算是在赎罪吧。

Maybe Apple was atonement.
M1
M16:25

他说坐在那里干瞪眼,我只庆幸他没举别的例子。

When he says sucking our thumbs, I'm just glad he didn't use some other example.

好,Becky。

Okay, Becky.