2003年股东大会 · 巴菲特谈如何通过阅读寻找投资机会 — 文稿

F10:00

对，我叫 Oliver Krausler，来自奥地利维也纳。

Yes, my name is Oliver Krausler and I'm from Vienna, Austria.

我的问题分两个部分。

My question has 2 parts.

第一部分是，你是怎么找到少数几个非常优秀的投资点子，并且因此取得这么大的成功的？

So the first part is, how do you get a few excellent investment ideas to be so successful?

你会读什么特别的报纸或者行业杂志吗？

Do you read any special newspapers or industry magazines?

或者你会去拜访公司的总部，或者它们的子公司吗？

Or do you visit their headquarters or any subsidiaries of companies?

还有，你会用哪些信息来源来对一家公司形成正确的判断？比如书籍，像 Value Line、Standard & Poor's、Moody's，像 Reuters、Bloomberg、Datastream 这样的数据库，年报、互联网，等等。

And which sources of information, like books, for example Value Line, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, databases like Reuters, Bloomberg, Datastream, annual reports, internet, and so on, do you use to get the right impression of a company?

第二部分是，如果你觉得像 The Washington Post、GEICO 或者 Gillette 这样的公司有非常强竞争力的产品，那么在你最终决定投资这家公司之前，会经历哪些步骤？

And the second part, if you think that a company like The Washington Post, GEICO, or Gillette has a very competitive product, what are the steps before you ultimately decide to invest in the company?

你会读哪些出版物来最好地了解这个产品？另外，这家公司的资产负债表以及损益表有多重要？

Which publications do you read to get the best knowledge of the product and how important is the balance sheet and profit and loss account statement of the company?

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.

M11:28

谢谢。

Thank you.

第一部分的答案算是——第二部分也可能算是——以上这些都有。

The answer to the first part is sort of—and maybe the second part is sort of—all of the above.

我的意思是，我们读很多东西，读日报，读周刊或者月刊，读年报，读 10-K，也读 10-Q。

I mean, we read a lot and we read daily publications, we read weekly or monthly periodicals, we read annual reports, we read 10-Ks, we read 10-Qs.

而且很幸运的是，投资这个行业有一个特点，就是知识会不断积累。

And fortunately, the investment business is a business where knowledge accumulates.

也就是说，你二十岁、三十岁时学到的东西，后来可能会一边前进一边做些调整，但这些东西都会慢慢沉淀成一个知识库，而且会终身有用。

I mean, everything you learn when you're 20 or 30, you may tweak some as you go along, but it all kind of builds into a knowledge base that's useful forever.

而且，至少对我们来说，你知道，我会读，Charlie 以前会读，现在可能也还是会读不少，不过我会读很多 10-K，也会读很多年报。

And, and we, at least, you know, I read, Charlie used to read, may still read a fair amount, but I read a lot of 10-Ks, read a lot of annual reports.

四十年到五十年前，我还会经常跟管理层交流。

40 or 50 years ago, I did a lot of talking to managements.

我以前时不时会出去跑一趟，真的会顺路拜访大概十五到二十家公司。

I used to go out and take a trip every now and then and really drop in on maybe 15 or 20 companies.

不过我已经很久很久没这么做了。

I haven't done that for a long, long time.

我发现我们现在做的几乎所有事情，基本上都能通过公开文件找到信息。

I find everything we do pretty much, I find through public documents.

我当初给 Clayton Homes 提出收购报价的时候，从来没去过那家公司。

When I made an offer for Clayton Homes, I'd never visited the business.

我也从来没见过那些人。

I'd never met the people.

我是通过电话完成这件事的。

I'd done it over the phone.

我读了 Jim Clayton 写的书。

I'd read Jim Clayton's book.

我看了那些 10-K。

I looked at the 10-Ks.

那个行业里的每一家公司我都了解。

I knew every company in the industry.

我会看竞争对手，也会尽量去理解这个生意，而且不带任何先入为主的看法。

I look at competitors and I try to, you know, I try to understand the business and not have any preconceived notions.

而且外部其实有足够多的信息，可以用来评估非常多的企业。

And there is adequate information out there to evaluate a great many businesses.

我们并不觉得和管理层谈话特别有帮助。

We do not find it particularly helpful to talk to managements.

管理层经常想来 Omaha 跟我聊，他们通常会给出各种各样的理由，说为什么想来跟我谈，但他们真正希望的是，我们会对他们的股票产生兴趣。

Managements frequently want to come to Omaha and talk to me, and they usually have a variety of reasons that they say they want to talk to me, but what they're really hoping is we get interested in their stock.

那从来都不起作用。

That never works.

管理层并不是最好的信息披露来源。

Managements are not the best reporting sources.

大多数情况下，数字告诉我们的东西比管理层说的更多。

In most cases, the figures tell us more than management does.

所以我们其实不会花什么时间去跟管理层聊。

So we do not spend any real amount of time talking to management.

当我们买一家企业的时候，我们会先看它过去的记录，来判断管理层是什么样的人；然后像我刚才说的，我们也会亲自接触一下，看看他们会不会继续干下去。

When we buy a business, we look at the record to determine what the management's like, and then we want to size them up personally, as I said earlier, whether they will keep working.

但我们才不在乎任何人的预测。

But we don't give a hoot about anybody's projections.

他们未来打算怎么做，我们连听都不想听。

We don't even want to hear about them in terms of what they're going to do in the future.

我们从来没发现这种东西有什么价值。

We've never found any value in anything like that.

不过，对整个商业的一般性认知——就是你知道的，哪些东西我们见过是行得通的，哪些东西我们见过是不行的——这些东西你会随着时间慢慢吸收很多。

But just the general business knowledge, you know, what we've seen work, what we've seen has not worked, there's a lot you absorb over time.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M24:29

对，我觉得，你的基础知识越扎实，你需要新获取的知识就越少。这个游戏很像那种蒙着眼下国际象棋的人。

Yeah, the more basic knowledge you have, I think the less new knowledge you have to get, and the game is a lot like that fellow that plays chess blindfolded.

他脑子里记得整个棋盘，也记得之前发生过的一切，这样他才能走出下一步；如果你只是在棋下到一半的时候，冷不丁把棋盘摆给他看，他是根本做不到的。

He's got a memory of the board and everything that happened before, and that enables him to do the next move in a way he never could if you just showed him the board mid-game cold.

所以——至于说看哪些出版物，我也不知道，Warren。

And so there— and in terms of what publications, I don't know, Warren.

我可不愿意放弃 The Wall Street Journal。

I would hate to give up The Wall Street Journal.

M15:09

哦，你肯定也不愿意放弃 The Buffalo News。

Oh, you'd also hate to give up The Buffalo News.

不过你可以——嗯，你要尽可能多读各种金融材料，看到什么就读什么。其实 The New York Times 现在的商业版，比二十五年前强多了。

But you could— well, you want to read lots of financial material as it comes along, and actually The New York Times has a far better business section than they had 25 years ago.

不过你还是要读 Fortune，你知道的，你还要读很多年报。

But you, you want to read Fortune, you know, you, you want to read lots of annual reports.

你真的得在脑子里建立一个资料库，这样你一看那些数字，大体上就能判断你面对的是一家什么样的企业。

You really want to have a database in your mind so that you can tell what kind of a business you're looking at in general by looking at the figures.

嗯，这东西被高估得太厉害了。

Uh, it's far overrated.

我们从来不看任何分析师报告。

We never look at any analyst reports.

我的意思是，我想我如果真看过哪怕一篇，那也是因为连漫画版都没得看了。

I mean, I don't think I've, you know, if I read one, it was because the funny papers weren't available.

你知道，这真的不是——我的意思是——我搞不懂人们为什么要这么做。

You know, it just isn't— I mean, it— I don't understand why people do it.

不过外面确实有很多数据。

But there's a lot of data out there.

而且，你知道，这里面最美妙的一点——也正是让投资这个游戏变得很棒的原因——就是你没必要每件事都判断对。

And, you know, the beauty of it is, it's really what makes the investment game great, is you don't have to be right on everything.

你不需要把全世界百分之二十的公司判断对，也不需要判断对百分之十，甚至百分之五都不需要。

You don't have to be right on 20% of the companies in the world, or 10% of the companies in the world, or 5%.

你只要每隔一两年抓到一个好点子就够了。

You only have to get one good idea every year or two.

所以这不是那种——你知道，我以前特别喜欢研究赛马胜负的时候，有句老话是——我希望 Bob Dwyer 还在场——就是说，你可以赢一场比赛，但你赢不了所有比赛。

So it's not something— you know, when I used to be very interested in horse handicapping, and the old story was— and I hope Bob Dwyer is still here— that, you know, you can beat a race, but you can't beat the races.

而你完全可以在某一家公司的判断上，做出一个非常赚钱的决策。

And you can come up with a very profitable decision on a single company.

我可不想被那样衡量。

I would hate to be measured.

如果有人把 S&P 500 里的五百只股票全都摆在我面前，非要我去预测它们未来几年相对大盘会怎么表现，我真不知道自己会做得怎么样。

If somebody gave me all 500 stocks in the S&P and I had to make some prediction about how they would behave relative to the market over the next couple years, I don't know how I would do.

但也许我能从里面找出一只，让我觉得自己有十拿九稳、百分之九十的把握是对的。

But maybe I can find one in there where I think I'm 9 in 10, 90%, in being right.

在股票投资里，这可是个巨大的优势。

It's an enormous advantage in stocks.

只要你这辈子别犯什么大错，其实你只需要在极少、极少几件事上判断正确就够了。

You only have to be right on a very, very few things in your lifetime as long as you never make any big mistakes.

M27:17

有意思的是，至少百分之九十的专业投资管理机构，思路跟我们完全不一样。

What's interesting is that at least 90% of the professional investment management operations don't think the way we do at all.

他们就是觉得，只要雇足够多的人，就能更擅长判断 Pfizer 和 Merck 在未来二十年里谁会表现更好，而且他们还能沿着整个 S&P 500 一只一只股票这么做，再加上广泛分散投资，到了十年之后，他们就会远远领先其他人。

They just think if they hire enough people, they can be better at determining whether Pfizer or Merck is going to do better over the next 20 years, and they can do that stock by stock all through the S&P 500, and have wide diversification, and at the end of 10 years they'll be way ahead of other people.

当然，他们做不到。

And of course they won't.

真正有这种想法的人非常少，也就是专门去寻找少数几个机会。

Very few people have this idea of searching for just a few opportunities.

M17:58

对，你要等那个最适合出手的好球。

Yeah, you wait for the fat pitch.

Ted Williams 在一本叫《The Science of Hitting》的书里写过这个。

Ted Williams wrote about that in a book called The Science of Hitting.

他说，想成为一个优秀的击球手，最重要的事情基本上就是等那个落在甜蜜区的球。

He said the most important thing in being a good hitter, you know, is to wait for the pitch in the sweet spot, basically.

不过，呃，你知道，我一直都说，想获得“你是个优秀商人”的名声，办法就是买下一门好生意。

But, uh, you know, I've always said that the way to get a reputation for being a good businessman is to buy a good business.

你知道，这可比接手一家烂生意、然后还要证明你自己有多了不起容易多了，因为这种事我真没怎么见过。

You know, there—it's much easier than taking a lousy business, you know, and showing how wonderful you are at it, because I haven't seen that done very often.

第二个问题？

Number two?