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1995年股东大会 · 15%费雪+85%格雷厄姆=100%巴菲特 ??

51 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 5:18
M1
M10:00

来自 New York City 的 Neil McMahon,也是 Sequoia 的股东。

Neil McMahon, New York City, also a Sequoia shareholder.

Ben Graham 的投资方式会促使你做周转。

Ben Graham investing encouraged turnover.

看 Berkshire 的持仓集中度,还有长期持有的风格,你现在还是百分之十五 Phil Fisher、百分之八十五 Graham 吗?

Looking at Berkshire's holdings concentration and long-term, are you still a 15% Phil Fisher and 85% Graham?

我不知道这个比例该怎么算。

I don't know what the percentage would be.

在我刚才提到的那三点上,我是百分之百 Ben Graham,那几点确实非常关键。

I'm 100% Ben Graham in those 3 points I mentioned earlier, and those really count.

我非常——我当年受 Phil Fisher 的影响非常大。

I am very— I was very influenced by Phil Fisher.

大概在一九六零年前后,我第一次读到他的那两本书。

When I first read his 2 books back around 1960 or thereabouts.

我觉得那是非常棒的两本书。

And I think that they're terrific books.

我觉得 Phil 这个人也非常了不起。

I think Phil is a terrific guy.

所以我想,那个比例大概是我随口给出来的——我想我第一次说这个,大概是在有一次 Jim Michaels 给我写稿的时候,用在 Forbes 上。

So I think I probably gave that percentage to— I think I first used it in Forbes one time when Jim Michaels wrote me.

我想,你知道,那就是那种我随口报了个数字的情况。

And I think I, you know, it was one of those things I just named a number.

不过我觉得——我觉得我更愿意把自己看成是某种意义上,百分之百 Ben Graham,加上百分之百 Phil Fisher。

But I think it— I think I'd rather think of myself as being a sort of 100% Ben Graham and 100% Phil Fisher.

而在他们那些不同的点上——其实他们彼此并不真的矛盾。

And in the points where they don't— and they really don't contradict each other.

只是他们强调的重点非常不一样。

It's just that they had a vastly different emphasis.

Ben 不会不同意这样一个说法:如果你能找到一家资本回报率很高、而且还能不断把更多资本投进去继续产生高回报的企业,那这就是世界上最好的企业。

Ben would not have disagreed with the proposition that if you can find a business with a high rate of return on capital that can keep using more capital on that, that that's the best business in the world.

当然,他赚到的大部分钱都来自 GEICO,而那恰恰就是这种类型的企业。

And of course, he made most of his money out of GEICO, which was precisely that sort of business.

所以他是明白这一点的。

So he recognized it.

只不过他认为,另一套办法——去买那些从统计上看非常便宜的东西,而且一次买很多——更容易执行,也更容易教给别人。

It's just that he felt that the other system of buying things that were statistically very cheap and buying a large number of them was an easier policy to apply and one that was a little more teachable.

他会觉得 Phil Fisher 的方法没有他那套那么容易教,但他的那套价值也更有限,因为面对特别大的资金量时,其实并不好用。

He would have felt that Phil Fisher's approach was less teachable than his, but his had a more limited value because it was not workable with really large sums of money.

在 Graham-Newman Corp. 的时候,Graham-Newman Corp. 是一家 closed-end fund。

At Graham-Newman Corp., Graham-Newman Corp. was a closed-end fund.

严格来说,它在技术上算是一家 open-end fund,但它的净值是六百万美元,而跟它有关联的那个合伙企业 Newman and Graham 也有六百万美元。

It was technically an open-end fund, but it had $6 million of net worth, and Newman and Graham, the partnership that was affiliated with it, had $6 million.

所以加起来,你手上总共大概有一千两百万美元的资金池。

So you had a total pool of $12 million.

那你就可以到处去买一些小型 machine tool 公司——或者别的什么公司——的股票,总之都是那些从统计上看很便宜的。

Well, you could go around buying little machine tool comp— stocks in machine tool companies, whatever it might be, all statistically cheap.

而那是一种非常不错的组合式操作。

And that was a very good group operation.

而且他必须——你得——如果你持有的是一家烂企业,你迟早得把它卖掉。

And he had to— you have— if you own a lousy business, you have to sell it at some point.

我的意思是,如果你持有的是一堆烂企业,你最好盼着其中有些被收购,或者发生点什么。

I mean, if you own a group of lousy businesses, you better hope some of them get taken over or something happens.

你需要周转。

You need turnover.

但如果你持有的是一家非常棒的企业,你基本上是不想周转的。

If you own a wonderful business, you know, you don't want turnover, basically.
M2
M22:21

Charlie 呢?

Charlie?

在我看来,Phil Fisher 那类企业里很有意思的一点是,其中非常多后来都没能一直保持那种优秀企业的状态。

What was interesting to me about the Phil Fisher businesses is that a very great many of them didn't last as wonderful businesses.

他的一个业务是 Title Insurance and Trust Company,这家公司在 California 州基本上是称霸的。

One of his businesses was Title Insurance and Trust Company, which dominated the state of California.

它有最大的 title plant,而且那套系统是靠人工维护的。

It had the biggest title plant, which was maintained by hand.

而且它的财务偿付能力很强,信誉和操守也都很好,诸如此类。

And it had great fiscal solvency and integrity and so forth.

它就是在一个很赚钱的领域里占据了主导地位。

It just dominated a lucrative field.

后来 computer 出现了,现在你只要花几百万美元,就能建起一个 title plant,而且不用养一大群文员也能维护下去。

And along came the computer, and now you could create it for a few million dollars, a title plant, and keep it up without an army of clerks.

很快,我们就有了二十家不同的 title company,它们会去找那些特别大的客户,比如大型放贷机构和大型房地产经纪公司,按过去的标准给他们支付离谱的佣金。

And pretty soon we had 20 different title companies, and they would go to great big customers like big lenders and big real estate brokers and pay them outlandish commissions by the standards of yore.

然后,呃,就这样把一大块一大块的业务给抢走了。

And, uh, bid away huge blocks of business.

再后来,在 California 州,所有 title insurance company 加在一起的总盈利都跌到零以下了,而一开始它们几乎还是垄断地位。

And in due course, in the state of California, the aggregate earnings of all the title insurance companies combined went below zero, starting with a virtual monopoly.
M1
M13:26

嗯,它看起来像是个垄断,对吧?

Well, it looked like a monopoly, didn't it?
M2
M23:29

所以,真正安全到你可以直接往前看二十年的公司,其实非常少。technology 有时候是你的朋友,有时候却是你最痛恨的敌人。

So very few companies are so safe that you can just look ahead 20 years, and technology is sometimes your friend and it's sometimes your bitter enemy.

如果 Title Insurance and Trust Company 当时够聪明,他们就该把那个 computer——他们原本把它看成是降低成本的工具——当成人类遭遇过的最糟糕的诅咒之一。

If Title Insurance and Trust Company had been smart, they would have looked on that computer, which they saw as a cost reducer, as one of the worst curses that ever came to man.
M1
M13:55

你可以说,要运用 Phil Fisher 那一套方法,在某种程度上,可能比运用 Graham 的方法更需要商业经验和洞察力。

You can—it probably takes more business experience and insights, to some degree, to apply Phil Fisher's approach than it does Graham's approach.

唯一的问题是,如果你用 Ben 那套方法,你可能会有很长一段时间什么都做不了;而且如果资金规模很大,操作起来也会非常困难。

If you—the only problem is you may be shut out of doing anything for a long time with Ben's approach, and you may have a lot of difficulty in doing it with big money.

但是,如果你严格按照他的 working capital test 来挑选 securities,比如说,那是行得通的。

But if you strictly applied, for example, his working capital test to securities, you know, it will work.

只是它未必能在特别大的规模上奏效,而且有些阶段你可能就是——你可能就是没什么可做的。

It just may not work on a very big scale, and there may be periods when you're not—you're not doing much.

Ben 其实更像个老师,而不是一个——我的意思是,他并没有那种强烈想赚很多钱的冲动。

Ben really was more of a teacher than a—I mean, he had no urge to make a lot of money.

这对他没什么吸引力。

It did not interest him.

所以他——他真正想要的是一种他认为可以教给别人的东西,把它作为自己哲学和/或方法的基石。

So he was—he really wanted something that he thought was teachable and as a cornerstone of his philosophy and/or approach.

他觉得,你坐在 Omaha 这里读他的书,然后去应用,买那些从统计上看很便宜的东西,就可以了;你不需要对商业、消费者行为,或者类似这些方面有任何特别的洞察。

And he felt you could read his books sitting out here in Omaha and apply buying things that were statistically cheap, and you didn't have to have any special insights about business or consumer behavior or anything of the sort.

我认为这一点毫无疑问是对的,但我也不认为你能按照这种方式去管理非常大规模的资金。

And I don't think there's any question about that being true, but I also don't think you can, you can manage lots of money in accord with it.

Zone 2?

Zone 2?