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巴菲特自己承认的投资生涯最大失败

38 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 3:25
M1
M10:01

大家好,我是 Leonid Sagalovsky。

Hello, I'm Leonid Sagalovsky.

我来自 Illinois 的 Chicago,还有 California 的 Berkeley。

I'm from Chicago, Illinois, and Berkeley, California.

非常感谢你们给我这个机会提问。

I'd like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to ask this question.

这是我第一次参加这个会议。

This is my first meeting.

我一般每五十年才来参加一次。

I tend to attend once every 50 years.

也感谢你们写的文章,两位写的那两篇,讲 Berkshire 的过去、现在和未来。

And also for your essay—both of your essays—on the past, present, and future of Berkshire.

在我们回顾过去这五十年的时候,我想请教这个问题。

As we reflect on the last 50 years, I'd like to ask you this question.

你们最难忘的一次失败是什么?你们又是怎么应对的?

What was your most memorable failure, and how did you deal with it?

谢谢。

Thank you.
M2
M20:34

是啊,这个嘛,我们在年报里多次谈过 Dexter。我在上世纪九十年代中期,看上了 Maine 州 Dexter 的一家鞋业公司,决定花大约四亿美元买下一个注定会变成零的东西。

Yeah, well, we've discussed Dexter many times in the annual report, where I, back in the mid-1990s, looked at a shoe business in Dexter, Maine, and decided to pay $400 or so million for something that was destined to go to zero.

而且是在几年之内就会归零,但我当时没看出来。

In a few years, and I didn't figure that out.

更糟的是,我还是用股票支付的收购价。我想,那些股票现在大概值,嗯,我也不知道,可能六十亿或七十亿美元。

And then on top of that, I gave the purchase price in stock, and I guess that stock would be worth, I don't know, maybe $6 or $7 billion now.

股价下跌的时候,我反而会感觉好一点,因为这样我的愚蠢造成的损失就少一点。

It makes me feel better when the stock goes down because the stupidity gets reduced.

在这件事上,没有任何人以任何方式误导我。

Nobody misled me on that in any way.

只是我自己看了以后,得出了错误的答案。

I just looked at it and came up with the wrong answer.

不过我得说,几乎每次我们发行股票,最后都成了错误。

But I would say almost any time we've issued shares, it's been a mistake.

你也这么认为吧,Charlie?

Wouldn't you say that, Charlie?

当然。

Of course.

对,我们现在已经很少这么做了。

Yeah, we don't do it much anymore.

是的,我们可能本来可以更大胆一点,尤其是在早些年。

No, we probably could have pushed harder, particularly in the earlier years.

我们一直把自己全部的净资产都放在公司里。

We've always had all of our own net worth in the company.

我们把整个家族的净资产都放进去了,还有那些从我们合伙企业一路跟过来的朋友,其中很多人把自己一半甚至更多的净资产交给我们管理。

We've had all our family's net worth, and we've had all these friends that came out of our partnership, many of whom put half or more of their net worth with us.

所以,我们做事一直一直一直都非常谨慎。

And so we've—we've been very, very, very cautious in what we've done.

回头看,可能有些时候我们本可以稍微再冒一点险,做成一些相当大的交易;现在看来,没去做是个错误。但我不愿意有百分之一的可能性,让我 Katie 阿姨的净资产化为乌有,或者发生类似的事。

And there probably were times when we could have stretched a little and pulled off something quite large, that we made a mistake looking back, but I wouldn't want to take a 1% chance of wiping out my Aunt Katie's net worth or something.

这种事,我这辈子没法接受。

It's just not something in life that I could live with.

所以,我宁可谨慎过头一百倍,也不愿意有百分之一点不够谨慎。只要我还在,这一点就不会变。

So I would rather be 100 times too cautious than 1% too incautious, and that will continue as long as I'm around.

不过,回顾我们的历史,人们会说,我们错过了一些很大的机会。那些机会我们是理解的,如果我们愿意出去多借点钱,本来是可以出手的。

But people looking at our past would say that we missed some big opportunities that we understood and could have swung if we'd wanted to go out and borrow more money.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M1
M12:54

嗯,这显然是真的。

Well, it's obviously true.
M2
M22:56

如果我们采用很多成功经营者所用的那种杠杆,Berkshire 会大得多。

If we had used the leverage that a lot of successful operators did, Berkshire would be a lot bigger.

大得多。

A lot bigger.

大得多。

A lot bigger.

但那样的话,我们晚上肯定会担心得睡不着。

But we would have been sweating at night.

因为钱的事晚上睡不着,真是太疯狂了。

It's crazy to sweat at night.

为了财务上的事情。

Over financial things.

对,为了财务上的事情。

Over financial things, yes.

好吧,我们就不继续聊这个了。

Well, we won't pursue that.

Carol?

Carol?