M21:13
谢谢。
Thank you.
很高兴你提到 Phil Fisher，因为他真的是一位非常了不起的头脑，也是位杰出的投资人。
I'm glad you brought up Phil Fisher because he is a terrific mind and investor.
他现在大概已经九十多岁了，而且——不过他在六十年代初写的那两本书，都是经典。我建议在座每一位真正对投资感兴趣的人，都去读一读他六十年代初出的那两本书。
He's probably in his 90s now, and— but a couple of books he wrote in the early '60s roughly are classics, and I advise everybody here who's really interested in investments to read those 2 books from the early '60s.
而且他人也很好。
And he's a nice man.
我——四十年前，我去过他在 San Francisco 的办公室，一个很小的办公室，他很客气，愿意抽时间跟我聊聊。
I went out to— 40 years ago, I dropped into his office in San Francisco, tiny office, and he was kind enough to spend some time with me.
我非常非常敬佩他。
And I'm a huge admirer of his.
至于我们卖出那些我们拥有控制权的企业时所用的标准，在年报里的 ground rules 下面都写得很清楚。
The criteria that we use for selling a business that we own control of are articulated in the annual report under the ground rules.
所以，就我们持有的这些企业来说，呃，我们已经列出来了——我建议你去看那里——从一九八三年开始，我们每年都把同样的这些 ground rules 写进去。
So in terms of businesses that we own, uh, we have set forth— and I direct you there— we've written those same ground rules every year since 1983.
实际上，在那之前的几十年里，这些原则就已经在我们脑子里了。
And actually, we had those in our head for decades before that.
呃，我们有这么一个有点特别的地方，你们应该了解，我们也希望股东明白：即使有人出的价格，远远高于我们当初买进时按经济价值计算出来的那个价值。
Uh, and we have this quirk which you should understand, and we want our shareholders to understand it, that even though we got offered a price that was far above its economic value as we might calculate it going in.
但是，如果现在有人对我们手上的某家公司出这样的价格，我们也没兴趣卖掉。
But if we got offered a price for that, for a business that we have now, we have no interest in selling it.
你知道，我们就是——我们不会仅仅因为有人出了个很漂亮的价钱，就把已经建立起来的这种关系切断。
You know, we just— we don't break off the relationships that we develop simply because we get offered a fancy price for something.
而且有时候我们确实遇到过这样的机会。
And we've had a chance to do that sometimes.
这实际上也许还有助于我们收购企业，因为我在过去几周里答应要买下的那两家公司，两家都非常在意，他们找到的是不是一个永久的归宿。
That may help us actually in acquiring businesses, because both of the companies that I've committed to buy in the last few weeks, both of them are very concerned about whether they have found a permanent home or not.
而那些用三十年、四十年、五十年，倾注感情把企业建立起来的人，往往真的很在乎这一点。
And people who build their businesses lovingly over 30 or 40 or 50 years frequently care about that.
当然，也有很多人并不在乎这个。
A lot of people don't care about that.
而这也是我们在买企业时会评估的一件事。
And that's one of the things we evaluate when buying a business.
我们会看这个老板，然后会问， 你是不是爱这个——你知道，实际上我们是在问自己：他爱的是这门生意，还是钱？
We look at the owner and we say, do you love the— you know, in effect, we ask ourselves, does he love the business or does he love the money?
喜欢钱本身没什么不对。
Nothing wrong with liking the money.
事实上，要是他们大多数人都不喜欢钱，我们反而会有点失望。
In fact, we'd be a little disappointed if most of them didn't like the money.
但是，但是说到究竟是更看重钱，还是更热爱企业，这对我们来说非常重要。
But, but in terms of whether the primacy is loving the money or loving the business, that's very important to us.
当我们遇到这样的人——他热爱自己的企业，也喜欢钱，但更爱自己的企业——那我们对他们来说，就是一个非常非常理想的归宿。因为在有规模的买家里面，我们几乎是他们唯一可以打交道的对象；我们可以承诺，他们加入这个体系之后，基本上就真的是永远的一部分了，而且，呃，而且，而且我们也做得到这个承诺。
And when we find somebody that loves their business and likes the money, but loves their business, we are a very, very desirable home for them because we're just about the only people that they can deal with of size where we can commit that they are going to be part of this operation really forever and, uh, and, and be able to deliver on that promise.
我会对卖方说，唯一可能坑你们的人，唯一可能坑你们的人，就是我。
I tell sellers that the only, the only person that can double-cross them is me.
我可以坑他们一把，但 Berkshire 永远都不会被收购。
I can double-cross them, but there's never going to be a takeover of Berkshire.
也永远不会有什么 management consultant 跑进来说，我觉得你们最好这么做。
There's never going to be a management consultant come in and say, I think you better do this.
也永远不会因为要回应 Wall Street，说你们为什么不是专注做这个或者那个的 pure play，所以你们应该把这块业务拆分出去。
There's never going to be a response to Wall Street saying, why aren't you a pure play on this or that, and therefore you ought to spin this off?
这些事都不会发生。
None of that's going to happen.
而且我们可以非常、百分之百确定地告诉他们，在很长很长一段时间里，如果他们决定加入 Berkshire，那这个决定就会是他们公司最终归属到哪里的最终决定。
And we can, we can tell them, uh, with 100% assuredness that, that for a very long time, that if they make a decision to come with Berkshire, they— that, that's— that, that decision will be the final decision as to where their company resides.
所以，除非那些在基本原则里写明的、极其罕见的那几个条件真的出现了，否则我们不会卖掉经营中的企业，哪怕有人出的价钱远远高于它们按理说值多少钱。
Um, so unless those couple conditions, which are extremely unusual, that are described in the ground rules, prevail, we will not be selling operating businesses, even though someone might offer us far more than logically they're worth.
至于股票这个问题，我们和 Phil Fisher 的看法不算完全一致，但已经非常接近了。
The question about stocks is we're not quite with Phil Fisher on that, but we're very close.
我们喜欢买那种我们认为业务非常稳固、经济优势非常强的股票，这样我们基本上就可以一直长期持有下去。
We love buying stocks where we think the businesses are so solid, have such economic advantage, that we can essentially ride with them forever.
不过你们今天早些时候也听我谈到报纸这个行业了。
But you've heard me talk about newspapers earlier today.
我们原本会觉得，二十年、二十五年前，我想 Charlie 和我大概都会认为，一家日报——你知道，在那种只有一家报纸的城市里，而这种城市几乎到处都是——大概是你能找到的最稳的投资之一。
We would have thought, uh, newspapers 20, 25 years ago, I think Charlie and I probably thought a daily newspaper, uh, you know, in a single newspaper town, which practically all are, is probably about the solidest investment you could find.
我们可能还会觉得，一个 network TV affiliate station 也是你能找到的最稳的投资之一；它们当时确实很稳。但过去二十年到二十五年发生的事情，肯定在某种程度上改变了这一点，也许改变的程度还非常非常大。
We might have thought a network TV affiliate station was about as solid as you could find, and they were very solid, but events have, over the last 20 or 25 years, have certainly changed that to some degree, and maybe to a, a very, very big degree.
所以我们偶尔也会重新评估：我们现在看到的、往后十年的经济特征，和十年前我们看到的那些，是不是已经不一样了，然后也许会得出一个多少有点不同的结论。
So we will occasionally reevaluate, uh, the economic characteristics that we see 10 years out from the ones that we saw 10 years ago and maybe come to a somewhat different conclusion.
对我来说，投资生涯最开始的二十年，或者也许更久，我决定卖出的原因几乎总是因为我发现了别的我特别想买的东西。
The first 20 years of investing for me, or maybe more, my decision to sell almost always was based on the fact that I found something else I was dying to buy.
我的意思是，四十五年前，我会把市盈率三倍的股票卖掉，去买市盈率两倍的股票，因为我总是钱不够。
I mean, I sold stocks at, you know, at 3 times earnings to buy stocks at 2 times earnings 45 years ago because I was always running out of money.
现在呢，我缺的不是钱，是点子。
Now I run out of ideas.
我手上钱很多，但没有想法。
I've got a lot of money but no ideas.
而且，嗯，你知道，我也不确定到底哪种情况更好。
And, uh, you know, I, I'm not sure which is better.
你怎么看，Charlie？
What do you think, Charlie?
我觉得你当年前面还有五十年可干、钱又更少的时候，状态可好多了。
I think you were way better off when you had 50 years ahead of you and less money.
我现在还是觉得我前面还有五十年呢，Charlie。
I still think I have 50 years ahead of me, Charlie.
关于卖出这个话题，你还想再展开说一点吗？
You want to elaborate any more on selling?
对，我们几乎从来不卖经营中的企业；真要卖的话，通常也是因为出了我们解决不了的问题。
Yeah, we almost never sell an operating business, and when it does happen, it's usually because we've got some trouble we can't fix.
好，第七个问题。
Okay, number 7.