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2008年股东大会 · 分散化投资,其实只适合不懂投资的小白

56 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 5:52
M1
M10:00

嗨,我是来自 New York City 的 Isaac Dimitrovsky。

Hi, I'm Isaac Dimitrovsky from New York City.

Buffett 先生,很高兴来到这里。

Mr. Buffett, it's great to be here.

我读到过,在你的投资生涯里有好几次,你对某一个想法非常有信心,愿意把自己很多钱投进去,比如百分之二十五甚至更多。

I've read that there were several times in your investing career when you were confident enough in one idea to put a lot of your money into it, say 25% or more.

我相信其中有几次是七十年代的 American Express 和 Washington Post,我也听你聊过你当时的想法。

I believe a couple of those cases were American Express and the Washington Post in the '70s, and I've heard you discuss your thinking on those.
M2
M20:26

对。

Yes.
M1
M10:27

不过,你能不能讲讲,另外还有哪些时候你也有足够的信心去下这么大的注,你当时在那些情况下是怎么想的?

But could you talk about any of the other times you've been confident enough to make such a big investment and what your thinking was in those cases?
M3
M30:36

Charlie 和我,如果我们只是管理我们自己的净资产,那我敢肯定,在很多次情况下——如果把时间拉长到五十年来看——一定有很多时候,你会愿意把至少百分之七十五的净资产投进一个想法里,是吧?

Charlie and I have been confident enough—if we were only running our own net worth, I'm certain a very significant number of times, if you go over 50 years, there have been a lot of times when you'd have put at least 75% of your net worth into an idea, wouldn't there?
M2
M20:51

是不是这样,Charlie?

Aren't there, Charlie?

嗯,不过,你在 Berkshire 之外那百分之七十五的身家,从来就不是个多大的数。

Well, but 75% of your worth outside Berkshire has never been a very significant amount.
M3
M30:58

嗯,不过我是往前说。

Well, but I'm going back.

咱们就假设它是个大数。

Let's just assume it was.

就,就假设 Berkshire 不算在里面。

Let's, let's just assume you didn't have Berkshire in the picture.

确实有过这种时候——我的意思是,我们见过各种各样的机会,值得我们把百分之七十五的净资产投进去。

There have been times—I mean, we've seen all kinds of ideas we would have put 75% of our net worth in.
M2
M21:12

Warren,我这辈子有些时候,投进去的东西甚至超过了我净资产的百分之百。

Warren, there have been times in my life when I've had more than 100% of my net worth invested in things.
M3
M31:17

那是因为你有个友好的银行家,而我没有。

That's because you had a friendly banker and I didn't.

不,确实有过这种时候——嗯,最开始我有七十——我有过好几次,把自己百分之七十五的净资产放在一个单一机会里。

No, there have been times—well, initially I had 70—I had several times I had 75% of my net worth in one situation.

在很长一段时间里,你会看到一些情况。我的意思是,如果你操作的是比较小的资金规模,有些机会你不把一半净资产投进去,反而是个错误。

There are situations you will see, over a long period of time, I mean, you will see things that it would be a mistake, if you're working with smaller sums, it would be a mistake not to have half your net worth in.

我的意思是,在证券市场里,你有时候真的会看到那种板上钉钉的机会,只不过这种机会不会经常出现,而且电视上也不会有人在那儿谈这些。

I mean, you really do sometimes in securities see things that are lead-pipe cinches, and you're not gonna see them often, and they're not gonna be talking about them on television or anything of the sort.

但是一个人一生当中,确实会发生一些非常特别的机会,让你可以把自己百分之七十五的净资产,或者类似这么大的比例,投到某一个特定情况里。

But there will be some extraordinary things happen in a lifetime where you can put 75% of your net worth or something like that in a given situation.

问题出在那些把自己净资产的百分之五百都压进去的人。

The problem has been the guys that have put 500% of their net worth in.

我的意思是,你看——就拿 LTCM 来说。

I mean, you know, if you look at—just take LTCM.

都是非常聪明的人,也都是很正派的人,其中一些还是我的朋友,水平很高,也懂自己的业务。

Very smart guys, very decent guys, some friends of mine, high grade, knew their business.

但是他们把自己净资产的大概二十五倍压进去了;如果他们没下这么重,那些本来是稳操胜券的机会。

But they put, you know, maybe 25 times their net worth into things that were a cinch if they hadn't have gone in that heavily.

我的意思是,他们做的是那种最终必须收敛的交易,但他们没能把这手牌打完。

I mean, they were in things that had to converge, but they didn't get to play out the hand.

但如果他们当时只投了自己净资产的百分之百,结果本来会很好。

But if they'd had 100% of their net worth in them, it would have worked out fine.

就算投了自己净资产的百分之二百,结果也会很好,但他们最后却上到了,怎么说呢,大概百分之两千五百,或者差不多那种级别。

They'd had 200% of their net worth and it would have worked out fine, but they instead went to, you know, maybe 2,500% or something like that.

所以有些股票——我的意思是,其实这个房间里就有不少人,几乎把自己接近百分之百的净资产都放在 Berkshire 里,而且有些人已经这么持有了四十年甚至更久。

So there are stocks—I mean, actually, there's quite a few people in this room that have close to 100% of their net worth in Berkshire, and some of them had it for 40 or more years.

呃,Berkshire 不属于那种稳操胜券的类别。

Uh, Berkshire was not in the cinch category.

我觉得它属于高概率那一类。

It was in the strong probability category, I think.

但是,但是我在二零零二年,呃,在 junk bond 这个领域里看到过一些机会。

But, but I saw things in 2002, uh, in the junk bond field.

我在股票市场里见过一些情况。

I saw things in the equity markets.

如果你当年能买到 Cap Cities,而且是 Tom Murphy 在经营它,呃,在一九七四年前后,它的售价只有那些资产实际价值的三分之一,甚至四分之一,而且你还有世界上最好的经理人。

If you could have bought Cap Cities with Tom Murphy running it, uh, in the early— in 1974, it was selling at a third or a fourth of what the properties were worth, and you had the best manager in the world.

他在管理这家公司,而且这门生意本身就相当他妈地不错,就算——就算经理人不是,呃,你——你也完全可以把自己百分之百的净资产都投进去,还不用担心。

Running the place and you had a business that was pretty damn good, even if, if the manager wasn't, uh, you, you could have put— you could have put 100% of your net worth in there and not worried.

你也完全可以把自己百分之百的净资产放进 Coca-Cola,呃,比我们买入更早的时候就可以了,但至少在我们买入的那个时候,这也绝不是一个危险的仓位。

You could have put 100% of your net worth in Coca-Cola, uh, earlier than when we bought it, but certainly around the time we bought it, and that would not have been a dangerous position.

反倒是去做一大堆经纪人推荐给人们的其他事情,要危险得多。

Be far more dangerous to do a whole bunch of other things that brokers were recommending to people.
M2
M24:01

Charlie,你想评论一下吗?

Charlie, you want to comment?

对,如果——美国的学生进了这些顶尖的商学院和法学院,然后他们学的是现在这种教法的公司金融,还有现在这种教法的投资管理。

Yeah, if you— the students of America go to these elite business schools and law schools, and they learn corporate finance the way it's now taught, and investment management the way it's now taught.

这些人里有些还会在报纸上和别的地方写文章,然后他们会说,哦,投资的全部秘诀就是分散化。

And some of these people write articles in the newspaper and other places, and they say, well, the whole secret of investment is diversification.

这就是他们反复念叨的口号。

That's the mantra.

他们完全把这事搞反了。

They've got it exactly back-assward.

投资的全部秘诀,是找到那些你可以安全而明智地不分散投资的地方。

The whole secret of investment is to find places where it's safe and wise to non-diversify.

事情其实就这么简单。

It's just that simple.

分散化是给那些对投资一窍不通的人准备的。

Diversification is for the know-nothing investor.

它不是给专业人士用的。

It's not for the professional.
M3
M34:47

而且,对一窍不通的投资者来说,采用这个做法一点问题都没有。

And there's nothing wrong with the know-nothing investor practicing it.

这恰恰就是他们应该做的。

It's exactly what they should practice.

而这也恰恰是一个优秀的专业投资人不该做的。

It's exactly what a good professional investor should not practice.

但这,你知道,这里面并不存在矛盾。

But that's, you know, there's no contradiction in that.

一个一窍不通的投资者,只要他知道自己就是一窍不通的投资者,并且在买入股票的时间上做分散、在买入的股票种类上也做分散,那他就能拿到还不错的结果。

A know-nothing investor will get decent results as long as they know they're a know-nothing investor, diversify as to time they purchase their equities and as to the equities they purchase.

但对一个真正懂自己在干什么的人来说,那就太荒唐了。

That's crazy for somebody that really knows what they're doing.

而且,呃,你会碰到一些机会,如果你只把自己净资产的百分之二十投进去,那你其实就是浪费了一生一次的机会,你知道,从没有真正重仓这一点来说。

And, uh, you will find opportunities that if you put 20% of your net worth in it, you have wasted the opportunity of a lifetime, you know, in terms of not really loading up.

而我们在很久很久以前、手上管理的资金还很小的时候,确实有机会这么干。

And we've had the chance to do that way, way in our past when we were working with small sums of money.

但以 Berkshire 现在这种资金规模来操作,我们再也不会有那样的机会了。

We'll never get a chance to do that working with the kinds of money that Berkshire does.

我们会尽量在一些标的上重仓,呃,呃,而且市场偶尔也会时不时给我们这样的机会。

We try to load up on things, uh, uh, and there will be markets when we get a chance to from time to time.

但绝大多数时候,我们都很少能把任何一个好主意买到我们真正想买的那么多。

But very seldom do we get to buy as much of any good idea as we would like to.

看第一个问题。

Go to number 1.