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1999年股东大会 · 巴芒点评日本“失去的十年”

33 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 4:08
M1
M10:00

大家早上好。

Good morning.

我叫 Bob Brewer,来自这条路那边的 Nebraska 州 Lincoln。

My name is Bob Brewer, and I'm from down the road in Lincoln, Nebraska.

我想请问一下,你们觉得 Japan 持续的经济动荡,在接下来五到十年里,可能会怎么影响全球经济和美国股市?

I just wanted to ask you how you think the continuing economic turmoil in Japan is likely to affect the global economy and the U.S. stock market over the next 5 to 10 years.
M2
M20:20

这个嘛,Charlie 和我都不擅长回答这种宏观问题,不过我可以这么说。

Well, Charlie and I are no good on those macro questions, but I would say this.

我的意思是,Japan 这个问题,在金融市场和银行体系里已经存在一段时间了。

I mean, the Japan problem has been around now in financial markets and banking systems, so it's been around for some time now.

所以我看不出有什么理由,认为它现在会比过去这几年对世界其他地方造成更大的影响。

So I see no reason why it should have more impact on the rest of the world now than it, than it has had in the last few years.

而且我会说,过去这几年它对美国的影响肯定是非常小的。

And I would say it's had certainly very little effect on the U.S. in the last few years.

而且这——这完全不是我们思考里的一个因素,呃,至少不会影响我们明天早上该买什么、卖什么。

And it's not— it's no factor in our thinking at all, uh, in terms of what we would buy or sell tomorrow morning.

我的意思是,如果我们明天碰到一个很好的企业,除非它是直接跟 Japan 有关系——我是说,它的主营业务就在 Japan——但如果它是在美国的企业,那这根本不会是我们会去考虑的事。

I mean, if, if we got offered a good business tomorrow, unless it was directly involved— I mean, its primary business was in Japan— but if it was a business in this country, that's not something that we would be thinking about.

我们会考虑的是那家企业本身的具体情况。

We would be thinking about the specifics of that business.

那些来来去去的事情,我们其实不会太担心。

We don't really get too concerned about the things that, that come and go.

我是说,归根结底,如果我们对一家企业在十年或者二十年的周期里判断是对的——就拿 See's Candies 来说吧。

I mean, in the end, if we're right about a business over a 10 or 20-year period— just take See's Candies.

我们是一九七二年买下它的。

We bought it in 1972.

你看看一九七三年和七四年都发生了什么,石油冲击,还有这个国家当时经历的通货膨胀,诸如此类的事情。

Look what happened in 1973 and '74, you know, and all the oil shocks and what this country was going through in inflation, all that sort of thing.

如果我们对这个企业的判断是对的,那些宏观因素是不会造成什么差别的。

If we're right about the business, the macro factors aren't going to make any difference, you know.

而如果我们对这个企业判断错了,宏观因素也救不了我们。

And if we're wrong about the business, macro factors are not going to bail us out.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M31:47

对,我觉得 Japan 发生的事,作为一个公民来看是很值得关注的。

Yeah, I think what's interesting in Japan is interesting to one as a citizen.

这是一个重要的工业国家,他们对 Keynesian economics 和其他那些理论都很了解,可是一旦开始滑入一场严重衰退,它就一直往下走、一直走,陷在那里,长期低迷,一年又一年;你把利率降到几乎零,财政赤字也拉得很大,经济还是起不来。

Here is a major industrial country, and they understand all about Keynesian economics and everything else, and when it starts sliding down into a big recession, it just keeps going and going and floundering and staying down, and year follows year, and you take the interest rates down to practically zero, and you run a big budget deficit, the economy still stays down.

我觉得这对全世界的经济学家来说都非常有意思。

I think this has been very interesting to the economists of the world.

我觉得他们当中任何人,大概都不会预料到,像 Japan 这样一个这么现代化的国家,会收缩这么久。

I don't think any of them would have predicted that as modern a country as Japan could contract for as long as it has.

它确实就是这样。

As it did.

我觉得原因跟它之前在地价和证券价格上的那种极端繁荣有关,也跟它在会计做法上的腐败,以及它对金融体系——包括银行——监管上的腐败有关。

And I think the cause is related to the extremeness of its booms in both land prices and security prices, and the corruption in its accounting practices and in its regulation of the financial system, including banks.

我觉得这对全世界来说是个很有意思的教训。

I think it's an interesting lesson for the world.

就是,会计和监管体系里千万不能混进去太多乱七八糟的东西,而且市场上的各种愚蠢行为也同样没有任何帮助。

Of how important it is not to let a lot of slop get into the, into the accounting and regulatory systems, and how a lot of folly in markets doesn't help either.
M2
M23:21

这事有点耐人寻味,你知道,大家老是在说,Japan 为什么不刺激经济呢?

Sort of fascinating to, you know, people keep saying, well, why doesn't Japan stimulate?

可他们已经把短期利率降到零了,长期利率也只有百分之二。

Well, they got short-term rates down to zero and long-term rates at 2%.

这要是我,早就被刺激到了,不过就像 Charlie 说的,这多少有点不符合一些经典的 Keynesian theory。

Well, that would stimulate me, but it's sort of, as Charlie says, it sort of defied a little bit some of the classical Keynesian theory on that.

不过在三十年代,我们国家也遇到过同样的问题。

But in the '30s, we had the same problem in this country.

到了三十年代后半段,我们也把利率大幅压低了。

We drove interest rates way down toward the latter half of the '30s.
M3
M33:49

而且我会说,美国那种特别强劲的繁荣,很可能跟所谓的财富效应有关,也就是股市一路涨、一路涨带来的影响。

And I would argue that probably the extreme prosperity in America is related to this so-called wealth effect with stock markets going up and up.

然后,嗯,我觉得人们原来以为这只是个比较小的因素,但它的影响可能比大家想的要大。

And, uh, and I think people thought that was a smaller factor than maybe it is.
M2
M24:08

一九九六年?

1996?