1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特谈伯克希尔的保险业务是如何运作的 — 文稿

M10:00

Buffett 先生，我叫 Pete Brown，来自 Ohio 的 Columbus，是 Class B 股东。

Mr. Buffett, my name is Pete Brown from Columbus, Ohio, Class B shareholder.

我有几个问题，如果可以的话。

I had a couple questions, if I could.

第一个是，我脑子里对我们这种典型的保险业务到底是怎么运作的，其实没有一个特别清楚的概念。

The first is, I don't have a very good idea in my mind how our typical insurance operations work.

我是说，尤其是，钱是怎么从保险资金池流出去，再进入投资资金池的；还有，我们的运营方式跟全国各地那种很普通、很常见的保险公司到底有什么不同。

I mean, in particular, how money leaves the insurance pool and enters the investment pool, and how our operations are different than the typical run-of-the-mill insurance operation, you know, around the country.

为什么我们能产生比别的、你知道，某个 XYZ 公司之类的，多得多的 float？

Why are we able to generate so much more float than, than, you know, the XYZ company, you know, somewhere else?

M20:34

我们的保险业务，其实是一组保险业务，它们各自都有不同的特点。

In our insurance business, we really have a group of insurance businesses, and they have different characteristics.

嗯，不过它们共同的一个特点其实是，它们全都是非常、非常好的业务。

Uh, the consistent characteristic actually is that they're all very, very good businesses.

其中有些规模大得多，而且还有机会继续变得更大；有些则没那么大，在增长方面的机会也比较有限。

Some of them are a lot larger and have opportunities to get larger, and some of them are not so large and have limited opportunities in terms of growth.

但我们手上的每一项保险业务，对 Berkshire 来说，都是一项独特的资产。

But every insurance operation we have is a distinct asset to Berkshire.

我们有一个规模较小的 workers' comp 业务。

We've got a smaller workers' comp operation.

我们有一个 credit 业务，credit card 业务。

We've got a credit operation, credit card operation.

我们有一个 homestate 业务。

We've got a homestate operation.

我们还有各种各样不同的业务——Kansas Bankers Surety 之类的。

We have all these different businesses—Kansas Bankers Surety, whatever.

它们全都是好业务。

They're all good businesses.

其中有些业务相对于保费规模来说，不会产生很多 float。

Some of them don't develop a lot of float relative to premium volume.

Kansas Bankers Surety 这种业务的性质，就是它不会产生很多 float。

The nature of Kansas Bankers Surety is that it won't develop a lot of float.

这只是由他们承保的业务类型决定的。

It just happens to be the kind of business they write.

而 comp 这一类业务的性质，就是它会产生更多的 float，因为 comp 的理赔支付更慢。

The nature of comp is that it develops more float because comp claims pay more slowly.

我们——你其实应该把它们每一个都看成是有不同特性的业务。

We—you really should think of each one of those having different characteristics.

GEICO 和 super-cat 业务就完全不一样。

GEICO is entirely different than the super-cat business.

但它们都是好业务。

They're both good businesses.

至于钱一进来我们怎么投资，我们就是钱一进来就投资。

In terms of how we invest the money when it comes in, we invest it when it comes in.

我的意思是——比如我们今天收到一大笔 super-cat 保费，这笔钱马上就会被投资出去。

I mean, it is—we'll get a large super-cat premium today, it's invested.

那如果我们明天有理赔发生，我们就会把投资撤出来，你知道，而且可能是相当大的一笔。

Now, if we have a claim tomorrow, then we disinvest, you know, and in a substantial way.

如果你看像 GEICO 这样的业务，它的现金流大概率一直都会是正的。

If you take something like GEICO, the cash flow is always going to be positive, probably, on that.

你知道，我们不会再碰上另一个 Hurricane Andrew 了，因为我们已经在相当大程度上退出了 homeowners 业务。

You know, we won't have another Hurricane Andrew because we've backed out of the homeowners business to quite an extent.

所以 GEICO 那边是一个月一个月地有钱进来，而且它增长得越快，进来的钱就越多。

So month by month, the money comes in at GEICO, and the faster it grows, the more the money that comes in.

我们的资本非常充足，所以基本上可以把这些钱投到任何对 Berkshire 来说最合理的地方。

We have so much capital that we can basically put that money into whatever makes the most sense for Berkshire.

所以，不管是思维上的、心理上的约束，还是很多保险公司所处的那种监管约束，我们都没有。

So we have none of the—either the mental or psychological constraints or the regulatory constraints that many insurance companies operate under.

很多保险公司会觉得，它们好像应该把这一部分放这里，那一部分放那里，诸如此类。

That many of them think they sort of should have this portion and this and this portion and that and so on.

对大多数做保险的公司来说，投资通常都是排在保险业务后面的。

Investments usually play second fiddle to the insurance business at most companies that are in the insurance business.

我们把这两块看成同等重要，呃，而且我们是把它们当成两个彼此独立的业务来经营。

We look at them as being of equal importance, uh, and we run them as two distinct businesses.

投资这边什么最合理我们就做什么，保险这边什么最合理我们也做什么。

We do whatever makes most sense on the investment side, whatever makes the most sense on the insurance side.

你真的应该把我们的每一项业务都分开来看。

You really should look at each one of our businesses separately.

GEICO 和 super-cat 业务的特性完全不一样。

GEICO has entirely different characteristics than the super-cat business.

它们都叫自己是保险。

They both call themselves insurance.

它们都会产生 float。

They both develop float.

但从经济层面来看，还有从竞争优势之类的角度来看，它们是两个、两个非常不同的业务。

But in economic terms and in terms of competitive strengths and that sort of thing, they're two, two very different businesses.

我们那些规模较小的业务，也都是不同的业务。

And our smaller businesses are different businesses.

其中有些可能会有相当不错的增长。

Some of those may grow reasonably well.

我们会继续努力做下去。

We'll keep working on it.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M33:26

你看一只公司的股票，很显然，你可以买任何期限的 government bond，

You look at a corporate stock, it's obvious you can buy any maturity of government bond.

随你想买什么期限都行。

you want.

所以，买这只股票的一个机会成本，就是拿它去和 bond 做比较。

So one opportunity cost of buying the stock is to compare it with the bond.

那么，你可能会发现，美国一半的股票你要么是太害怕，要么是了解得太少，要么是评价太差，以至于你宁可拿 government bond。

Well, you may find that half the stocks in America you're so fearful about, or know so little about, or think so poorly of, that you'd rather have the government bond.

所以从机会成本的角度来说，这些股票就会先被过滤掉。

So on an opportunity cost basis, they're taken out of the filter.

然后你就开始找那些你觉得比 government bonds 好得多的公司。

Now you start finding corporations where you like the stocks way better than government bonds.

你必须把它们一个一个互相比较，等你找到一个你认为是最好的机会，而且是你能理解、并判断它是最好机会的标的，那你现在就有一个可以买的了。

You've got to compare them one against the other, and when you find one that you regard as the best opportunity, that you can understand as the best opportunity, now you've got one to buy.

这是个非常简单的想法，而且它用到的，不过就是经济学或者博弈论里最基本的一些概念。

It's a very simple idea, and it, it uses nothing but the most elementary ideas from, from, uh, from economics or game theory.

这其实就是——就思维过程来说，简直像小孩子玩的东西一样简单。

It's just—it's child's play as a mental process.

当然，难的是对企业做判断和估值，但这个思维过程本身是非常轻松的。

Now, it's hard to make the business appraisals, but the mental process is a cinch.

M24:33

如果有人硬要 Charlie 和我二选一——告诉我们，我们只能在 New York Stock Exchange 上市的全部两千五百只、三千只，或者不管总共有多少只股票里面，去买 A、B、C、D 这些股票中的某一只，或者去买一只十年期 government bond，而且股票要持有十年，bond 也要持有十年，那么大概率至少有百分之八十的情况，我们会选十年期 government bond。

If Charlie and I were forced—told we had a choice of buying stock A, B, C, or D in all 2,500 or 3,000 or whatever may be listed on the New York Stock Exchange, or buying a 10-year government bond, and we had to hold the stock for 10 years or the bond for 10 years, probably in at least 80% of the cases we'd take the 10-year government bond.

你知道，很多情况下，是因为别的那些业务我们了解得还不够透。

You know, in many cases because we didn't understand the business well enough elsewhere.

其次，就算我们看懂了，也还是可能更偏向那只百分之十的 government bond。

Secondly, we may understand it and still prefer the 10% government bond.

所以，不过我们会用这样的方式来衡量所有东西。

So, but we would measure everything that way.

还有，呃，我也不知道——Charlie，这个百分之八十是你估出来的吗，还是怎么来的？

And, and, uh, I don't know what—did you come up with 80% or where, Charlie?

假设你被扔到一个荒岛上，待十年，只能抱着一张股票凭证，或者抱着一张 government bond，你会选哪一个？

Desert island, 10 years, get to fondle a stock certificate or fondle a government bond, which one are you going to choose?

M35:15

不过总之，我觉得人生就是一连串的机会成本。

But anyway, I think life is a whole series of opportunity costs.

你知道，你得跟你能方便找到、而且也愿意要你的人里最好的那一个结婚。

You know, you got to marry the best person who is convenient to find who'll have you.

你知道，投资其实也是差不多同样的一种过程。

You know, investment is much the same sort of a process.

M25:34

我就知道，我们午饭后准会出状况。

I knew we'd get in trouble after lunch.

第二区。

Zone 2.