M20:42
嗯，我们看待企业风险的时候，会从这个角度去想：比如说，五年、十年、十五年之后，会发生什么事情，可能会摧毁、改变，或者削弱我们现在所认为这家企业具备的经济优势。
Well, we think of business risk in terms of what can happen, say, 5, 10, 15 years from now that will destroy or modify or reduce the economic strengths that we perceive currently exist in a business.
而有些企业，这点非常——根本没法判断，至少对我们来说没法判断，那我们干脆就不去想了。
And some businesses, that's very— it's impossible to figure, at least it's impossible for us to figure, and then we just, we don't even think about it then.
我们是极度厌恶风险的。
We are enormously risk-averse.
但我们不是那种会因为今天 California 发生地震，可能损失十亿美元，就害怕风险的人。
We are not risk-averse in terms of losing $1 billion if there were an earthquake in California today.
比如说，我们接下来大概一周左右，正在考虑承保一张超过十亿美元的原保险风险保单。
And we're thinking of writing a policy, for example, in the next week or so on a primary insurance risk of over $1 billion.
只要数学上对我们有利，这就不会让我们困扰。
That doesn't bother us as long as the math is in our favor.
但是，如果是做一组这样的交易，我们就会非常厌恶风险。
But in terms of doing a group of transactions like that, we are very risk-averse.
换句话说，我们希望自己在每一笔交易里，都有数学上的优势。
In other words, we want to think that we've got a mathematical edge in every transaction.
而且我们认为，一生中我们会做足够多的交易，这样一来，不管任何单独一笔的结果如何，整个组合的期望值——都会接近于一种确定性。
And we think that we'll do enough transactions over a lifetime so that, that, that no matter what the result of any single one, that the group expectancy would— gets almost to certainty.
当我们看企业的时候，我们会去想它们可能出什么问题。
When we look at businesses, we try to think of what can go wrong with them.
我们会去看那些现在很不错的企业，然后思考它们可能会出什么问题。
We try to look at businesses that are good businesses now, and we think about what can go wrong with them.
如果我们能想到很多可能出错的地方，我们就直接算了。
If we can think of very much that can go wrong with them, we just forget it.
我们不是——我们不是那种主动去承担很多风险的人。
We are not— we are not in the business of assuming a lot of risk.
在企业投资这件事上。
In businesses.
这并不是说我们不会无意中这么做，也不会犯错，因为我们当然会。
That doesn't mean we don't do it inadvertently and make mistakes, because we do.
但是我们不会——不会故意地，呃，或者主动地、自愿地进入那种我们认为存在非常重大风险、而且企业可能会发生重大变化的局面。
But we don't— we don't intentionally, uh, or, or willingly, voluntarily go into situations where we pursue— perceive really significant risks that the business is going to change in a major way.
这就回到了你们可能以前听我讲过的一个问题：这家企业周围到底有什么样的护城河。
And that gets down to what you've probably heard me talk about before, is what kind of a moat is around the business.
你知道，我们看每一家企业时，都会把它想成一座经济城堡。
You know, every business that we look at, we think of as an economic castle.
而城堡是会遭到掠夺者攻击的。
And castles are subject to marauders.
在资本主义体系里，不管你的城堡是卖 razor blades，还是 soft drinks，还是什么别的，你都得预期会发生这种事。
And in capitalism, any castle you have, whether it's razor blades or soft drinks or whatever, you have to expect that.
我的意思是，你会希望资本主义制度以这样的方式运转：外面有成千上万、甚至上百万手握资本的人，在想着怎么把你的城堡夺走，然后拿去为他们自己所用。
I mean, you want the capitalistic system to work in a way that millions of people are out there with capital thinking about ways to take your castle away from you and, and, and, and appropriate it for their own use.
接下来的问题就是，你的城堡周围到底有什么样的护城河，能保护它。
And then the question is, what kind of a moat do you have around that castle that protects it.
See's Candies 的城堡周围，就有一道非常棒的护城河。
See's Candies has a wonderful moat around its castle.
而 Chuck Huggins 自从一九七二年接手这道护城河以来，每一年都在把它不断拓宽。
And Chuck Huggins has taken that moat, which he took charge of in 1972, and he has widened that moat every year.
他会往护城河里扔鳄鱼、鲨鱼，还有食人鱼，这样别人想游过去进攻城堡，就会变得越来越难。
He throws crocodiles and sharks and piranhas in, in the moat, and it gets harder and harder for people to swim across and attack the castle.
所以他们就不这么干了。
So they don't do it.
你要是回头看一九七二年以来的情况，Forrest Mars 当年用 FLM 试过，我不知道，那大概是二十年前吧。
If you look since 1972, Forrest Mars tried with FLM, I don't know, 20 years ago.
而且，我都不敢去想，他为了那次尝试到底花了多少钱。
And, and I hate to think of how much money it cost him to try that.
而他本来还是个非常有经验的商人。
And he was a very experienced businessman.
所以我们看企业的时候，会从这个护城河的角度来想——看它有没有能力维持护城河的宽度，以及别人是不是根本没法跨过去；这是我们判断一家伟大企业最主要的标准。
So we, we think of them— we think in terms of that moat and the ability to keep its width and its impossibility of being crossed as the primary criterion of a great business.
而且我们会对旗下的经理人说，我们希望这条护城河每年都能变得更宽。
And to our managers, we say we want the moat widened every year.
你知道，这并不一定意味着今年的利润就一定比去年高，因为有时候并不会这样。
You know, that does not necessarily mean that the profit is more this year than last year, because it won't be sometimes.
但是，如果护城河每年都在变宽，这门生意最后就会做得非常好。
But if the moat is widened every year, the business will do very well.
当我们没有——当我们看到一条护城河在任何方面显得不够稳固的时候——回到你的问题上——那就实在是太冒险了。
When we don't have— when we, when we see a moat that's tenuous in any way, it's— getting back to your question, it's, it's, it's just too risky.
我们不知道该怎么去评估那种情况。
We don't know, we don't know how to evaluate that.
所以，我们就不碰它。
And therefore, we leave it alone.
我们认为，我们所有的企业——几乎所有的企业——都有相当不错的护城河，而且我们觉得这些经理人也都在不断把它们加宽。
We think all of our businesses, virtually all of our businesses, have pretty darn good moats, and we think the managers are widening them.
Charlie？
Charlie?
你还能说得比这更好吗？
How could you say it better?
来，这个问题答得不错，吃点 peanut brittle 吧。
Here, have a— have some peanut brittle on that one.
好，第六个。
Okay, six.