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2007年股东大会 · 做投资决策时的重要考虑因素:机会成本

49 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:13
M1
M10:00

对,嗯,Buffett 先生、Munger 先生,再次感谢你们每年都这么慷慨地抽时间跟我们交流。

Yes, um, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger, thank you again for being so generous with your time with us, uh, every year.

我想接着那位来自 Australia,还有来自 Munich 的先生关于估值的问题继续问一下。

I'd like to follow up on the question from the gentleman from Australia and from Munich on valuation.

嗯,那位来自 Australia 的先生问到了安全边际,你的回答是,特别优秀的企业可能并不需要那么大的安全边际。

Uh, the gentleman from Australia asked about margin of safety, and you replied that a superior business may not require that much of a margin of safety.

那我接着想问的是,这是不是意味着,对优秀企业来说,未来就是按市场平均回报率来预期?

And my follow-up would be, is, does that suggest market rate of returns going forward for superior businesses?

然后关于 Munich 那个估值问题,你举了一个用贴现现金流给农场估值的例子,我很好奇你们是怎么得出贴现率的,以及面对不同企业时,你们会怎么调整这个贴现率。

And then on the Munich valuation, which you cited a farm example on discounted cash flows, I'm very curious how you come up with your discount rate and how you might adjust that discount rate based upon various businesses.

比如你们愿不愿意谈谈,你们给 Coca-Cola、J&J,或者你们过去一些投资所用的贴现率?

You might want to discuss your discount rates used for Coca-Cola, J&J, or some of your past investments?
M2
M20:59

对,我们并没有正式设定什么贴现率。

Yeah, we don't formally have discount rates.

我的意思是,每次我一开始讲这些东西,Charlie 就会提醒我,我这辈子从来没做过 spreadsheet。

I mean, every time I start talking about all this stuff, Charlie reminds me that I've never prepared a spreadsheet.

不过你知道,实际上我脑子里其实是在这么做的。

But I do, you know, in effect, in my mind I do.

但是,呃,很明显,对于一家企业,按我们现在投入的金额来比,我们希望它未来产出的现金回报,要明显高于 government bond。

But, uh, we are going to want to get a significantly higher return, obviously, in terms of cash produced relative to the amount we're outlaying now for a business than we are from a government bond.

我是说,这个你知道,肯定得先作为最基础的衡量标准。

I mean, we, you know, we're gonna—that, that has to be the yardstick at a base.

那接下来我们到底想要高出多少呢?

Then how much more do we want?

如果 government bond 的利率是百分之二,我们是不会去买一家企业,只为了未来很多年里预期赚到百分之三或者百分之三点五的。

Well, if government bond rates were 2%, we're not going to buy a business to earn 3% or 3.5% expectancy over the years.

我们就是不想用这种方式把钱投出去。

We just don't want to commit our money that way.

我们宁可坐着等一阵子。

We'd rather sit around and wait a little while.

呃,如果它们是百分之四点七五,那你知道,随着时间推移,我们希望拿到多少呢?

Uh, if they're 4.75%, you know, what do we hope to get over time?

嗯,我们希望比那个高出相当一截,但我没法告诉你说,我们每天早上都会坐下来,然后我打电话给 Los Angeles 的 Charlie,问他今天我们的 hurdle rate 是多少。

Well, we want to get a fair amount more than that, but I can't, I can't tell you that we sit down every morning and, and I call Charlie in Los Angeles and say, what's our hurdle rate today?

我的意思是,我们从来没真正用过这个说法。

I mean, we have never used the term.

呃,你知道,这有点像——我们想要的回报得足够高,这样就算股票市场关上两年,如果利率再上升一百个基点或者两百个基点,我们对买下的东西还是会觉得很满意。

Uh, you know, it's a little bit of the—we want enough so that we feel very comfortable if they close down the stock market for a couple of years, if interest rates go up another 100 basis points or 200 basis points, we're still happy with what we've bought.

再往上的话,我真的——我知道这听起来有点模糊,但它本来就是模糊的。

And above that, I really, you know, I know it sounds kind of fuzzy, but it is fuzzy.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M32:31

对,hurdle rate 这个概念本身当然是讲得通的,但很多人在谈 hurdle rate 的时候,也犯了不少很糟糕的错误。

Yeah, the concept of a hurdle rate makes nothing but sense, and yet a lot of terrible errors are made by people who are talking about hurdle rates.

不是说有些东西你能量化、能去猜,它就一定是你在这个复杂世界里处理问题时最关键的控制变量。

Just because you can measure something and guess it doesn't mean that it's the controlling variable in what you're dealing with in a messy world.

而且,呃,我觉得没有什么能替代这样一种思考:把大量投资选项摆在一起,认真想为什么这个比那个更好,以及它们各自大概能带来什么样的回报。

And, uh, I don't think there's any substitute for thinking about a whole lot of investment options and thinking about why one is better than another and what the likely returns are.

每一个都是如此,等等等等。

From each, et cetera, et cetera.

而 hurdle rate 这个概念的问题在于,不是说我们在某种意义上没有这么个标准,而是它作为一个比较事物的体系,没那么好用。

And the trouble with the hurdle rate concept, not that we don't have one in a sense, uh, is that it doesn't work as well as, as a system of comparing things.

换句话说,如果我手头有一个东西,我觉得它肯定能给我百分之八的回报,而且我想买多少就能买多少,而你这边有一个完全不错的投资,但我觉得它只能赚百分之七,那我连五分钟都不用浪费在你这儿。

In other words, if, if I have something available that I think will give me 8% for sure, and I can buy all I want of it, and you've got a perfectly good investment that I think will earn 7, I don't have to waste 5 minutes with you.

你就像那种邮购新娘的服务,结果寄来的新娘还带着 AIDS。

You're like the mail order service offering the bride through the mail and she's got AIDS.

你知道,我完全可以直接转去看别的题目。

You know, I can go on to some different subject.

而且,而且——所以说,机会成本这个概念,在投资里其实被讲得太少了。

And, and it's, it's—and so this, the concept of opportunity cost is so little taught in investment.

这个概念在所有主要大学的经济学大一课程里都会教,但你一到了 corporate finance 这些院系之类的地方,它就不太适合他们想用的那套数学方法,所以他们就把它忽略了。

They teach it in the freshman course in economics in all the major universities, but when you get to the corporate finance departments and so forth, it doesn't lend itself to the kind of mathematics they want to use, so they ignore it.

但在现实世界里,你做决策真正该依据的,就是你的 opportunity cost。

But in the real world, your opportunity costs are what you want to make your decisions based on.
M2
M24:19

对,而且就算你——就算你手上有一个你非常熟悉、而且非常有把握的东西,如果这时候有人拿个百分之八点五来找你,也不会让你心动。

Yeah, and even if you were— if you had something that you were really familiar with and were very sure on, the 8.5% wouldn't tempt you if somebody came along.

这对你来说是个很实际的问题。

That's a practical matter for you.
M1
M14:28

当然。

Sure.
M2
M24:28

这个——就像我刚才提到的,我待过十九家公司的董事会。

It— I've been on, as I mentioned, I've been on 19 corporate boards.

我会说,我看过的那些汇报——而且我看过很多——每一份里面都有 internal rate of return 的计算,你知道,要是把那些东西全烧了,董事会反而会更受益。

I would say that of the presentations I've seen, and I've seen a lot of them, and every one of them had a calculation of internal rate of return, you know, if they'd burned them all, the boards would have been better off.

我的意思是,这里面——这里面有太多胡扯的数据和说法了,因为做汇报的人本质上都知道听的人想听什么,也知道为了推动 CEO 反正本来就想做的事,到底需要拿出什么样的东西,所以你最后——最后拿到的就是一堆胡说八道的数字。

I mean, it, it is— there is so much nonsense presented because the presenters essentially know what the listeners are desirous of hearing and what is needed in order to get through something that the CEO wants to do anyway, that you just— it's just, you just get nonsense figures.

然后,呃,你知道,我们可能也会拿到胡扯的数字,但那至少是我们自己的。

And, uh, you know, we may get nonsense figures too, but they're ours.
M3
M35:10

对,我给你举个这方面的例子。

Yeah, let me give you an example of that.

我有个年轻朋友,专门向投资人卖 private partnership 的份额,他所在的领域竞争特别激烈,很难拿到像样的回报。

I have a young friend who sells private partnership interests to investors, and he's in a really tough field where it's hard to get decent returns.

我就问他,你跟他们说你的目标回报率是多少?

And I said, what return do you tell them you're aiming for?

他说,百分之二十。

And he said, 20%.

我说,你这个数字是怎么定出来的?

And I said, how did you pick that number?

他说,要是我定得再低一点,他们就不会把钱给我。

He said, if I chose any lower number, they wouldn't give me the money.
M2
M25:40

而我们认为,这世界上根本没人能拿着大额资金赚到百分之二十。

And there's no one in the world we think can earn 20% with big money.

我的意思是,这根本——所以任何人只要做出这种承诺,我们基本上立刻就会把他排除掉。

I mean, it just— so anybody making a promise like that, basically, we're going to write off immediately.

让我很惊讶的是,某种意义上,大投资人居然这么容易轻信,像 pension funds 这些也是。总有人跑来跟他们许诺什么 Holy Grail,而他们又太想得到那个东西了,所以你知道,他们就愿意去相信一些明摆着只能是胡扯的话。

It's amazing to me what, you know, in a sense, how gullible big investors are, pension funds and so on, in that they have people come around and promise them the Holy Grail, and they want it so badly, you know, that they're willing to believe things that just have to be nonsense.

我们来看第九位。

Let's go to number 9.