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2003年股东大会 · 企业内在价值是重要但模糊的概念,计算时需要留有安全边际

52 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:20
M1
M10:00

你计算的是内在价值本身,还是一个绝对肯定低于内在价值的数字?

Do you calculate intrinsic value or a number that's absolutely positively under intrinsic value?

你放进那个公式里的,是哪个数字?

That's the number you put in the equation.

还有,就算你发现一只股票的价格低于这个内在价值下限,你还会不会继续做第二部分功课,去分析它未来的内在价值会不会下降?

And even when you find a stock selling for less than this lower bound of intrinsic value, do you still do the homework on the second part and analyze, will the intrinsic value go down in the future?

谢谢。

Thank you.
M2
M20:21

对,不过如果我现在能轻个二十磅左右,我大概会觉得自己更有资格谈自律。

Yeah, I would feel somewhat better qualified to speak on self-discipline if I weighed about 20 pounds less.

这个我们暂时先不管。

For the moment, we'll ignore that.

你问题的第二部分,就是关于内在价值会不会下降——其实,如果你把内在价值算成未来现金流折现后的价值,那这个计算本身就应该把这样一个事实包含进去:有些企业未来赚的钱会比现在少。

The, uh, the, the second part of your question relating to intrinsic value going down—actually, if you compute intrinsic value as reflecting the discounted value of future cash flows, that should have built into it a calculation that allows for the fact that certain businesses are going to earn less in the future than now.

不是说到那个时候它的内在价值才下降,因为你现在就应该把这一点放进计算里。

It isn't that their intrinsic value goes down then, because you should build it into your calculation right now.

不过你知道,像我们过去很多次说过的,内在价值这个东西非常重要,但也非常模糊。

But, you know, as we've pointed out many times in the past, intrinsic value is terribly important and very fuzzy.

我们会尽最大努力,只在那种我们觉得自己把握最高、判断相当有把握的企业里去运用这个方法,而这样一来,很多很多公司就被排除在外了。

And we do our best to work with— in the kind of businesses where we think that we have the highest probabilities, where our predictions are of a fairly highly probable nature, and that leaves out all kinds of companies.

比如说,像 natural gas pipeline 这样的业务,通常就比较好判断。

It's pretty good, we'll say, at something like a natural gas pipeline.

我的意思是,一条 pipeline 出现巨大意外的可能性,理论上应该是相对比较小的。

I mean, the chances of big surprises in a pipeline should be relatively small.

当然这不代表完全没有,只是相对比较小。

That doesn't mean they're zero, but they're relatively small.

现在,假设你有一条 gas pipeline——有些公司确实是这样——它要么面临天然气供应逐渐减少,要么面临竞争对手的 pipeline 试图抢走你的合同,而这些合同是你十年前签的、两年后就到期了,到时候你就不得不降价。

Now, let's assume that you had a gas pipeline, which some have, where either the supply of gas is going to run down, or where there are competitive pipelines that may be trying to take away your contracts that you wrote 10 years ago and expire in 2 years, and you're going to have to cut prices.

我会说,两年后你不得不降价时,如果你今天已经正确地做了计算,并且把未来利润率会低于今天这个事实算进去了,那么它的内在价值并不是到那时才比今天下降。

I would say that 2 years from now, when you have to cut prices, the intrinsic value hasn't gone down from today if you properly calculate it today and build in the fact that profit margins in the future will be lower than today.

我们最近看过一家 pipeline 公司,我们觉得它会受到竞争性价格压力的冲击,因为还有别的 pipeline 可以把 gas 运到市场,形成替代路径。

We looked at a pipeline recently where we think they are going to be vulnerable to competitive price pressures because of alternate ways of getting gas to market through other pipelines.

于是计算结果就完全不一样——不是计算方法不一样,而是结果不一样,因为这条 pipeline 和那种低成本 pipeline 不一样——那种是把 gas 从一个市场运到另一个市场的低成本通道。

And the calculation is entirely different—the calculation isn't different, the results are different in terms of that pipeline versus a pipeline that is the low-cost pipeline—bringing gas from one market to another.

而且它以后仍然会是最低成本的提供者。

And will remain the low-cost producer.

但关键不是——如果计算得当,你一开始就要把未来经营利润下滑的预期算进去。

But it isn't—if properly calculated, you build in the prediction of decline in future operating earnings.

你不能等到事情真的发生了,才开始预判。

You don't wait till you get there to anticipate it.

你知道,Charlie 有句名言,他只想知道自己会死在哪里,这样他就永远不会去那里。

You know, Charlie's famous for saying that all he wants to know is where he's going to die, so he'll never go there.

这其实就是商业预测的一部分。

Well, that's part of predicting in business.

我是说,我一直很喜欢——我是真的从来没见过 investment banker 做的材料。

I mean, there—I love the—I really have never seen an investment banker's book.

我希望有一天能见到一本,也希望到时候自己不会被震惊到受不了——因为在那种待售企业的材料里,企业盈利居然会往下掉。

I hope to see one someday, and I hope I can survive the shock when I do see it, where the earnings of the business being offered go down.

很多企业的盈利都会下降,而且就是会下降。

Lots of businesses' earnings go down, and they're going to go down.

可我总是看到这些胡扯,你知道,他们把未来十年一路往外推,结果永远都是一路上涨。

And I get all this nonsense, you know, where they project it out for 10 years and it always goes up.

这根本不是真实世界,你必须认真分析企业。

It just isn't the real world, and you have to analyze businesses.

有些企业将来会承受巨大的竞争压力,而这种压力今天根本还不存在。

Some businesses are going to be subjected to enormous competitive pressures that aren't extant today.

比如说,我们在 Dexter Shoe 上就犯过这样的错误。

And we made that mistake, for example, at Dexter Shoe.

我的意思是,我们买下了一家税前利润大概四千万美元的企业,然后我们假设未来会和过去一样好。

I mean, we bought a business that was earning $40 million or so pre-tax, and we assumed that the future would be as good as the past.

结果我们当时完全错了——我当时真的是大错特错。

And we couldn't have been more— I couldn't have been more wrong.

所以那就是一种把未来的竞争环境往后投射的情况,可那些竞争条件到了未来其实并不会存在。

So that was a case of projecting into the future conditions which were not going to exist in the future, competitive conditions.

这也是做生意的一部分。

That's part of, you know, that's part of business.

我可以告诉你,Fortune 500 里面有百分之二十——不过我不知道具体是哪百分之二十——大概率在五年之后赚的钱会比今天少很多。

And I will tell you that, you know, 20% of the Fortune 500, but I don't know which 20%, are going to be earning, you know, significantly less money probably 5 years from now than they are today.

而这就是这个游戏的核心:弄清楚未来的现金流大概会是什么样。

And that's, that's what the game is all about, figuring out what those future cash flows are likely to be.

如果你做不到,或者你觉得自己没法在这方面给出合理的估计,那你就看下一个。

And when you can't, when you feel you can't come up with reasonable estimates in that respect, you move on to the next one.
M3
M34:29

Charlie?

Charlie?

对,我们有一种很简单、很老派的纪律,Warren 把它比作 Ted Williams 等一个最好打的球再出手。

Yeah, we have this simple old-fashioned discipline which Warren likens to Ted Williams waiting for a fat pitch.

我不知道 Warren 怎么看,但如果你对我说,Charlie,你可以像别人那样去做资金管理——拿去跟指数比较,还要有 consultant 挑 consultant,再由他们向各个 committee 汇报、审查你。

I don't know about Warren, but if you said to me, Charlie, you can go into the business of managing money the way other people do, where you're measured against indexes and you've got consultants choosing consultants that are reviewing you to committees.

我会非常讨厌那种方式。

I would just hate it.

我会觉得自己像是被戴上了镣铐,而且这种镣铐来自整个制度本身,这个制度会阻止我真正创造价值。

I would regard it as being put into shackles, and shackles where the very system was preventing me from delivering value.

Warren,你会怎么看?

Warren, how would you feel about that?
M2
M25:10

对,我们不会那么做。

Yeah, we wouldn't do it.

我们不会那么做。

We wouldn't do it.

事实上,我们也从来没那么做过。

We never did do it, as a matter of fact.

而且你知道,一开始——我们在一九五六年五月五号成立 partnership 的时候,我给那七位 limited partners 发了一份叫做 Ground Rules 的东西。

And one of, you know, the initial— when we formed the partnership on May 5th, 1956, I passed out to the 7 limited partners something called the Ground Rules.

我当时说,你知道,这是我能做的,这是我不能做的,还有一些事我也不知道自己到底能不能做。

And I, you know, I said, said, here's what I can do and here's what I can't do, and here's some things I don't know whether I can do or not.

那份东西也许挺短的,但如果你一开始就打算去做一件你明知道自己做不到的事,那肯定会出问题。

Maybe it was fairly short, but the idea of setting out to do something that you know you can't do, that can't be, you know, that's got to lead to problems.

我的意思是,如果有人告诉我,我必须跳过七英尺高——其实现在就算降到四英尺也行——要我在日落之前跳过去,不然就把我枪毙,那我会出去买一件防弹背心。

I mean, somebody tells me I have to high jump 7 feet, and we can even move that down to 4 feet now, you know, between now and sundown or I'll be shot, you know, I will go out and buy a bulletproof vest.
M3
M35:55

对,资金管理这个大体系,通常要求人们假装自己能做到其实做不到的事,还要假装自己喜欢,哪怕他们其实根本不喜欢。

Yeah, the, the general system for money management requires people to pretend that they can do something that they can't do, and to pretend to like it when they really don't.

我觉得那是非常糟糕的一种人生过法,不过报酬倒是很高。

And I think that's a terrible way to spend your life, but it's very well paid.
M2
M26:19

第四个问题。

Number 4.