1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特：企业ROE在长期内不可能超越GDP的增长 — 文稿

M10:00

Buffett 先生，Munger 先生，我叫 John Shain。

Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, my name is John Shain.

我来自 Tennessee 的 Nashville。

I'm from Nashville, Tennessee.

刚才您在回答另一个问题的时候，提到了股本回报率这个话题。

You touched on the subject of return on equity in response to a different question.

我想知道，您愿不愿意顺着下面这个思路再展开讲讲。

I wonder whether you might be willing to elaborate along the following line.

现在，Standard & Poor's 500 整体的股本回报率大概是百分之二十二。

Right now, the Standard & Poor's 500 in aggregate have a return on equity of about 22%.

而几十年来，美国企业的平均水平更像是百分之十二到百分之十三。

The average over the decades for corporate America has been more like 12 or 13%.

我们是怎么走到现在这种盈利能力异常高的地步的？还有，您觉得未来十年到十五年里，我们回归到百分之十几这个均值的可能性有多大？

How did we get to this point of extraordinary profitability, and how likely do you think we are over the next 10 or 15 years to revert back to the mean of the low teens?

M20:44

嗯，我想说的是，我以前从来没觉得这会发生。

Well, what I would say is I never thought it would happen.

所以我先说明一点，如果你当时听了我的，你对一九九六年、一九九五年，或者一九九七年的股本回报率判断，就会错得离谱。

So I start out with the fact that if you'd listened to me, you'd have been dead wrong in terms of what the return on equity in 1996 or 1995, 1997 would be.

在一个长期利率是百分之七，而且整个经济里大量储蓄的能力又非常惊人的世界里，我看不出来百分之二十二的股本回报率是可以长期维持的。

It does not seem to me that 22% returns on equity are sustainable in a world where the long-term interest rate is 7% and where the capability of saving large amounts in the economy, you know, is quite dramatic.

你会觉得，在你说的百分之七和百分之二十二之间，应该会有某种拉平的效应；随着储蓄在经济体内被不断配置，随着我们一直被教导说会随着时间发挥作用的竞争力量开始起作用，情况本该如此。

You would just think that there would be some sort of leveling effect between the 7 and the 22 you name, that as savings got directed within the economy and as the competitive forces operate that we've been taught will operate over time, would come into play.

但是，你知道，我在这个问题上一直都看错了，所以我才说，如果真能做到这种回报水平，那这些估值也不能说是不合理。

But, you know, I've been wrong on that subject, and that's why I say these levels are not unjustified if those kinds of returns can be made.

因为这么说吧，假设你手里有一只永续债，票息是百分之二十二，而且你还能——再假设其中四分之一，或者三分之一的票息会被分配出来。

Because let's just say that you had a 22% perpetual bond and you had the ability—and let's say that a quarter of that, a third of that coupon would be paid out.

也就是说，你有一只票息百分之二十二的债券，假设其中百分之七被支付出来，算是 S&P 的股息支付率吧，另外百分之十五则再投资到更多同样特征、同样是百分之二十二回报的债券里。

So you got a bond with a 22% coupon and say 7% is paid out, being the dividend payout on the S&P, we'll say, and the other 15% is reinvested in more 22% bonds with similar characteristics.

那么，在一个百分之七利率的世界里，这种工具按现值来算值多少钱呢？

Now, what's that instrument worth on a present value basis in a 7% world?

它值很多很多钱。

It's worth a lot of money.

事实上，它值钱到某个时候会变成一个数学谬误，因为当复合增长率高于贴现率时，你就会得到无穷大的数字，或者说，你会走向无限。

In fact, it's worth so much money that it becomes a mathematical fallacy at some point, because when the compound rate becomes higher than the discount rate, you get into infinite numbers, or you get into infinity.

而这个数字——这个概念，是我们在 Berkshire 很喜欢琢磨的。

And that's a number—that's the concept we like to think about around Berkshire.

只是我们还没想明白怎么才能真正做到。

We haven't figured out how to attain it.

有一本书叫《The Petersburg Paradox》，或者有一篇文章叫《The Petersburg Paradox and the Growth Stock Fallacy》。

There's a book called The Petersburg Paradox, or there's an article called The Petersburg Paradox and the Growth Stock Fallacy.

我想名字应该是这个，作者好像是一个叫 David Durand 的人，大概是二十五年前写的。

I think that's the name of it, by a fellow named, I think, David Durand, written about 25 years ago.

它讲的就是这个问题：增长率高于贴现率。

And it gets into this bit where the growth rate is higher than the discount rate.

这种情况按理说不应该持续很长时间，不过在它发生的时候，确实很有意思。

And it shouldn't work for an extended period of time, but it's sure fun while it's going on.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M33:17

对，我觉得有几件事促成了这个现象，而这个现象正是我们非常认真地预测错了的。

Yeah, I think a couple of things contributed to this phenomenon that we so carefully mispredicted.

第一，企业回购股票变得非常流行。

Number one, it became very fashionable for corporations to buy in shares.

我觉得我们也在很小的程度上推动了这种觉醒，而且我认为，从理性的企业决策角度来看，这是件好事。

And I think that we helped in a very small way bring on that enlightenment, and I think that was a plus in terms of rational corporate decision-making.

另一件发生的事是，反垄断监管在允许人们收购竞争对手这件事上宽松了很多，我觉得这两个因素帮助提高了美国的资本回报率。

The other thing that happened is that the antitrust administration got way more lenient in allowing people to buy competitors, and I think those 2 factors helped raise returns on capital in the United States.

不过，呃，这种情况——你不会觉得它能永远持续下去。

And, uh, but that can't—you wouldn't think that could go on forever.

而百分之十五的年复合增长，会让它的增速远远快于整个经济能增长的速度，也远远快于长期来看总体利润能增长的速度。

And what 15% per annum compounded will do is grow way faster than the economy can grow, way faster than aggregate profits can grow over a long pull.

所以迟早总得发生点什么。

So sooner or later, something has to happen.

我不觉得我们已经进入了一个什么新秩序，好像数学规律 somehow 被废除了。

I don't think we've reached a new order of things where the laws of mathematics are somehow repealed.

M24:37

如果这个国家的实际产出，比如说，每年增长百分之三——也就是实际 GDP 每年增长百分之三——而这个国家整个行业的资本化价值每年增长百分之十，那到某个时候，就会陷入数学上的荒谬。

If real output in this country grows at, say, 3% a year—call it real GDP grows at 3% a year—and the capitalized value of industry in the country grows at 10% a year, at some point you get into mathematical absurdities.

我的意思是，在低通胀率的情况下，你知道，你不可能一直这样——如果我们现在这个经济体的 GDP 是七万亿到八万亿美元，股票估值也是七万亿到八万亿美元，这也许有道理，也许没道理。

I mean, with the low inflation rates, it, it, you know, you, you can't have a—if we have an economy that's $7 or $8 trillion now in GDP and $7 or $8 trillion in equity valuation, that may or may not make sense.

但是，但是如果你看到一个经济体，GDP 是十五万亿美元，而股票估值是七十五万亿美元，七十五万亿美元的股票估值。

But, but if you have one that's $15 trillion in GDP and $75 trillion in equity valuation, $75 trillion in equity valuation.

你知道，这就会走到一些根本——根本说不通的地步。

You know, you, you get to things that don't—can't make any sense.

所以，如果这些彼此之间多少有点关系的项目——哪怕这种关系很弱，或者至少在短期内并不明确——它们出现这种不同步的增长率，过一阵子之后就是行不通的。

So if you get these differential rates of growth among items that have some relationship, however tenuous, or at least nonspecific in the, in the short run, it doesn't work after a while.

而且，你知道，没人愿意思考这个。

And, you know, nobody wants to think about that.

他们也不愿意去想自己的死亡。

They don't want to think about their own death.

但我的意思是，这个——不是说你不愿意想，它就会消失。

But I mean, it's, it's—It doesn't go away just because you don't want to think about it.

而且，呃，我们还没到那样的地步，但是，你可以把这些数字往后推演，呃，过一阵子它们就会变得完全没有意义。

And, uh, we haven't gotten any point like that, but, but you can project out, uh, numbers, uh, and they just won't make any sense after a while.

M35:56

对，企业利润不可能占到 GNP 的百分之两百。

Yeah, corporate profits can't be 200% of GNP.

M25:59

对。

Yeah.

M35:59

事实上，连占到 GNP 的百分之五十都不可能。

Indeed, they can't be 50% of GNP.

所以，这种高复利增长率，自动就会走向荒谬。

So these, these high rates of compounding just go automatically into absurdity.

M26:07

对，实际上它们也不可能占到 GDP 的百分之二十，或者类似这样的数字。

Yeah, they really can't be 20% of GDP or some number like that.

所以，如果——如果你开始说倍数不可能无限提高，你就会看到——你就会得到这种增长率差异，而它们就是会——过一阵子之后，你就彻底偏离轨道了。

So if—and if you start saying you can't have a multiple of more, you get the—you get differential rates, and they, they just simply—you, you leave the tracks after, after a while.

M36:20

你们在座的所有人都应该明白这一点，因为那些靠卖投资建议、经纪服务等等为生的专业人士，对于相信那些不可能为真的事情是真的，拥有巨大的既得利益。

And all you people should be aware of this, because all the people who are professional sellers of investment advice and brokerage services, etc., etc., have an immense vested interest in believing that things that can't be true are true.

M26:39

对，而且——

Yeah, and—.

M36:40

而且不光如此，他们还是经过 Darwinian 式的筛选才留下来的，拥有非常强的销售能力和旺盛的精力。

And not only that, they've been selected in a Darwinian process to have formidable sales skills and large energy.

这对我们其他人来说是很危险的。

And this is dangerous to the rest of us.

M26:50

对，不过，你们也是被筛选出来，专门来接收他们建议的人。

Yeah, well, you've been selected to be the recipients of their advice.

M36:54

没错。

Right.

而且，他们还会搞清楚我们是谁，然后大概傍晚六点钟的时候找上门来。

Furthermore, they figure out who we are and come in about 6 o'clock in the evening.

M27:04

又回到 Zone 1 了。

Zone 1 again.