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2001年股东大会 · 股东问芒格:您最近在投资上犯的重大错误是什么?

48 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 4:31
M1
M10:00

早上好,先生们。

Good morning, gentlemen.

我叫 Jay Parker。

My name is Jay Parker.

我来自 Washington State,这个问题是关于犯错的。

I'm from Washington State, and this question regards mistakes.

既然这样,那这个问题大概应该问 Mr. Munger。

So that being the case, it should probably be directed to Mr. Munger.

Mr. Munger,我知道您很喜欢借助 humility 来推动理性思考。

Mr. Munger, I know you're fond of invoking humility to promote rational thought.

所以我的问题是,Mr. Munger,您最近一次犯下的、最重大的商业错误是什么?为什么会发生?

So my question is, what's the most recent business mistake that you've made, Mr. Munger, and why did it occur?
M2
M20:31

这个问题我要记一下。

I'm going to take notes on this one.
M3
M30:40

在 Berkshire 的历史上,最严重的错误,其实是那些因为没做而犯下的错误。

The mistakes that have been most extreme in Berkshire's history are mistakes of omission.

它们不会体现在我们的数字里。

They don't show up in our figures.

它们体现在机会成本上。

They show up in opportunity costs.

换句话说,我们遇到过机会,几乎就要做了,事后回头看,我们能清楚地知道,不去做是一个非常大的错误。

In other words, we have opportunities, we almost do it, in retrospect we can tell that we were very much mistaken not to do it.

从股东的角度来说,在我们的历史上,真正代价最大的就是这种错误。而且很少——我觉得没多少管理层会认真去思考或者谈论机会成本。但是 Warren,我们已经白白错过了几十亿、几十亿、又几十亿美元。

In terms of the shareholders, those are the ones in our history that it really cost the most, and very few—I don't think many managements do much thinking or talking about opportunity costs, but Warren, we have blown billions and billions and billions.
M2
M21:31

那我干脆就直说了。

I might as well say it.
M3
M31:31

你说得对,没错。

You're right, right.

而且我们还在 계속犯这种错。

And we keep doing it.
M2
M21:39

有些人可能会说,我们在这方面越来越“擅长”了。

Some might say we're getting better at it.
M3
M31:43

我不喜欢提具体是哪几家公司,因为——你知道的,我们以后说不定还想买它们,而且我们会按我们的价格去买。

I don't like mentioning the specific companies because the—you know, we may in due course want to buy them, and we'll do so at our price.

但人生里几乎处处如此,公司经营里也是一样,真正代价巨大的,和本来轻而易举可能实现的结果相比,往往就是那些错失的机会。

But practically everywhere in life, and in corporate life too, what really costs in comparison with what easily might have been are the blown opportunities.
M2
M22:12

对。

Yes.
M3
M32:12

我是说,那真的是一笔惊人的钱。

I mean, it just—it's an awesome amount of money.

我年轻一些的时候,有人向我提供过三百股 Bellridge Oil。

When I was somewhat younger, I was offered 300 shares of Bellridge Oil.

哪怕是个傻子都能看出来,这笔交易几乎不可能亏钱,而且大有可能赚钱。

An idiot could have told me there was no possibility of losing money and a large possibility of making money.

我买了。

I bought it.

三天之后,那个人又打电话给我,说还能再给我一千五百股。

The guy called me back 3 days later and offered me 1,500 more shares.

但这一次,我得先卖掉点别的东西,才能去买这该死的 Bellridge Oil。

But this time, I had to sell something to buy the damn Bellridge Oil.
M2
M22:40

对。

Yeah.
M3
M32:41

但如果你一路追溯下去,这个错误让我损失了两亿美元。

But that mistake, if you traced it through, has cost me $200 million.

而这一切,仅仅是因为我得多费一点点事,去卖掉点东西。

And it was all because I had to go to a slight inconvenience and sell something.

Berkshire 也会干这种事。

Berkshire does that kind of thing too.

我们就是改不了。

We never get over it.
M2
M23:00

对。

Yeah.

我想补充一句,我们说的这类遗漏型错误,我们犯过不少,而且有些还非常大。

I might add that when we speak of errors of omission, of which we've had plenty, and some very big ones.

我们不是指那种没买某只股票,比如是朋友在经营,或者我们知道这家公司名字,结果它从一涨到一百。

We don't mean not buying some stock where a friend runs it or we know the name and it went from 1 to 100.

那不算什么。

That doesn't mean anything.

只有——我们只把那些处在我们能力圈之内的事情,才算作错误。

It's only—we only regard errors as being things that are within our circle of competence.

所以,如果有人知道怎么在 cocoa beans 上赚钱,或者知道怎么在一家 software company 里赚钱,诸如此类,而我们错过了,那在我们看来不算错误。

So, if somebody knows how to make money in cocoa beans or they know how to make money in a software company or anything, and we miss that, that is not an error as far as we're concerned.

真正算错误的是,某个东西我们明明看得懂,我们就站在那儿盯着它看,却什么也不做。

What's an error is when it's something we understand and we stand there and stare at it and we don't do anything.

或者更糟的是,最让我受不了的是,我们明明做了,却只做了非常小的一点。

Or worse yet, what really gets me is when we do something very small with it.

本来可以下很大的注,结果我们只滴了个眼药水那么一点。

We do an eyedropper's worth of it when we could do it very big.

Charlie 很文雅地把我这种做法称为,我在那儿吮手指。

Charlie refers to that elegantly when I do that sort of thing as when I'm sucking my thumb.

而且说真的——我的意思是,我们有时候确实会这样犹犹豫豫。

And they're really—I mean, we have been thumb-suckers at times.

面对那些我们其实很了解的企业。

With businesses that we understood well.

可能是因为我们开始买了以后,价格稍微涨了一点,于是我们就在那儿等,盼着它能回到我们最初开始买的那个价位,好让我们再多买一点。

And it may have been because we started buying and the price moved up a little, and we waited around hoping we would get more at the price we originally started.

这里面可能有很多种原因。

There can be a lot of things.

但这些都是巨大的错误。

But those are huge mistakes.

当然,传统会计根本不会把这些算进去。

Conventional accounting, of course, does not pick those up at all.

但在我们自己的记分簿里,这些都算。

But they're in our scorebook.

请 Zone 6 提问。

Zone 6, please.