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2001年股东大会 · 保持对被收购企业的忠诚度给伯克希尔带来了什么好处?

41 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 5:16
M1
M10:00

嗯,你好。

Yeah, hi.

我是来自 Texas 州 Dallas 的 James Halperin。

I'm James Halperin from Dallas, Texas.

我从一九九五年起就是股东了。

And I've been a shareholder since 1995.

而且我对此感觉非常好。

And I feel great about it.

所以,谢谢你们。

So, thank you.

这个问题是关于 Berkshire 所谓的永久持有资产的。我的问题是,在做投资决策的时候,你们会不会用某种数学方式,去计算 Berkshire 对它所投资的上市公司保持忠诚这种声誉,到底值多少钱?

This question has to do with Berkshire's so-called permanent holdings and whether, when making investment decisions, you somehow mathematically calculate a value to Berkshire's reputation for loyalty to its public investees.

比如说,假设你们非常有把握,认为 Pepsi 或者 Procter & Gamble 的现金流增长会比 Coke 或者 Gillette 更快,而且替换持仓的成本优势大到足以完全抵消税务影响。

Let's say you were confident enough that Pepsi or Procter & Gamble would grow cash flow faster than Coke or Gillette would, and that the replacement value of the stock was less expensive enough to more than make up for the taxes.

那你们会不会比如卖掉 Coke,去买 Pepsi 呢?

Would you then sell Coke, for example, to buy Pepsi?

如果不会,为什么不会?

And if not, why not?

还有,在这类决策里,你们怎么衡量这种忠诚声誉的价值?

And how do you value this reputation for loyalty aspect in those decisions?
M2
M20:55

嗯,我觉得这是个非常好的问题。

Well, I think that's a very good question.

我不认为我们会——我觉得我们极不可能得出那样的结论,就是说我们会确定到那种程度——你刚才提到了 P&G 和 Pepsi,相对于我们现在持有的那些——说某家大型消费品公司一定会比我们持有的这些公司表现更好。

I don't think we would ever— I think it's very unlikely we would come to the conclusion that we were that certain that— you mentioned P&G and Pepsi versus the ones— but that some major consumer products company would do better than the ones we're in.

不过,我们很可能会判断另一家公司也会做得相当好,然后再额外买入它。

We might very well decide that some other one is going to do quite well and buy that additionally.
M1
M11:22

对。

Yeah.
M2
M21:23

但从实际操作上讲,如果我在一家公司的董事会里,或者 Charlie 代表 Berkshire 在董事会里,这就会变得非常困难。

As a practical matter, if I'm on the board of a company, or Charlie were to be representing Berkshire, it's very difficult.

我会说,对我们来说,交易他们的证券几乎是不可能的。

I would say it's almost impossible for us to trade in their securities.

因为这会带来太多问题。

It just creates too many problems.

别人会觉得我们知道一些其实我们并不知道的事,或者,尤其是如果我们在卖出的话,大家就会非常怀疑,我们是不是在公司内部发现了什么外界还不知道的信息。

People would think we knew something we didn't, or, you know, particularly if we were selling it, that, you know, people would be questioning very much whether we had detected something within the company that was not available to the rest of the world.

所以,只要我们进入董事会,实际上就等于放弃了非常大一部分投资调动的灵活性。

So we really give up an enormous amount of investment mobility when we go on a board.

所以我甚至不会去考虑你刚才说的那种做法,尽管如果我只是一个管理资金、经营这项业务的基金经理,我很可能会这么做。

And so I don't even think about doing what you're suggesting, although I might very well if I were just a money manager running the business.

当然,我们也已经在年报后面的 owner's manual 里、在那些基本原则里讲得很清楚了——对于那些我们买下控制权的企业,它们就是不卖的,哪怕价格再诱人,也不会让我们动心。

We certainly— and we've laid it out in the ground rules in the back of our owner's manual in the annual report— we've certainly said in terms of businesses we buy control of that they just aren't for sale and a fancy price will not tempt us.

我们也写明了例外情况,就是如果我们认为一家企业的盈利能力在可预见的未来会出现永久性下滑,或者企业出现了劳工问题——过去某个时期 The Buffalo News 就可能有过这种情况。

And we lay out that exception relating to businesses where we think there's a permanent loss of earning power as far as the eye can see, or businesses where we have labor troubles, which we— in the past, we might have had at The Buffalo News at one period.

但除此之外,仅仅因为我们觉得把钱放到别的地方能用得更好,我们对此是没兴趣的。

But otherwise, simply because we can use the money better someplace else, we're not interested in it.

你知道,我也没法真的钻进自己的内心,准确告诉你,这里面有多少是因为我觉得如果我们这么做,将来会更有利于我们收购企业;又有多少只是出于我的天性——就是当我和别人做了一笔交易,而且我对方和我相处的方式很满意时,我就愿意一直跟他们站在一起。

You know, I can't really dig into my psyche and tell you how much of that is because I think that will help us buy businesses in the future if we behave that way, or how much it's just my natural inclination that when I make a deal with somebody and I'm happy with how they behave with me, then I want to stick with them.

很可能两方面都有,你知道,我也不想硬去给这两者分个权重。

It's probably both, you know, and I, I, I wouldn't want to try and weight the two.

我对前者带来的结果很满意,我对后者——呃——也就是我内心对这件事的感受,本质上也很满意。

I'm happy, you know, with the results of the first, and I'm happy with the, the, uh, the way I feel essentially about the second.

我只是觉得,另一种做法太疯狂了。

I just think it's crazy.

我知道,如果 Berkshire 全都是我自己一个人拥有,我也绝不会去想着来回倒腾这些企业,仅仅为了交易那些信任我、我也喜欢、而且对我非常公平的人所经营的企业。

I know if I owned all of Berkshire myself, I wouldn't dream of trading around businesses with people that have trusted in me and that I like and that have been more than fair with me.

我绝不会为了让我的遗产从某个很大的数字的百分之百,变成某个非常非常大的数字的百分之一百零五,而去来回倒腾这些企业。

I wouldn't dream of trading around businesses so that my estate was 105% of some very large number instead of 100% of some large number.

我会觉得那简直是一种疯狂的生活方式。

I just would regard that as a crazy way to live.

我也不希望,因为我经营的是一家上市公司,就让我做出一些如果这是家私营公司的话、我自己会觉得不舒服的行为。

And I don't want the fact I run a public company to cause me to behave in a way that I would be uncomfortable behaving as if it were a private company.

不过我也觉得,作为股东,你们有权知道这是我个人一个比较特别的习惯或者说做法,所以二十年来,我一直都把这一点摆出来,呃,作为你们应该了解的事情,呃,不管你已经是投资人,还是在成为投资人之前。

But I also feel that you as shareholders are entitled to know that that's an idiosyncrasy of mine, and therefore I lay it out and have laid it out for 20 years, uh, as something that you should understand, uh, as an investor or before you become an investor.

我相信,从长远来看,这对我们做收购肯定是有帮助的;但是,它到底能不能在某种程度上弥补 Charlie 说的那种机会成本——也就是偶尔把一些资产在有利时机处置掉的机会——我不知道,而且这也是我永远不会去计算的事情。

I'm sure it helps us in acquisitions over time, but whether that in any way compensates the opportunity cost that Charlie talks about of making an occasional advantageous disposal, I don't know, and it's something I'll never calculate.

Charlie?

Charlie?

嗯,我倒是会去算,至少会大致地算一下,到目前为止,我认为这种忠诚带来的效果,对我们来说是加分的。

Well, I do tend to calculate it, at least roughly, and so far, I think that the loyalty effect is a plus in our life.

不过你觉得这一点在两边都成立吗——我是说,在 marketable securities 和 owned businesses 这两类里面都成立吗?

Would you regard that as true, though, in both public— I mean, both marketable securities and owned businesses?

哦,不是的。

Oh, no.

我觉得,对上市公司的大宗持股来说,这种忠诚效应远没有在 private companies 身上那么重要。

I don't think the loyalty effect in blocks of public companies is nearly as important as it is with the private companies.

你们可以说,我们去当一些公司的董事其实是个错误,因为一旦我们是董事,我们在投资上就放弃了大量的灵活性,这一点毫无疑问,确实如此。

You can say it's a mistake for us to be directors of companies because we give up a huge amount of flexibility in investment because we are directors, and there's no question that we do.

如果你唯一考虑的只是赚钱,那你就不应该去当任何一家公司的董事。

It's— if you're thinking solely of making money, you do not want to be a director of any company.

这一点是毫无疑问的。

There's just no question about that.