M10:38
我买它，是因为它属于我们过去所说的那种，或者说，是一种“烟蒂股”式的投资方法：我们会到处寻找那些还剩最后一口的东西。
I bought it because it was what we used to call, or the cigar— it was a cigar butt approach to investing where we would look around for something with a free puff left in it.
你知道，它又湿又软，多少还有点恶心，但毕竟是免费的。
You know, it was soggy and kind of disgusting and everything, but it was free.
而 Berkshire 当时的售价低于营运资本。
And Berkshire was selling below working capital.
而且它过去曾经定期通过要约收购回购股票。
Had a history of repurchasing shares periodically on tender offers.
它当时的售价是——我想，第一次买入时大概是每股七点五美元。
And it was selling at— first purchase was, I think, at $7.50 a share.
事实上，我办公室里还留着那张经纪人的交易单，是两千股。
In fact, I've got the broker's ticket up in the office, 2,000 shares.
在我看来，他们似乎打算定期发起要约收购，而价格可能会更接近营运净资本，也许会是每股十一美元或十二美元左右，类似这样的数字，然后我们就可以在要约收购时卖掉。
And they— it looked to me like they were going to have a tender offer periodically, and there would probably be some figure closer to working net working capital, which might have been $11 or $12 a share, some such number, and we would sell on the tender.
我们以前也持有过一些这样的证券，也用这种方式买过一些股票。
And that was— we had other securities we owned that way, and we bought some that way.
后来有一次，我见到了当时管理 Berkshire 的 Seabury Stanton。他告诉了我一些情况，还把我变成了内部人士，所以我暂时什么也做不了。不过他说，他正在考虑发起一次要约收购，还问我们会以什么价格提交股票。
And then actually, I met Seabury Stanton one time who was running Berkshire, and he told me and made me an insider so I couldn't do anything, but he said he was thinking of having a tender, and he wondered what price we'd tender at.
如果我没记错的话，我可能记错了，我回头可以查一下，但我想我当时说的是十一又八分之三美元。
And I, as I remember, I may be wrong on this, I could look back on it, but I think I said $11 3/8.
然后他——他又问我，如果我们以十一又八分之三美元进行要约收购，你会提交股票吗？
And he's— and he, and he said again to me, well, if we have a tender at $11 3/8, will you tender?
我说，会，我会提交。
And I said, yes, I will.
呃，之后很明显，我有一段时间不能再对这只股票做任何操作了。
And, uh, and then I was frozen out, obviously, of doing anything in the stock for a little while.
但后来他真的发起了要约收购。我记得，我拆开信封一看，价格是十一又四分之一美元。
But then he came along with the tender offer, and I, as I remember, I opened the envelope and it was $11 1/4.
我可能记错了，也可能是十一又二分之一美元对十一又八分之三美元，但总之比他跟我说的、也是我同意的价格低了八分之一美元。
I may be wrong, it may have been $11 1/2 to $11 3/8, but it was an eighth below what he had said to me and what I'd agreed to.
所以我觉得这事挺让人恼火的，就没有提交股票。
So I found that kind of irritating, and I didn't tender.
然后我买进了大量股票。
And then I bought a lot of stock.
我还买了——Ken Chace 是公司董事，他父亲那边有一些家族成员，不是 Ken 的直系亲属，而是有亲属关系的另一个家族，他们想卖掉一大笔股票。
And I bought— Ken Chace, who's a director, his father had some members of the family, not his direct family, but a related family that wanted to sell a block.
于是我们买下了好几大笔股票，没过多久就控制了这家公司。
And we bought several blocks, and before long we controlled the company.
所以，如果他们当时真的以那个价格进行要约收购，只差八分之一美元的话，我们就不会买下这家公司了。
So at an 8th of a point difference, we wouldn't have bought it, uh, the company, if they'd actually tendered at that price.
其实，后来 Blue Chip 也发生过类似的事情。
We had a somewhat similar thing happen with Blue Chip, actually, later on too.
如果当初没有买下它，我们的情况会好得多。因为那样一来，像 National Indemnity 之类的公司，我们就不会把它买进一家拥有很多其他股东的上市公司，而是会通过合伙企业私下买入，这样我们的合伙人就能拥有更大的权益。所以，Berkshire 恰恰是用来逐步收购一批优秀公司的错误工具。但我算是稀里糊涂地走上了这条路，然后我们就一直这么做下去了。
Now, it would have been—we would have been much better off if we hadn't bought it, because then things like National Indemnity and all of that, instead of buying it into a public company with a great many other shareholders, we would have bought it privately in the partnership, and our partners would have had a greater interest. So Berkshire was exactly the wrong vehicle to use for buying a bunch of wonderful companies over time, but I sort of stumbled into it and we kept moving along.
后来我解散合伙企业的时候，把这些资产分给了 Berkshire，因为当时看来，这是最简单、最好的处理办法。
And when I disbanded the partnership, I distributed it out to Berkshire because it seemed like the easiest and best thing to do.
而且我也一路坚持了下来，我非常享受这个过程。
And I followed through on it, and I enjoy it enormously.
我很高兴事情最后能这样发展。
I'm glad it all worked out this way.
不过从经济角度看，很可能这并不是最好的结果。
It did not work out the best way economically, in all probability.
当时用来建立整个企业的基础，确实是错的，但也许从某种意义上说，这反而让事情变得更有趣了。
It was, it was a—it was the wrong base to use to build an enterprise around, but maybe in a way that's made it more fun.
Charlie，你对此还有什么要补充的吗？
Charlie, do you have anything to add on that?
你可以跟大家讲讲 Blue Chip 的故事。
You can tell them about the Blue Chip story.