巴菲特：没有投资这家科技公司，是我的失职 — 文稿

M10:00

早上好，Warren。

Good morning, Warren.

这个问题来自一位持有我们股票很多年的股东。我得先告诉你，昨晚他在 Hilton Hotel 的大堂里拦住我，就问了这个问题。

This question comes from a longtime shareholder who, I should tell you, accosted me last night in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel with this question.

Warren，这些年来你一直回避科技公司，说这类公司太难预测，而且没有护城河。

Warren, for years you stayed away from technology companies, saying they were too hard to predict and didn't have moats.

后来你投资 IBM 的时候，大家感觉你对科技的看法变了；最近你投资 Apple 的时候，又让人有这种感觉。

Then you seemed to change your view about technology when you invested in IBM, and again when you recently invested in Apple.

但是到了周五，你又说 IBM 没有达到你的预期，还卖掉了我们三分之一的持仓。

But then on Friday, you said IBM had not met your expectations and sold a third of our stake.

你是不是会区别看待 IBM 和 Apple？还有，你从投资科技公司这件事里学到了什么？

Do you view IBM and Apple differently, and what have you learned about investing in technology companies?

M20:36

嗯，我确实是非常不一样地看待它们。不过你知道，显然我当初买 IBM——开始买是在六年前——我原本觉得，在过去的这六年里，它的表现会比实际更好一些。

Well, I do view them very differently, but, you know, obviously when I bought the IBM— started buying it 6 years ago— I thought it would do better in the 6 years that have elapsed than, uh, it has.

至于 Apple，我，我认为它们是非常不一样的一门生意。

And, uh, Apple I, I regard them as being quite different business.

我，我觉得 Apple 更像是一家消费品公司，至少从分析它的——从某种意义上说，分析它周围的护城河、消费者行为之类这些方面来看，是这样的。

I, I think Apple is much more of a consumer products business in terms of the— in, in, in terms of sort of analyzing, uh, moats around it and consumer behavior and all that sort of thing.

显然，它的产品里面有各种各样的科技含量，但如果说到判断它未来的潜在客户会怎么做，这和，比如说，判断 IBM 的客户会怎么做，是不一样的。

It's obviously a, a product with all kinds of tech built into it, but in terms of laying out what their prospective customers will do in the future, as opposed to, say, what IBM's customers.

这是两种不同的分析方式。

It's a different sort of analysis.

这不代表我的判断就是对的，时间会告诉我们答案，但这确实是两种不同类型的决策。

That doesn't mean it's correct, and we'll find out over time, but they are 2 different types of decisions.

然后，呃，第一个判断我是错了，至于第二个判断我是对还是错，我们以后会知道。

And, and, and, uh, I was wrong on the first one, and we'll find out whether I'm right or wrong on this, on the second.

不过我不——我不会把它们看成是完全一样的 apples and apples，但我也不完全把它们看成 apples and oranges，大概是在这两者之间吧。

But I don't— I do not regard them as, uh, apples and apples, and I don't quite regard them as apples and oranges, but they're somewhat in between on that.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M31:52

嗯，我们之所以避开科技股，是因为我们觉得自己在那里没有优势，而别人有。

Well, we avoided the tech stocks because we felt we had no advantage there and other people did.

我觉得这是个好主意，别去别人比你更强的地方玩。

And I think that's a good idea, not to play where the other people are better.

不过，你要是事后问我，我们在科技领域最大的错误是什么，我觉得我们其实是有足够判断力看懂 Google 的。

But, you know, if you ask me in retrospect what was our worst mistake in the tech field, I think we were smart enough to figure out Google.

早期的时候，那些广告的效果比别的任何东西都好太多了。

Those ads worked so much better in the early days than anything else.

所以我会说，在这件事上，我们辜负了你们；我们明明有能力看明白，也够聪明去做，但最后没做。

So I would say that, that we failed you there, and we were smart enough to do it and didn't do it.

这种事我们也老是会发生。

We do that all the time too.

M22:26

对，我们很早就是他们的客户了，比如说通过 GEICO。我们当时看到——这些数字我记不太准了，可能早就过时了——但我记得，我们那时候每次点击要付给他们十美元或者十一美元，差不多就是这个数。

Yeah, we were their customer very early on with, with GEICO, for example, and we saw— I don't— these figures are way out of date, but I remember, you know, we were paying them $10 or $11 a click or something like that.

只要你每次有人点那么一下小东西，你就得付给别人十美元、十一美元，而你自己几乎没有任何成本，你就知道，这是一门好生意，除非有人能把它从你手里抢走。

And anytime you're paying somebody $10 or $11 every time somebody just punches a little thing where you've got no cost at all, you know, that's a good business unless somebody's going to take it away from you.

所以，我们当时是近距离看到了这件事带来的影响。

And so, we were close up seeing the impact of that.

顺便说一句，如果你们今晚在酒店房间里没什么事可做，就一直去点 Progressive 之类的——不过别真这么干。

And incidentally, if any of you don't have anything to do in your hotel rooms tonight, just keep punching Progressive or something and you're going to— Don't really do that.

我刚刚脑子里突然闪过这么个念头。

The thought just happened across my mind.

不过你知道，这真的是——你几乎从没见过这样的生意，我几乎可以这么说——我记得像 LASIK surgery 之类的项目，好像每次点击要六十美元、七十美元，而且没有增量成本，几乎没成本。

But, you know, that is— you've never seen a business, almost never seen a business like it where— and I think for LASIK surgery and things like that, I think the figures were, you know, $60 or $70 a click with no incremental, no cost.

而且，我还认识那帮人。

So, and I knew the guys.

我的意思是，他们当年招股书其实就是他们自己设计的。

I mean, they actually designed their prospectus.

他们还来见过我。那是在最初那版之后一点点，在他们上市的时候，比 Berkshire 还稍微晚一点。

They came to see me and they, a little bit after the original one, when they went public, a little bit after Berkshire even.

所以我，我其实有很多办法可以去提问题，或者做类似的事，去让自己多了解一点，但是，但是我搞砸了。

And so I, I had plenty of ways to ask questions or anything of the sort, educate myself, but, but I blew it.

M33:48

还有，呃，我们也错过了 Walmart，当时那几乎是板上钉钉的机会。

And, uh, we blew— we blew Walmart too when it was a total cinch.

我们本来足够聪明，完全能看明白这一点，可我们没有。

We were smart enough to figure that out and we didn't.

M23:58

对，对，关键还是得真正把执行这件事看明白。

Yeah, yeah, figuring out execution is what counts.

所以总之，嗯，而且我在 IBM 这件事上也可能犯了两个错误。

So anyway, well, and I could be making two mistakes on IBM.

我的意思是，这个，你知道，在我看来，要预测不同领域里谁会赢，或者像 cloud services 这种业务里到底会出现多大的价格竞争，都会更难。

I mean, the, the, you know, there, there, it's harder to predict, in my view, uh, the winners in various items or how much price competition will enter in, uh, to something like cloud services and all that.

M34:25

这——

It—.

M24:26

我会——我前几天说过一句话，真的是很了不起，我当时还问 Charlie，他能不能想到类似的情况。

I will— I made a statement the other day which, it's really remarkable, and I was— I asked Charlie whether he could think of a situation like it.

就是有一个人，呃，在两个其实相当不同的行业里，几乎是同时，打造出了非常惊人的经济机器，就像现在发生的这样——

Where one person has, uh, built an extraordinary economic machine in two really pretty different industries, you know, almost simultaneously, as has happened—.

M34:54

从零开始。

From a standing start at zero.

M24:56

从零开始，而且还有其他竞争对手，那些对手有大量资本，还有各种别的资源。

From a standing start at zero, with other— with competitors, with lots of capital and everything else.

能在零售里做到这一点，又能在 cloud 这件事上也做到这一点，就像 Jeff Bezos 做到的这样，我的意思是，我，我，我，我是说，像 Mellons 那样的人，当然也投过很多不同的行业之类的，但 Jeff 实际上等于是同时担任两家从零起步的企业的 CEO，呃，而且如果，你知道，Andy Grove 以前在 Intel 常说，你想想看，如果你有一颗银弹，你可以开一枪，干掉一个竞争对手，那个人会是谁？

To do it in retailing and to do it with the cloud like Jeff Bezos has done, I mean, I, I, I, I mean, people like the Mellons invested in a lot of different industries and all of that, but he has been in effect the CEO simultaneously of two businesses starting from scratch, uh, that if, you know, Andy Grove used to use at Intel, used to say, you know, think about if you had a silver bullet and you could shoot it and get rid of one of your competitors, who would it be?

嗯，我觉得，不管是在 cloud 还是在零售领域，都会有很多人想把那颗银弹瞄准 Jeff。

Well, I think that both in the cloud and in retail, there are a lot of people that would aim that silver bullet at Jeff.

而且他做得——这是一种不同类型的游戏，但他在 The Washington Post 这件事上，这手牌也打得跟任何人相比都不遑多让，我觉得几乎已经做到最好了。

And he's done a— it's a different sort of game, but he's, you know, at The Washington Post, he's played that hand as well as anybody I think possibly could.

所以这是非常了不起的商业成就，因为他实际参与了执行，不只是出钱而已，是两门业务，两门可能几乎跟你能找到的任何业务相比，都同样让竞争对手害怕的业务。

So it's a remarkable business achievement where he's been involved actually in the execution, not just bankrolling it, of, of two businesses that, that are probably as feared by their competitors almost, uh, as any you can find.

这个——Charlie，你还有什么进一步的想法吗？

It's— Charlie, you got further thoughts?

M36:15

嗯，我们有点像 Mellons，那种老派的人，也做得还不错，而 Jeff Bezos 是另一种物种。

Well, we're sort of like the Mellons, old-fashioned people who've done all right, and Jeff Bezos is a different species.

M26:28

顺便说一句，我们完全错过了它。

And we missed it entirely, incidentally.

我们从来没有持有过一股 Amazon。

We never owned a share of Amazon.

好，Greg Warren。

Okay, Greg Warren.