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2000年股东大会 · 巴芒点评2000年的疯狂股市投机现象

51 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 5:54
M1
M10:00

各位先生,你们好。

Hello, gentlemen.

我叫 Dan Sheehan。

My name's Dan Sheehan.

我来自加拿大多伦多。

I'm from Toronto, Canada.

首先,我想感谢你们举办这个周末的活动。

First of all, I'd like to thank you for this weekend.

对我来说,这个活动变得越来越重要了,因为现在越来越难找到关于股市的理性讨论了,而这个周末对我们大多数人来说,真的是一股清新的空气。

It's become more and more important to me as it's become more and more difficult to find rational discussion about the stock market, and this weekend really is a breath of fresh air for most of us, I think.

我经常参考的一个人是 Benjamin Graham,而我现在担心的是,他把一九二九年和三十年代初那段时期称作一种实验室实验,在那段时间里,正常的内在价值和安全边际失效了,或者至少看起来是这样。

One of the places I refer to a lot is Benjamin Graham, and what worries me now is what he referred to as a period in 1929 and the early '30s as a lab experiment, where normal intrinsic values and margins of safety broke down, or seemed to anyway.

所以我想知道,你们觉得这种情况在接下来几年里会发生到什么程度,以及你们在做投资时会为这件事担心到什么程度。

And I wonder how much you think that might happen now in the next few years and how much you worry about that with the investments you're making.
M2
M20:50

嗯,我们通常认为,在市场里你什么情况都可能看到。

Well, we generally believe you can just see anything in markets.

我是说,市场随着时间推移会发生的一些事,真的非常、非常惊人。

I mean, just extraordinary, uh, what happens in markets over time.

这些东西最终都会被理顺的,你知道,迟早而已。

It gets, it gets sorted out over, you know, eventually.

但我的意思是,我们确实见过一些毫无价值的公司,卖到几十亿美元的市值。

But I mean, we have seen companies sell for tens of billions of dollars that are worthless.

而且有些时候,我们也见过一些东西只卖到百分之二十。

And at times we have seen things sell for 20%.

有不少这样的例子,也不难找到,那些公司由完全像样的人在经营,却真的只卖到

A number of things, not, not hard to find, perfectly decent people running them, sell for literally 20%.

它们实际价值的百分之二十,或者百分之二十五。

20% or 25% of what they were worth.

所以,这些情况我们都见过,以后也还会继续见到。

So we have seen and we'll continue to see everything.

这就是市场的本性。

It's just the nature of markets.

随着时间推移,市场会制造出非常非常离谱的现象。

They produce wild, wild things over time.

而面对这些离谱现象中的一种时,关键是别在别的离谱现象出现时也被带着跑,因为这些离谱的事会在一段时间里形成它们自己的“真相”。

And one of those wild things, and not to get carried away when other wild things happen, because the wild things create their own truth for a while.

你必须明白,你知道,之所以会这样发生,就是因为——人们从中得到了愉快的体验之类的。

And you have to, you know, you— that's the reason they're happening, is— and people are getting pleasant experiences and all that.

只要你在市场里待的时间足够长,你什么都能见到。

You'll see everything if you're around markets for a reasonable period of time.

我们现在并没有看到这个市场里有什么特别明显、特别严重的低估案例。

We don't see any great cases of dramatic undervaluation by this market.

所以并不是说,因为市场某个特定领域可能存在这种投机狂热,我们就能看到别的地方因此出现惊人的低估。

So it isn't like we're seeing— because there's this perhaps speculative mania in a particular area of the market, we do not see that creating incredible undervaluation other places.

那边正在发生的事,也许会在几年之后导致低估,也许不会。

What's happening there may lead to undervaluation, you know, a few years from now, or it may not.

这个我不知道。

I don't know that.

但是,我们现在并不是说能找到那种价值大概是你买入价格两倍的东西,因为坦白说,现在市场上的钱实在太多了,如果你真找到这种东西,很可能也会被某些做收购的人很快纠正掉。

But, but we're— it isn't like you can find things that are, that are worth double or thereabouts what you're paying, because frankly, there's so much money sloshing around that if, if you found such a thing, it would be very likely corrected by, by some buyout types.

我的意思是,我们当然很想找到那种售价只有它净值、或者说只有它内在价值一半的企业。

I mean, we would love to— find businesses that are selling for half of what their net worth, what they're intrinsically worth.

但我们找不到。

We don't find that.
M3
M32:48

嗯,我的确觉得现在这个时期非常不寻常。

Well, I do think that the present time is a very unusual period.

很难想到还有哪个时期,住宅房地产、普通股之类的资产价格上涨得这么快,而且市场上还漂着这么多容易拿到的钱。

It's hard to think of a time when residential real estate and common stocks and so on rose so rapidly in price and there was so much easy money floating around.

我的意思是,现在真的是一个非常不寻常的时期。

I mean, this is a very unusual period.
M2
M23:16

有意思的是,而且我相信你也想过这一点,就是现在你会看到一种公司——我们今年早些时候就看到过几家——这么说吧,它的市值可能卖到一百亿美元,但这家公司本身,就算股权估值有一百亿美元,恐怕连一亿美元的债都借不到。

What's fascinating, and I'm sure you've thought of it, is that you can now have a business—we saw a few of them, you know, earlier this year, we'll say—that might have been selling for $10 billion, where the business itself could not have borrowed probably $100 million in debt with an equity valuation of $10 billion.

但是这家公司本身——如果它是一家非上市的私营企业——是借不到一亿美元的。

But the business itself would not—if as a private business—would not have been able to borrow $100 million.

可是这家公司的所有者,因为它是上市公司,却可以拿着他们手里那一点点小纸片,借到几十亿美元,因为——因为他们有这个市场估值。

But the owners of that business, because it's public, can borrow many billions of dollars on, on, on their little pieces of paper because the—because they have this market valuation.

如果它是一家私营企业,公司本身连个人能借到金额的大概二十分之一都借不到——这种事以前也发生过一些,但这次可能是极端到前所未有的程度了,呃,可能连二十年代都算上。

If it's a private business, the company itself couldn't borrow 1/20th or so of what the individuals—That's happened to a degree before, but this has probably been as extreme as anything that's happened, uh, probably including, uh, the '20s.

这并不是说它们完全对应,但——但这次确实非常极端。

That doesn't mean there's a parallel to it, but, but it's been pretty extreme.
M1
M14:17

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M34:19

我觉得,这大概是现代资本主义里最极端的一次了。

I think it probably is the most extreme, uh, that has happened in, in modern capitalism.

就我这一生来看,我会说,三十年代——它造成了英语世界六百年来最严重的一次衰退,而且当时也非常极端。

In my lifetime, I would say the '30s were the— it created the worst recession in the English-speaking world in 600 years, and it was very extreme.

在 Omaha,整个三十年代,你在 Henderson's Cafeteria 花两毛五就能买一顿随便吃的。

You could buy an all-you-can-eat in Omaha through the '30s for a quarter from Henderson's Cafeteria.

而现在,我们看到的是资本主义能带来的另一张面孔。

And now we're seeing the other face of what capitalism can do.

这几乎和三十年代一样极端,只不过方向完全不同。

And this is almost as extreme as the, uh, as the '30s were, but in a different direction.

现在是零失业,投机泛滥,诸如此类,诸如此类。

It's zero unemployment, rampant speculation, etc., etc.

这是一个令人惊叹的时期。

It's an amazing period.
M2
M25:14

不过,这并不会让结果更容易预测。

That does not make it easy to predict, however, the outcome.
M3
M35:18

对。

No.
M2
M25:21

但它至少告诉我们,有些东西是我们想要避开的。

It, it says to us, though, certain things we want to stay away from.

我的意思是,基本上,对我们来说,这是一种防范性的判断。

I mean, basically, that's—it's precautionary to us.

它并不意味着机会。

It does not spell opportunity.

虽然毫无疑问,在过去这一年里,把股东的无知变现的能力,呃,我觉得是前所未有的。

Although there's no question that the—in the last year, the ability to monetize shareholder ignorance, uh, has never been exceeded, I think.

你也这么看吧,Charlie?

Wouldn't you say so, Charlie?

好,第二个问题。

Okay, number 2.