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2002年股东大会 · 巴菲特:如何区分投资与投机

78 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 8:21
M1
M10:00

问题的第二部分呢?

The second part of the question?
M2
M20:02

谢谢,先生。

Thank you, sir.

我问题的第二部分是这样的:按照你对 gold 的判断,如果把美元相对于 gold 的价值出现大幅下跌这个因素算进去,比如说下跌百分之四十或者更多;再考虑到一九二九到一九四八年,以及一九六四到一九八一年这两个时期,和美元贬值呈正相关,而你研究的另外两个时期则是负相关,那么你会不会调整一下你刚才提到的、对未来十年 common equity 每年百分之七总回报的预期?

The second part of my question is this: given your assumptions on gold, if you were to factor a significant decline in the value of the dollar against gold, let's say 40% or more, and given the correlation of 1929-48 and '64-81 eras positively to decline of the dollar, and the negative correlation in the other two eras that you had studied, would you care to adjust the 7% total annual return you were quoted as expecting for common equity in the coming decade?

另外,结合这一点,你愿不愿意也谈谈你对其他主要资产类别的预期回报率?比如说 bonds、real estate,还有你认为对投资者来说,哪一类资产最有价值?

And in conjunction with that, would you care to comment on your expected rate of return on all other major asset classes, perhaps like bonds, real estate, and which would you believe offers the best value for investors?

非常感谢。

Thank you very much.
M1
M10:50

除非是在不寻常的情况下,我的预期——对。

Except under unusual circumstances, my expected— right.

像 bonds 这种东西,我的预期回报就是它在当时能提供的收益率。

My expectancy on something like bonds is what bonds are producing at a given time.

我不觉得自己比 bond market 更聪明。

I don't think I'm smarter than the bond market.

当然,你可以问,当这些利率大幅波动的时候,难道我的看法也会跟着大幅波动吗?

Now, you can say, when those rates swing all over, does that mean I swing all over?

答案基本上是,会。

The answer is pretty close to yes.

我的意思是,我不知道 bonds 的正确利率应该是多少。

I mean, I don't know what the right rate for bonds is.

我觉得,如果说有什么的话——我对经济相关性这类东西是非常警惕的。

I think that if there's— I'm very leery of economic correlations.

我是说,我花了很多年折腾这类东西,我把 stock prices 跟世界上各种各样的东西都做过相关分析。

I mean, I spent years fooling around with that sort of thing, and I mean, I correlated stock prices with everything in the world.

然后,问题就在于,当我真的找到一种相关性的时候。

And the, you know, the problem was when I found a correlation.

我的意思是,就像你们看过那种说法,什么 AFC 还是 NFC 赢了 Super Bowl,就会怎样怎样,诸如此类的东西。

I mean, it's, you know, you've seen these things on whether the AFC or the NFC wins the Super Bowl and all that sort of thing.

你总能找到一个东西和另一个东西存在相关性,但归根结底,一家企业,或者任何一种经济资产,它值多少钱,取决于它在整个生命周期里能产出多少 cash。

You can find something that correlates with something else, but in the end, a business or any economic asset is going to be worth what it produces in the way of cash over its lifetime.

如果你拥有一块 oil field,拥有一个 farm,拥有一栋 apartment house,你知道,对 oil field 来说,关键就是这块油田的寿命,以及你能从里面开采出多少东西。

And if you own an oil field, if you own a farm, if you own an apartment house, you know, with the oil field, it's the life of the oil field and what you can get out of it.

也许你能做 secondary recovery,也许你能做 tertiary recovery。

Maybe you get secondary recovery, maybe you get tertiary recovery.

不管怎么样,它的价值就是未来能开采出来的 oil 的折现价值。

Well, whatever it may be, it's worth the discounted value of the oil that's going to come out.

然后你还得去估计产量,以及价格。

And then you have to make an estimate as to volume and as to price.

对于 farm,你要估计作物产量、成本,还有农产品价格。

With a farm, you make an estimate as to crop yield and costs and crop prices.

对于 apartment house,你要估计租金、运营开支、它能维持多久,以及未来什么时候会有人盖出新的 apartment houses,让未来潜在租客觉得那些更新的更合意,等等。

And the apartment house, you make an estimate as to rentals and operating expenses and how long it'll last and when people will build other new apartment houses that potential renters in the future will find preferable and so on.

但所有投资,本质上就是现在先拿出一些钱,未来再拿回更多的钱。

But all investment is, is laying out some money now to get more money back in the future.

那么,对于这个“未来把钱拿回来”,有两种看法。

Now, there's two ways of looking at the getting the money back.

一种是看这个资产本身会产出什么——这叫投资。

One is from what the asset itself will produce— that's investment.

另一种是看以后别人愿意花多少钱从你手里买走它,而不管这个资产本身能产出什么,我把这叫做投机。

One is from what somebody else will pay you for it later on, irrespective of what the asset produces, and I call that speculation.

所以,如果你看的是资产本身,那你就不会在意市场报价,因为这个资产会自己为你产出钱。

So if you are looking to the asset itself, you don't care about the quote because the asset is going to produce the money for you.

而这也就是——这就是整个社会从投资这项资产中最终能得到的东西。

And that's how— that's what society as a whole is going to get from investing in that asset.

另一种看法则是,看明天会有人愿意为它出多少钱,哪怕它本身其实一文不值。

Then there's the other way of looking at it, is what somebody will pay you tomorrow for it, even if it's valueless.

那就是投机。

And that's speculation.

当然,社会最终从这里头什么也得不到,但有一群人会通过让另一群人付出代价来赚钱。

And of course, society gets nothing out of that eventually, but one group profits at the expense of another.

当然,几年前那场泡沫里,这种现象的规模非常大。

And of course, you had that operate in a huge way in the bubble of a few years ago.

你会看到各种各样根本产不出任何东西的玩意儿,但短期内却发生了大量的财富转移。

You had all kinds of things that were going to produce nothing, but where you had great amounts of wealth transfer in the short term.

如果把它们当成投资来看,你知道,那就是一场灾难。

As investments, you know, they were a disaster.

但如果把它们当成财富转移的手段来看,对某些人来说,那可太棒了。

As means of wealth transfer, they were terrific for certain people.

而对那些站在财富转移另一边的人来说,那就是灾难。

And they were—for the other people that were on the other side of the wealth transfer, they were disasters.

我们只看一点——我们根本不在乎它有没有市场报价,因为我们买它,并不是想着再卖给别人。

We look solely—we don't care whether something's quoted because we're not—we don't buy it with the idea of selling it to somebody.

我们看的是这门生意本身最终能产出什么。

We look at what the business itself will produce.

我们在一九七二年买下了 See's Candies。

We bought See's Candies in 1972.

它之所以成功,是因为后来它持续产生了现金。

The success of that has been because of the cash it's produced subsequently.

这可不是建立在我每天打电话给某家券商,然后问一句:我的 See's Candies 股票现在值多少钱。

It's not based on the fact I call up somebody at a brokerage house every day and say, what's my See's Candies stock worth?

这就是我们对待任何东西的方法。

And that, that is our approach to anything.

说到利率,我不擅长。

On interest rates, I'm no good.

几年前我买了一些 REITs,因为我觉得它们被低估了。

I bought some REITs a couple of years ago because I thought they were undervalued.

我为什么会觉得它们被低估了?

Why did I think they were undervalued?

因为我觉得,按那些公司的资产来看,它们可以产生百分之十一到百分之十二的回报,而我认为百分之十一到百分之十二的回报很有吸引力。

Because I thought they could produce 11% or 12% in terms of the assets that those companies had, and I thought an 11% or 12% return was attractive.

现在,REITs 的价格更高了,所以你知道,它们已经不像当时那么有吸引力了。

Now, the REITs are selling at higher prices and, you know, they're not as attractive as they were then.

但你就是去看每一种资产类别、每一门生意、每一个农场、每一个 REIT,不管它是什么,然后问一句:这东西随着时间推移,大概率能产出多少?

But you just look at every asset class, every business, every farm, every REIT, whatever it may be, and say, what is this thing likely to produce over time?

这就是它的价值。

And that's what it's worth.

它在不同时间点的成交价格,可能会有天差地别,但那只意味着一个人在另一个人身上赚钱,而那不是我们玩的游戏。

It may sell at vastly different prices from time to time, but that just means one person is profiting against another, and that's not our game.
M3
M35:03

Charlie?

Charlie?

普通股的价格之所以这么难预测,是因为普通股这种具有广泛流动性的市场,会时不时在某些板块,或者整个市场里,形成一种 Ponzi scheme。

What makes common stock prices so hard to predict is that a general liquid market for common stocks creates from time to time, either in sectors of the market or in the whole market, a Ponzi scheme.

换句话说,会有一种自动发生的过程:有人被吸进去,另外一些人又跟着进来,因为上个月有用,或者去年有用;它可以一路堆到荒唐透顶的程度,而且这种水平还能持续相当长一段时间。

In other words, you have an automatic process where people get sucked in and other people come in because it worked last month or last year, and it can build to perfectly ridiculous levels, and the levels can last for considerable periods.

要去预测这种东西,这种某种意义上的 Ponzi scheme——你也可以说,它是偶然被塞进普通股估值里的——

Trying to predict that kind of thing, sort of a Ponzi scheme, which is, if you will, accidentally thrown into the valuation of common stocks.

就是生活本身各种力量推动出来的。

By just the forces of life.

按定义来说,这会非常非常难预测。

By definition, that's going to be very, very hard to predict.

这也就是为什么,即便股票被严重高估了,做空它们还是这么危险。

That's what makes it so dangerous to short stocks, even when they're grossly overvalued.

你很难知道,在已经存在的高估之外,它们还能被高估到什么程度。

It's hard to know just how overvalued they can become in addition to the overvaluation that exists.

而且我不认为,你能通过看 gold 的价格,或者任何别的相关性,来预测市场里的这种 Ponzi scheme 效应。

And I don't think you're going to predict the Ponzi scheme effect in markets by looking at the price of gold or any other correlation.
M1
M16:35

Charlie 和我——我是随口估个数——我们大概至少在一百家公司上达成过一致,也可能更多,我们都觉得那些是骗局,你知道,就是那种泡沫型的东西。

Charlie and I—I mean, I'm pulling a figure out of the air—we have probably agreed on at least 100 companies, maybe more, that we felt were frauds, you know, bubble-type things.

如果这些年来我们真的去做空那些东西,我们现在说不定早就破产了。

And if we'd acted on shorting those over the years, we might be broke now.

但在判断上,我们大概是一百次里差不多一百次都判断对了。

But we were right on probably just about 100 out of 100.

只是,Charlie 说的那种 Ponzi scheme,到底还能膨胀到什么程度,是很难预测的。

It's just, it's very hard to predict how far what Charlie calls the Ponzi scheme will go.

它也不完全算是那种“scheme”,因为大多数情况下,它并不是某一个人精心炮制出来的。

It's not exactly a scheme in the sense that it isn't concocted, in most cases, by one person.

它更像是一种自然现象,只不过会被 promoters、investment bankers、venture capitalists 这些人一路推着、养着往前走。

It's sort of a natural phenomenon that seems to be nursed along by promoters and investment bankers and venture capitalists and so on.

但他们也不是说会一起坐在一个房间里商量好这一切。

But it's— they don't all sit in a room and work it out.

它就是——会利用人性的某些特点,然后自己形成动能,最后砰的一下破掉。

It just— it plays on human nature in certain ways, and it creates its own momentum, and eventually it pops.

你知道,没人知道它什么时候会破,所以你没法去做空——至少我们觉得,做空这类东西并不是特别明智。

You know, and nobody knows when it's going to pop, and that's why you can't short— at least we don't find it makes good sense to short those things.

但它们——这种东西其实是看得出来的。

But they are— it is recognizable.
M3
M37:44

对。

Yes.
M1
M17:45

你其实知道,自己面对的是这类疯狂的东西,但你不知道它会涨到多高,什么时候结束,或者别的什么。

You know when you're dealing with those kind of crazy things, but you don't know when— how high they'll go or when it'll end or anything else.

而那些自以为知道的人,有时候就会下场去玩。

And people who think they do, you know, sometimes play in it.

还有一些人知道怎么利用这种情况。

And other people know how to take advantage of it.

我的意思是,这一点是毫无疑问的。

I mean, there's no question about that.

你不需要有两百的 IQ,才能看懂那样一个时期,然后想出怎么把别人的大笔财富转到自己这边来。

You don't— you do not have to have a 200 IQ to see a period like that and figure out how to have a big wealth transfer from somebody else to you, you know.

而且,这种事当时是大规模发生的。

And, and that was done on a huge scale.

你知道,近年来,这并不是资本主义最值得赞赏的一面。

You know, in recent years, it's not the, you know, it's not the most admirable aspect of capitalism.

第四区。

Area 4.