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1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特:BRK能保持15%的年化增长我就心满意足,但它很难实现

43 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 4:42
F1
F10:00

Buffett 先生,我叫 JP,来自 Singapore。

Mr. Buffett, my name is JP from Singapore.

我飞了二十四个小时才到这儿。

I flew 24 hours to get here.

Buffett 先生,您这一辈子一再地说得保守、做得超预期。

Mr. Buffett, throughout your life, you have repeatedly underpromised and overdelivered.

比如说,最近很多年,您给 Berkshire Hathaway 设定的长期账面价值增长目标是年化百分之十五,但实际做出来大概是百分之二十四。

For many recent years, for example, you have targeted Berkshire Hathaway's long-term book value growth at 15%, yet you have come through at about 24%.

也就是说,您的保守说法和最后结果之间,差了整整百分之九。

That is a big gap of 9% between your modesty and the outcome.

这可能是企业史上最大剂量的谦虚了。

Perhaps the biggest dose of modesty in corporate history.

我想请问,为什么您的保守说法和最后结果之间会有这么大的差距?

May I ask, why is there such a big gap between your modesty and the outcome?
M1
M10:45

我不觉得那是谦虚。

I don't think it was modesty.

我觉得那是——一方面,过去十年到十五年里,我们碰上了一个非常棒的市场,它重新给所有企业做了估值。

I think it was—for one thing, we've had a terrific market that has reappraised all businesses in the last 10 or 15 years.

所以,当我们真正开始担心未来表现的时候,嗯,关键因素是我们的资本规模变大了。

So when we really started worrying about future performance, uh, the key factor was having larger amounts of capital.

嗯,而且,而且毫无疑问,你运作的资本规模越大,这件事就越难做。

Uh, and, and there's no question that the, the larger the amount of capital you work with, the more difficult the job is.

而我们很幸运的是,资本规模上升的过程,刚好碰上了那种几乎把所有船都大幅抬起来的环境。

Now, we were fortunate that that ascension in capital happened to coincide with things that just lifted all the boats, uh, substantially.

所以,嗯,我们的运气比我十年前或者五年前原本猜想的要好。

And, uh, so we, we have had better luck than I would have guessed we would have had, uh, 10 years ago or 5 years ago.

但这背后有一个巨大的顺风在帮我们,而未来我们不会再有这样的顺风了。

But it's been aided by a huge tailwind, and we won't have that tailwind in the future.

这一点我可以向你保证。

I can, I can assure you of that.

但我们会继续背着更大的资本规模,这就是拽着我们的那个锚。

But we will have the larger amount of capital, which is the anchor that works on us.

所以,如果 Charlie 和我现在能签一个协议,让 Berkshire 在未来十年里每年内在价值增长百分之十五,我们现在就会签。

So if Charlie and I could make a deal to increase the intrinsic value of Berkshire at 15% a year over the next 10 years, we would sign up now.

而且,我甚至不希望你们拿更低的数字来诱惑我们,因为——那些数字算出来会非常惊人。

And I, I don't want you to even tempt us with lower numbers because it—those numbers get astounding.

如果我们十年里完全不分红,嗯,你知道的,你可以自己算一算,年化百分之十五最后会把我们带到什么规模。

If we paid no dividend at all, uh, over a 10-year period, uh, you know, you, you can figure out where a 15% rate would take us.

我们希望能做到,但我们认为那绝对,嗯,是上限了。

And we hope to get there, but we think that is absolutely, uh, the tops.

而且——我觉得很有可能会出现这样一段时期:当市场表现开始落后于企业本身的时候,这个增长率可能会比那低很多很多。

And it's—and I think it's very likely for a period when, when the market starts underperforming businesses that the rate could be very substantially lower than that.

Charlie,你要不要再展开讲讲?

Charlie, do you want to expand on that?

嗯,这位提问者来自 Singapore。Singapore 在经济发展史上也许有着最好的记录,所以他才会把年化百分之十五说成是保守。

Well, the questioner came from Singapore, which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of developing an economy, and therefore he referred to 15% per annum as modest.

这不是保守,这是傲慢。

It's not modest, it's arrogant.

也只有来自 Singapore 的人才会说这算保守。

And only somebody from Singapore would call it modest.

对,对,Charlie,小心点,不然他们可能会来个口头表决,要求我们搬去 Singapore。

Yeah, yeah, be careful, Charlie, or they'll have a voice vote that we should move to Singapore.

我的意思是,这是一群要业绩的人。

I mean, this is the group that wants performance.
F1
F13:10

对。

Yeah.
M1
M13:11

大笔资金是不可能以超高速度、以那种超级复利的速度持续增长的。

Large quantities of money are not going to compound at super rates, at super-compound rates.

大资金不行——小资金大概也不行,不过大资金肯定不行。

Large—small sums probably aren't either, but large sums aren't.

如果有谁承诺——任何管理大笔资金的人——承诺或者暗示他们能取得真正非常出色的回报,你知道,我会离他们远一点。

And if anybody promises— anybody that manages large sums of money that promises or implies that they can achieve really outstanding returns, you know, I'd stay away from them.

数字,数字实在是太大了。

The numbers, the numbers just get too big.

而且,你知道,最近这些年,你们也已经在某些资金管理机构身上看到过这种情况。

And, you know, you've seen some of that with certain money management organizations in recent years.

而且,你知道,在我们的内在价值——这个数明显比我们的账面价值要高得多——这个基础上做到百分之十五,就会变成一个非常非常大的数字。

And, you know, 15% on, on an intrinsic value which is substantially greater than our book value gets to be a very, very big number.

而我们需要的是巨大的点子。

And we need, we need huge ideas.

我们不需要成千上万个点子。

We don't need thousands of ideas.

我的意思是,我们也许需要,但我们根本不可能想出那么多。

I mean, we might need them, but we could never come up with them.

所以我们寻找的是那种非常大的机会。

So what we look for is the very large idea.

但我们现在还没找到,不过我们会继续找,而且时不时地,我们还是会找到一些东西。

But we're not finding them now, and we'll keep looking, and every now and then we will find something.

但说真的,如果你觉得我们有机会做到比百分之十五还更好——相信我,这可不是什么我愿意签字打包票的数字。

But really, if you think we're going to have any chance of doing better than 15%— and believe me, that is no number that I'd want to sign my name to.

但你真的不应该,呃,不然你最后会对 Berkshire 失望,而我们也不希望让你失望。

But you really shouldn't, uh, you're going to be disappointed in Berkshire, and we don't want to disappoint you.

所以这就是为什么我们会尽量对预期保持现实。

So that's the reason we try to be realistic about expectations.

第六区。

Zone 6.