M10:00
说到 manufactured housing，你知道，现在这个行业里基本上几乎所有人都在亏钱，只有 Clayton 还在赚钱。
Manufactured housing, you know, it is— I mean, practically everybody in manufactured housing is losing money now, and Clayton is making money.
他们这些年来在经营方式上，政策一直都稳健得多。
They've, they've had much sounder policies in terms of how they've operated over the years.
他们有一个做法是，他们大部分房子都是通过自己的零售网点卖出去的。
One of the things they do, most of their houses are sold through their own retail units.
他们大概有，我记得，差不多二百九十七家自己的零售门店，这些门店经理基本上是跟 Clayton 按五五分成利润。
They have about, I think, 297 or so retail outlets of their own, and those managers are on a 50/50 profit split, basically, as I remember it, with Clayton.
对。
Yeah.
而且他们要对自己做出来的所有 paper 负责。
And they're responsible for all of the paper they generate.
所以，这跟几年前 manufactured housing 行业里的情况不一样。那时候制造商把房子卖出去——我的意思是，先通过 floor plan 融资压给经销商，然后这个经销商如果能在票据上找着某种买方，甚至只要他能在外面找个活生生的人，弄出一点看起来像首付的东西来，他可能就能按发票价格的百分之一百二十五，甚至百分之一百三十去借钱。
So, unlike what was going on a few years ago in manufactured housing, where a manufacturer would sell a house— I mean, it'd be floor-planned to a dealer, and then that dealer could borrow, maybe if he got some kind of a purchaser on the note, maybe 125% or 130% of invoice price if he could just create a warm body out there someplace that would give him some apparent down payment.
那种局面简直就是为灾难量身打造的。
That situation was just built for disaster.
但在 Clayton 这里，买下产品的那个人带来的利润或者亏损，会一直跟着走，直到那笔债务全部还清为止。
But at Clayton, the profit or loss off that person who buys the product goes till the obligation is fully paid for.
所以，如果某个经销商首付收得不够，或者把房子卖给了本来就不该卖的人，那问题就得他自己扛，而且 repo 回来的房子也得他接着处理。
So if a dealer takes inadequate down payments or sells to people he shouldn't be selling to, it's gonna be his problem, and he's gonna get the repo back.
他得自己把它再卖掉。
He's gonna have to sell it himself.
paper 上的损失也会记到他头上。
He's gonna get the loss on the paper charged to him.
这就让零售层面的行为方式，跟很多其他 manufactured housing 制造商当时出现的做法，完全不一样。
And that produces an entirely different kind of behavior at the retail level than occurred with many of the other manufactured housing, uh, manufacturers.
不过，这不是一个轻松的生意。
But it's, it's not an easy business.
呃，不过—— Clayton 做法是对的。
Uh, it's— Clayton does it the right way.
实际上，如果你去读 Jim Clayton 的书，他会在里面讲到他当年在 Indiana 买第一套 home 的时候，还会讲一些当时制造商在操作上的小花招。
And in fact, if you read Jim Clayton's book, he will tell— he tells in there about the time he bought his first home in Indiana, and he tells about a little of the funny business that went on, in terms of how the manufacturer behaved.
他还描述了一些人是怎么利用那些制度，在融资上钻空子的。
And he describes some of the systems that people use to game the financing.
而这些做法现在正在以非常大的规模反噬，不管是对 manufactured housing 公司，还是对那些给零售 paper 提供融资的人，都是这样。
And those activities are coming home to roost in a huge way for both the manufactured housing companies and for the people that finance the retail paper.
Clayton 基本上一直都是按正确的方式来做，而且他们以后也会继续这么做。
Clayton did it right, basically, and they'll continue to do it right.
即便如此，整个 manufactured housing 行业在融资方面的名声已经被搞得很糟了，所以现在甚至只有 Clayton 还能做到 securitize。
Even so, there is such a stain over the whole manufactured housing industry in terms of financing that even Clayton is the only one that is able to securitize.
而且就像我前面说的，如果没有我们，他们现在也不可能像一年前那样，在那个程度上去做 securitize。
And as I said earlier, they cannot securitize to the extent— without us, they wouldn't be able to securitize to the extent that they could have a year ago.
这是个陷入大麻烦的行业。
It's an industry in big trouble.
我觉得我们在这里面会做得不错，因为我认为我们合作的是一家一流的 player。
I think we'll do fine in it because I think we're in with a class player.
我觉得他们已经把这些制度都建立起来了，激励机制也是对的，而这个东西必须贯穿整个系统。
I think they've got these systems in place that have the right incentives, which you need all the way through the system.
而且我认为 Berkshire 会让他们变得更强，因为我们不会去做 securitize。
And I think Berkshire will make them even stronger because we will not securitize.
我们会把这些资产留在自己的 portfolio 里。
We'll keep it for the portfolio.