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1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特:我如何在五分钟内判断是否会投资一家企业

45 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 5:00
M1
M10:00

这个五分钟测试是这样的,你知道,Charlie 和我,对这个国家里几乎所有规模大到会引起我们兴趣的公司,基本都很熟悉。

The 5-minute test is, you know, Charlie and I have— we're familiar with virtually every company of a size that would interest us in the country.

我的意思是,如果你四十多年甚至更久一直在研究企业,就像你每天都在研究棒球运动员一样。

I mean, if you've been around for 40 or more years looking at businesses, it's just like if you were looking at, you know, studying baseball players every day.

过一阵子之后,你就会认识所有这些球员。

You get to know all the players after a while.

事情就是这么运作的。

And that's the way it works.

然后,我们在这些年里,也在脑子里慢慢形成了一套过滤器。

Then we have a bunch of filters we've developed in our minds over time.

我们不是说这些过滤器是完美的。

We don't say they're perfect filters.

我们也不是说,这些过滤器不会偶尔把本来该通过的东西给漏掉;但它们非常——它们很高效,而且效果跟我们花上几个月、请来专家、做各种各样的事情一样好。

We don't say that those filters don't occasionally leave things out that should get through, but they're very— they're efficient, and they work just as well as if we spent months and hired experts and did all kinds of things.

所以,我们确实可以在五分钟内告诉你,我们对某个东西有没有兴趣。

So we really can tell you in 5 minutes whether we're interested in something.

比如说 FlightSafety,我们以前从来没持有过它的股票,但我们至少二十年前就已经很熟悉这家公司了,你说是不是,Charlie?

And we had never owned shares in FlightSafety, but we'd been familiar with the company for at least 20 years, wouldn't you say, Charlie?
M2
M20:58

对,我有个合伙人买了很多它的股票。

Sure, I had a partner who bought a lot of it.
M1
M11:02

二十年前的事。

20 years ago.
M2
M21:02

对。

Yeah.
M1
M11:03

对,不过几乎任何企业都是这样。对于那些我们搞不明白的企业,我们自己心里很清楚;那样的话,我们通常也不太想再进一步了解它们了,虽然一路上可能多少还是会顺带知道一点。

Yeah, but that's true of almost any business, and we've got a fix on what we don't understand, and then we don't care to know any more about them, particularly, although we'll pick up a little as we go along, maybe.

但对于那些——我们有能力理解的企业,我们大概也已经了解到我们能了解到的极限了。

But, and then the ones that are— we're capable of understanding, we've probably gotten about as far as we'll get already.

所以我们确实能在五分钟内知道。

So we do know in 5 minutes.

当然,当时我们在和 FlightSafety 打交道的时候,在收购之前,甚至收购之后的一小段时间里,我从来没有——我从来没有踏进过他们任何一个——他们在全球大概有四十个左右的培训中心。

Now, when we did something with FlightSafety, before the purchase and even for somewhat a little after the purchase, I'd never been— I'd never set foot on a piece— they have 40 or so training centers around the world.

我一个都没去过。

I'd never set foot on one of them.

我也从没去过他们的总部。

I'd never been to their headquarters.

我们从没看过任何租约。

We never looked at a lease.

我们也从没看过这些物业的产权文件。

We never looked at title to the properties.

我的意思是,这些事情我们都不做。

I mean, we don't do all of those things.

而且,这么说吧,到目前为止,这从来没让我们损失过一分钱。

And, and I will say this, to date, that's never cost us a penny.

真正让我们赔钱的,是我们错误判断了一家企业最根本的经济特性。

What costs us money is when we misassess the fundamental economic characteristics of the business.

但这一点,并不是靠人们通常所说的 due diligence 就能看出来的。

But that is something we would not learn by what people generally consider due diligence.

我们当然可以让律师去审各种各样的东西,但那并不能决定一笔交易到底是好交易还是坏交易。

We could have lawyers look over all kinds of things, but that isn't what makes a deal a good deal or a bad deal.

而且,而且我们也不会靠做一大堆研究、出一大堆报告来哄自己。

And, and we don't kid ourselves by having lots of studies made and lots of reports made.

那些东西最后都会去支持他们认为付钱给他们的那个人想听的结论,反正通常就是这样。

They're going to support whatever they think the guy that pays them, you know, wants anyway.

所以那并不意味着——它们其实什么都说明不了。

So it doesn't mean— they don't mean anything.

都是胡扯。

They're nonsense.

不过,我们确实很在意自己对一家企业经济特性的判断是不是正确;而在这方面,我们觉得自己有一些过滤器,能在某些情况下告诉我们,我们已经知道得足够多,可以做出判断了。当然,然后我们也还是会犯一些错。

But we do care about being right about the economic characteristics of the business, and that's one thing we think we've got certain filters that tell us in certain cases that we know enough to assess, and then we make some mistakes.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M2
M22:46

除了这个之外,我没什么可补充的了,不过大家往往低估了少数几个简单而重大的理念的重要性。

I've got nothing to add to that except that people underrate the importance of a few simple big ideas.

而且我觉得,Berkshire Hathaway 在某种程度上是一个带有教育意义的企业,教大家正确的思维体系;我想其中最重要的教训就是,少数几个大理念,真的很管用。

And I think that to the extent Berkshire Hathaway is a didactic enterprise teaching the right systems of thought, I think that the chief lessons are that a few big ideas really work.

我觉得我们这套筛选标准一直都相当有效,原因之一也正是因为它们非常简单。

I think these filters of ours have worked pretty well, and because they're so simple.
M1
M13:24

对,我觉得,我觉得这个房间里的大多数人,如果他们只是把注意力放在什么样的企业是好企业、什么样的企业不是好企业上,再稍微花点时间想一想。

Yeah, I think, I think most of the people in this room, if they just focused on what made a good business or didn't make a good business and thought about it a little while.

他们就能形成一套自己的筛选标准,让他们在五分钟之内,基本上就判断出什么说得通,什么说不通。

They could develop a set of filters that would let them in 5 minutes figure out pretty well what made sense or didn't make sense.

我的意思是,五分钟之后,我们也许还是会因为某些原因,没法在某笔交易上达成一致;但还有一点通常也能看出来,至少在那些特别明显的案例里,你很快就能判断出,这个人是不是你想要的那种经理人。

I mean, there may be some reason after 5 minutes we don't get together on a deal of some sort, but another thing you can usually tell, at least you can tell it in the extreme cases, you can tell whether you've got the kind of manager very quickly that you want to have.

我是说,如果一个人这辈子一直都能打出四成的打击率,而且很幸运的是,年龄并不会改变他在商业表现上的这个画面,再加上他又热爱自己在做的事,那这事就会成。

I mean, if you've got somebody that's been batting .400 all their life, and fortunately age doesn't change that picture in terms of business performance, and they love what they do, it's going to work.

如果卖方特别在意钱,那你们大概率做不成一笔很好的交易。

If the seller cares a lot about the money, you're probably not going to make a very good deal.

我的意思是,如果他们真正感兴趣的是拿到钱之后要拿去做什么,那之后他们可能就会对自己的生意失去热爱,或者兴趣变淡。

I mean, if their real interest is in what they're going to do with the money, they may fall out of love or have less interest in their business subsequently.

我们很喜欢和那种纯粹就是痴迷自己生意的人一起合作,而且效果通常非常好。

We love working with people who are just plain nuts about their businesses, and it works very well.

而且这种人你通常是看得出来的。

And you can usually spot that.

当然,话虽这么说,还是会有少数人琢磨着怎么装出这种态度,你知道的,当他们想把一些破烂卖给我们的时候。

Now, having said that, we'll have a few people figuring out how to fake that attitude, you know, when they try and sell us some piece of junk here.

不过 Charlie 说,我们也许会被那种戴着绿色遮光眼罩的人给骗了,你知道,再配个寒酸的小办公室之类的;但我们不会被那个穿着麂皮鞋的人给忽悠住。

But Charlie says we can get conned by some guy with a green eyeshade, you know, and a low-rent office and all that, but we won't get taken in by the guy with the suede shoes.

十一区。

Zone 11.