2001年股东大会 · 巴菲特：没有公司可以长期以15%的速度增长 — 文稿

M10:00

我是来自 Atlanta 的 Steve Caswell。

Steve Caswell from Atlanta.

我的问题是关于 Gillette 的。

My question concerns Gillette.

你觉得他们想把盈利增长做到百分之十五以上这个目标，是不是某种程度上把他们带进了现在渠道库存方面的问题？

Do you think their goal of trying to grow earnings at 15+% kind of got them into their current inventory problems at the trade?

还有，关于收购 Duracell，我知道当时你们两位都不是这笔交易的最大支持者。

And as well, the Duracell acquisition, I know at the time neither one of you were the biggest fans of the deal.

我就是想知道，你们现在怎么看这件事。

I just want to know how you feel about it now.

M20:27

嗯，我会说这是个错误，而且我也一直这么说。

Well, I would say it's a mistake, and I've said it.

我觉得任何公司去预测每年百分之十五的增长都是个错误，不过这么做的公司确实很多。

I think it's a mistake for any company to predict 15% a year growth, but plenty of them do.

一方面，你知道，除非美国经济每年都能增长百分之十五，不然的话，任何这种百分之十五的目标，最后都会追上你，让你下不来台。

For one thing, you know, unless the U.S. economy grows at 15% a year, eventually any 15% number catches up with you.

这根本就讲不通。

It just doesn't make sense.

非常非常少的大公司，能把盈利按每年百分之十五这样持续复利增长。

Very, very few large companies can compound their earnings at 15%.

这事不会发生的。

It isn't going to happen.

你可以去看看 Fortune 500，如果你想从里面挑十家公司，说它们的增长能持续复利——当然这里先排除那种之前利润被压得特别低的年份，我的意思是，如果某一年它们只是刚刚打平，那这个基数几乎就是零。

You can look at the Fortune 500, and if you want to pick 10 names on there that will compound their growth from other than some extraordinarily depressed year— I mean, if they had a year where they just broke even, so the number is practically zero.

但是，如果你从里面随便挑那些当前盈利已经创纪录的公司，再想选出十家，认为它们在未来二十年平均每年都能达到百分之十五或更高，我敢跟你打赌，你这份名单里超过一半最后都做不到。

But if you pick any company on there that currently has record earnings, and you want to pick out 10 of them that over the next 20 years will average 15% or greater, I will bet you that more than half of your list will not make it.

所以我觉得这是个错误，而且我在年报里也说过，我觉得这会逼着人们在会计处理上越拉越紧。

So I think it's a mistake, and as I've said in the annual report, I think it leads people to stretch on accounting.

我觉得这也往往会让他们去改变渠道上的做法。

I think it tends to make them change trade practices.

而且我并不是在特别针对 Gillette，但我可以告诉你，如果你去看那些这么干过的公司，你会发现很多人都犯过这类错误。

And I, you know, I'm not singling out Gillette in the least, but I can tell you that if you look at the companies that have done it, you will find plenty of examples of people that have made those sort of mistakes.

至于 Duracell，我是说，很明显，Duracell 的结果并没有像当时 Gillette 管理层希望的那样发展。

And I think that in connection with Duracell, I mean, obviously Duracell has not turned out the way that the management of Gillette at the time hoped that it was going to.

Charlie，当时进来做那个汇报的投资银行家是谁来着？

And who were the investment bankers who came in and made the presentation, Charlie?

M32:04

我觉得这种事一直都在发生。

I think that kind of stuff happens all the time.

以后也还会继续发生。

It will continue to happen.

这就是系统里自带的。

It's just built into the system.

M22:15

就是——

Just—

M32:15

我看到的高增长未来盈利预测，只会更多，不会更少。

I see more predictions of future earnings growth at a high rate, not less.

我的意思是，的确有少数人某种程度上像是发了个戒誓，不再这么说了，但这种人非常少。

I mean, a few people have sort of taken an abstinence pledge, but it's very few.

因为这就是分析师想听的。

It's what the analysts want to hear.

M22:33

这也是 investor relations 部门希望管理层去说的话。

That's what the investor relations departments want the managements to say.

这会让他们的日子更轻松，你知道，但五年后、十年后，真正还得留在那里继续面对同样问题的人，不一定是他们。

It makes their life easier, you know, but they don't have to be there 5 years from now or 10 years from now doing the same thing.

M12:43

这——

It's—

M22:44

我的意思是，如果我们给 Berkshire 预测百分之十五的增长，你知道，百分之十五意味着，在估值倍数不变的前提下，也就是说，五年后就是两千亿美元，十年后就是四千亿美元，十五年后就是八千亿美元，二十年后就是一万六千亿美元。

I mean, if we predicted 15% for Berkshire, you know, 15% means that, assuming the same multiples, I mean, that means, you know, in 5 years, $200 billion, in 10 years, $400 billion, you know, 15 years, $800 billion, $1.6 trillion in 20 years.

那估值就会变得太夸张了。

And the values get to be crazy.

你知道，如果你有一家企业，市值是四千亿到五千亿美元，而且不久前这种公司还真有好几家，你想想看，要在百分之十五的贴现率下，用未来现金流来证明这个估值合理，到底得做到什么程度。

And, you know, if you have a business with a market value of $400 or $500 billion, and you've had a few of those not so long ago, just think of what it takes to deliver in the way of future cash at a 15% discount rate to justify that.

如果一家企业今天一分钱现金都不给你，却卖到五千亿美元，那你知道，要让你的投资获得百分之十五的回报，它今年就得给你七百五十亿美元。

If you've got a business that's delivering you no cash today and it's selling for $500 billion, you know, to, to give you 15% on your money, it would have to be giving you $75 billion this year.

但如果它今年不给你七百五十亿美元，那你知道，明年它就得给你八百六十二点五亿美元。

But if it doesn't give you $75 billion this year, you know, it has to be giving you $86.25 billion next year.

如果明年也做不到，那第三年它就得给你接近一千亿美元。

And if it doesn't do it next year, it has to be giving you almost $100 billion in the third year.

这就是——这些数字大得吓人。

It just—those numbers are staggering.

我的意思是，某些市场估值背后隐含的那些意义，真的，你知道，简直像是《Gulliver's Travels》里的东西，或者类似那种。

I mean, the implications involved in certain market valuations really, you know, belong in Gulliver's Travels or something.

但人们却非常认真地对待这些估值。

But people take them very seriously.

我的意思是，人们当时真的是在给企业估值五千亿美元。

I mean, people were valuing businesses at $500 billion.

就在一年前，或者一年半以前。

A year or a year and a half ago.

而且从数学上讲——几乎没有什么数学计算——如果你要求自己的资金回报接近百分之十五，几乎不存在什么数学计算，能让你有可能证明那些估值是合理的。

And there's just no mathematical—almost no mathematical calculation you can make that would—if you demanded something like 15% on your money, there's almost no mathematical calculation you could make that would possibly lead you to justify those valuations.

M34:33

Charlie，你还有什么要补充的吗？

Charlie, do you have any more?

嗯，我在另一个场合说过，某种程度上，股票卖起来有点像 Rembrandts。

Well, I said on another occasion that to some extent, stocks sell like Rembrandts.

它们卖得好，并不是因为人们看这幅画能得到什么价值。

They don't sell based on the value that people are going to get from looking at the picture.

它们之所以能卖，是因为 Rembrandts 过去一直在升值。

They sell based on the fact that Rembrandts have gone up in value in the past.

当股票也出现这种估值方式的时候，就可能发生一些疯狂的事情。

And when you get that kind of valuation into stocks, some crazy things can happen.

Bond 要理性得多，因为没人会相信一只只支付固定、而且不高利息的 bond 能涨到天上去；但股票呢，它们的表现有一部分就像 Rembrandts。

Bonds are way more rational because nobody can believe that a bond paying a fixed rate of modest interest can go to the sky, but with stocks, they behave partly like Rembrandts.

我当时说，假设你把 America 每一家 pension fund 里装的全都换成 Rembrandts，那当然，随着人们不断买进越来越多的 Rembrandts，或者 Rembrandts 的碎片，而且价格越来越高，Rembrandts 的价格就会一路往上涨。

And I said, suppose you filled every pension fund in America with nothing but Rembrandts, and of course Rembrandts would keep going up and up as people bought more and more Rembrandts or pieces of Rembrandts at higher and higher prices.

我说，二十年都这么买 Rembrandts，最后不会搞出一团大乱吗？

I said, wouldn't that create a hell of a mess after 20 years of buying Rembrandts?

而如果股票价格整体上变得有点非理性，那这不就有点像把一半的 pension funds 都装满 Rembrandts 吗？

And to the extent that stock prices generally become sort of irrational, isn't it sort of like filling half the pension funds with Rembrandts?

我觉得这些都是很好的问题。

I think those are good questions.

M25:52

不过，一旦这个势头起来了，人们就会有非常强的利益去推销 Rembrandts。

Once it gets going, though, people have an enormous interest in pushing Rembrandts.

我的意思是，它会形成自己的利益群体。

I mean, it creates its own constituency.

所以，在一九——

So in 1.