M1
M10:00
早上好，董事长先生，副董事长先生。
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman.
我叫 Andy Peake，来自 Connecticut 州的 Weston。
My name is Andy Peake, and I'm from Weston, Connecticut.
过去你们在中国做过一些投资——比如说 PetroChina 和 BYD，这里举两个例子。
In the past, you have made a few investments in China—PetroChina and BYD, to name two.
考虑到中国在世界上的重要性越来越高，你会给中国新一届领导层和企业 CEO 们什么建议，这样你才会在中国做更多投资呢？
Given the growing importance of China in the world, what advice would you give the new Chinese leadership and corporate CEOs such that you would make more investments in China?
谢谢。
谢谢.
M2
M20:25
嗯，Charlie 在中国做了最近的一笔投资，所以这个问题我就让他来回答。
Well, Charlie's made the most recent investment in China, so I'll let him handle that one.
M3
M30:31
对，我们可没花多少时间去给中国提建议。
Yeah, we're not spending much time giving advice to China.
M2
M20:40
这倒不是因为他们不想听我们的建议。
That's not because they're not hungry for our advice.
M3
M30:46
但你停下来想一想，中国是从一个非常非常艰难的起点走过来的，而他们现在做得非常好。
But if you stop to think about it, China's been doing very, very well from a very tough start.
从某种程度上说，我们反而应该去那边请教，而不是给建议。
To some extent, we ought to seek advice there instead of give it.
M2
M21:00
而且我们也一直是这么做的——我得说，在六十年的投资生涯里，我们发现，给任何企业里的人提建议，几乎都没什么用。
And we have—I would say that we found it almost useless in 60 years of investing to give advice to anybody in business.
M3
M31:12
我们发现，我们其实能控制的东西很多。
We have found that we have a lot of control.
这有点像拿一根面条去推着办事。
It's kind of like controlling affairs by pushing on a noodle.
很惊人的是，就算我们持有百分之二十的股份，我们实际能施加的影响也非常小。
It's amazing how little influence we've had when we've had 20% of the stock.
而人们总是有一种错觉，觉得总部拥有巨大的控制力。
And people have this illusion of vast control at headquarters.
Berkshire 的妙处就在于，我们建立了一套体系，不需要总部有太多控制。
The beauty of Berkshire is that we created a system that doesn't require much control at headquarters.
M2
M21:42
所以我们——如果你看看我们最大的四笔投资，它们现在的价值，可以这么说，肯定值五百亿美元。
So we—if you look at our 4 largest investments, which are worth, we'll say, they're certainly worth $50 billion today.
其中有一些我们持有了二十五年，还有一笔持有了二十年。
We've had some of them for 25 years, one of them, another one for 20 years.
我们跟这些公司的 CEO 交流过多少次呢——当然，除非我们在董事会里，我在 Coca-Cola 就是这样——但如果说到这些我们投了五百亿美元的公司，我会说，我们跟他们 CEO 交谈的次数，平均下来一年都不到两次，而且我们不是靠给他们提建议来做生意的。
The number of times that we have talked, unless we were on the board, which I was at Coca-Cola, but the number of times we've talked to the CEO of companies where we have $50 billion, I would say it doesn't average more than twice a year, and we are not in the business of giving them advice.
如果我们认为，一笔投资的成功要取决于他们是否听从我们的建议，那我们就会去找别的机会了。
If we thought that the success of our investment depended upon them following our advice, we'd go on to something else.