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1996年股东大会 · 巴芒谈多元思维模型及自己思考事情的方式

28 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 3:19
M1
M10:00

来自纽约市的 Mike Assael 要问 Charlie 一个问题,是关于我们脑子里应该有的大概一百个模型——我们来了。

Mike Assael from New York City with a question for Charlie about the 100 or so models we ought to have in our head— Here we are.

——就是你那篇非常精彩的 worldly wisdom 演讲最后提到的那个。

—Mentioned at the end of the excellent worldly wisdom speech.

我想知道,在行业整合、产品延伸、垂直整合这些方面,最有用的模型是什么;还有,有没有什么模型能解释,在一些特殊情况下,为什么投资零售类股票是有道理的。

I'd like to know the most useful models on industry consolidation, on product extension, on vertical integration, and any models which explain the special cases when it makes sense to invest in retailing stocks.

如果 Warren 有什么要补充或者要修正的,我也非常想听。

And if Warren has anything to add or subtract, I'd love to hear it.

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.
M2
M20:32

嗯,我很高兴来回答这么一个“谦虚”的问题。

Well, I'm glad to answer such a modest question.

我说过,你脑子里要有一百个模型,但那些都是非常大的、相当有普适性的模型,而且都很有用。

I spoke about having 100 models in your head, but those are all great big models of considerable generality that are useful.

会一遍又一遍地派上用场。

Over and over again.

可一旦你开始问,工业整合会发生什么、零售业会怎样,等等这些问题,你就已经进入非常复杂的子模型层面了。

Now, you're down into very complex sub-modeling when you get into a separate model for what's gonna happen in industrial consolidations and retail and so on.

而那些子模型,我并没有全都掌握。

And I'm not up to all those sub-models.
M3
M31:16

事实是,你知道,我们其实也就掌握了那么几个——不过我们会把那些通用模型拿来套进去,有时候一下子就想通了,有时候就不行。

The truth is, you know, we're up to a few, and— but we take the general models and, you know, plug them in, and sometimes the light goes on and sometimes it doesn't.

但如果真想通了,它们会非常有用。

But if it does, they could be quite useful.

如果你足够专注,你确实会看到某些商业模式和商业行为会反复出现。

If you focus, you do see repetition of certain business patterns and business behavior.

顺便说一句,Wall Street 往往会忽略这些。

And Wall Street tends to ignore those, incidentally.

我的意思是,Wall Street 似乎确实没法长时间记住那些重要的商业教训。

I mean, Wall Street really doesn't seem to learn for very long business lessons.

他们学会这些东西,未必对他们自己有好处。

It may not be to their advantage to learn it.

Charlie 大概会说,这正好能套进 Charlie 的那个模型里。

Charlie would— that would probably plug right into Charlie's model.
M2
M22:02

那当然。

You bet.

对。

Yeah.
M3
M32:04

你知道,如果你是在卖未来的故事,那最好忘掉过去可能更有利;前提是,你拿钱是靠把这个故事卖出去,而不是拿自己的人生去下注。

It's better to, you know, to— if you're out selling the future, it may be better to forget the past if you're getting paid on selling it and not on betting your life on it in some way.

Berkshire 有一种情况,确实和很多公司有点不一样。我们假定——很遗憾这可能是个错误——但我们假定自己会一直存在下去。

One situation at Berkshire that really is somewhat different than many companies, we assume, and unfortunately it's an error, but we assume we'll be around forever.

所以,我们做保险业务的时候,会假定我们会一直在这里,把每一笔理赔都赔掉。

So, when we are in our insurance business, we assume we're going to be here to pay every claim.

我们不会六十五岁退休,然后把一堆东西交给别人。

And we're not going to retire at 65 and hand over something to someone else.

而且,在会计上耍花招也完全没有意义,因为以后终归会找上我们。

And it wouldn't make any sense playing games on accounting because it would catch up with us later on.

但很多企业,我觉得它们看事情的期限感并没有这么长。

And whereas— in many businesses, I don't think they have quite the same horizon on things.

Coca-Cola 和 Gillette 倒是会这样想,但很多公司考虑的是——我恐怕比你愿意相信的还要多——它们在想,接下来四个季度左右,能画出什么样的小图景给别人看。这很容易做到,但我们的问题是,我们觉得自己要待的时间会比四个季度长得多。

They do at Coca-Cola, or they do at Gillette, but many companies are thinking about what kind of— I think, I'm afraid that more than you'd like, are thinking about what kind of little pictures they can paint for the next 4 quarters or so, and that's easy to do, but our problem is we're gonna be around a lot longer, we think, than 4 quarters.

所以这不是我们可以采用的做法。

So that's not an option available to us.

我们必须——我们真的是按这样来经营的:就好像到了二零五零年之类的时候,会有人回头看,然后问一句,结果到底怎么样?

And we have to— we really run it as if in the year 2050 or something, somebody's going to look and say, how'd it work out?