M10:17
嗯，答案是，我们其实并不会，你知道。
Well, the answer is we don't, you know.
如果我们对管理层失去信心，如果我们对它竞争优势的持久性失去信心，如果我们意识到当初买入时判断错了，我们会卖，而且卖过很多次。
If we lose confidence in the management, if we lose confidence in the durability of the competitive advantage, if we recognize we made a mistake when we went into it, we sell plenty of times.
所以这并不罕见。
So it's not unheard of.
但反过来讲，如果你真拥有一家非常棒的企业，而且管理层也很出色，不过最重要的还是这家企业本身非常棒，那拿不准的时候，就继续持有。
On the other hand, if you really get a wonderful business with outstanding management, but mostly the wonderful business part of it, when in doubt, keep holding.
但这也不是什么不可违背的铁律。
But it's no inviolable rule.
现在，在我们持有的这些企业里，不只是我们持有的证券，我们有一种态度，我们也在自己的经济原则里表达过：当我们买下一家企业时，就是打算长期持有的。
Now, among the businesses we own, not just securities we own, we have an attitude which we express in our economic principles that when we buy a business, it's for keeps.
而我们只有两个例外：一种是它们眼看就要开始无限期亏钱，另一种是我们遇到了重大的劳工问题。
And we make only 2 exceptions: when they promise to start losing money indefinitely, or if we have major labor problems.
除此之外，我们不会仅仅因为有人出更高的价，哪怕高到超过它本身的价值，就把它卖掉。
But otherwise, we are not going to sell something just because we get offered more money for it, even than it's worth.
这是我们一个比较特别的地方，我们也希望我们的合伙人知道这一点。
And that's a peculiarity we have, and we want our partners to know about that.
我们确实觉得，从长期收购企业这件事来看，这大概对我们是有帮助的。
We do think it probably helps us in terms of buying businesses over time.
而且这也是我们希望经营自己公司的方式。
It's also the way we want to run our business.
但股票和债券，我们是会卖的，只不过我们比大多数人更不愿意卖。
But with stocks, bonds, we sell them, but we're more reluctant to sell them than most people.
我的意思是，如果我们当初的判断是对的，我们愿意把它持有非常非常久。
I mean, if we made the right decision going on, we like to ride that a very long time.
我们持有过很多——我们有些股票一拿就是几十年。
And we've owned many—we've owned some stocks for decades.
但如果竞争优势消失了，如果我们真的对管理层失去信心了，如果我们最初的分析错了，而这种情况发生了，我们就会卖，或者如果我们发现了更有吸引力的东西。
But if the competitive advantage disappears, if we really lose faith in the management, if we were wrong in the original analysis and that happens, we sell, or if we find something more attractive.
通常我们手头都有很多现金，但在去年的九月，九月底的时候，我们已经承诺要向 Wrigley 投入六十六亿美元。
Normally we have plenty of money around, but in September of last year, late September, we had committed to put $6.6 billion in Wrigley.
后来 Goldman Sachs 需要五十亿美元，GE 需要三十亿美元。
We—and then Goldman Sachs needed $5 billion, GE needed $3 billion.
我卖掉了价值二十亿美元出头的 J&J，只是因为在当时那种情况下，我不想让我们的现金水平降到某个点以下。
I sold a couple billion dollars' worth of J&J just because I didn't like getting our cash level down below a certain point under the circumstances that existed then.
那并不是因为我对 J&J 有什么负面的判断。
That was not a negative decision on J&J.
只是——只是这意味着我想让手头多留二十亿美元左右，而且我看到一个机会，可以去做一件可能过不了多久就见不到的事；而 J&J 我以后随时都可以买回来。
It just—it meant that I wanted a couple billion more around, and I saw an opportunity to do something that I probably wouldn't see too much later, whereas I could always buy J&J back at a later date.
不过，那是个比较特殊的情况。
But that's an unusual situation.