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2019年股东大会 · 伯克希尔账上的千亿现金,为何不去买标普指数基金?

53 段 · 4 位说话人 · 原片 7:53
F1
F10:00

Warren,你一直都很推崇指数投资,也主张不要去择时。

Warren, you are a big advocate of index investing and of not trying to time the market.

但 Berkshire 持有这么大一笔现金和 T-bills,在我看来,你这好像有点说一套做一套。

But by your having Berkshire hold such a large amount of cash and T-bills, it seems to me you don't practice what you preach.

我在想,一个不错的替代方案是,在你找到有吸引力的收购机会或者回购股票之前,把 Berkshire 大部分多余的现金投到一个分散得很好的指数基金里。

I'm thinking that a good alternative would be for you to invest most of Berkshire's excess cash in a well-diversified index fund until you find an attractive acquisition or buy back stock.

如果过去十五年你一直这么做,同时始终保留你想要的两百亿美元现金缓冲,我估计到二零一八年底,公司账上的一千一百二十亿美元现金、现金等价物和短期 T-bills 投资,本来就不是现在这个数了,而是大概会值一千五百五十亿美元。

Had you done that over the past 15 years, all the time keeping the $20 billion cash cushion you want, I estimate that at the end of 2018, the company's $112 billion balance in cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments in T-bills would have instead been worth about $155 billion.

这两个数字之间的差额,就是机会成本,相当于 Berkshire 目前账面价值的百分之十二以上。

The difference between the two figures is an opportunity cost equal to more than 12% of Berkshire's current book value.

你怎么回应我这个说法?

What is your response to what I say?

还有——我刚忘了说,这个问题来自 Mike Elhar,他就职于位于佛罗里达州 Boca Raton 的 The Colony Group。

And for— I forgot to say the question is from Mike Elhar, who is with The Colony Group located in Boca Raton, Florida.
M1
M11:10

这个问题问得完全合理,我也不会去跟这些数字抬杠。

That's a perfectly decent question, and I wouldn't quarrel with the numbers.

我会说,比如这确实是一种可选方案,我的接班人也许会想采用,因为综合来看,比起拿着 Treasury bills,我其实更愿意持有指数基金。

And I would say that, that, that is an alternative, for example, that my successor may wish to employ, because on balance, I would rather own an index fund than carry Treasury bills.

不过我得说,如果我们在二零零七年或者零八年就开始实行这个政策,那到了二零零八年底或者二零零九年,我们调动资金的能力可能就会处在不一样的位置。

I would say that if we'd instituted that policy in 2007 or '08, we might have been in a different position in terms of our ability to move late in 2008 or 2009.

所以,当规模是几千亿美元的时候,这在执行上会有一些问题;如果你处理的是十亿美元、二十亿美元这种规模,情况就不一样了。

So it has certain execution problems with hundreds of billions of dollars that it does if you were having a similar policy with a billion or $2 billion or something of the sort.

但这确实是个完全理性的观察。

But it's a perfectly rational observation.

当然,回头看这十年的牛市,这一点确实会特别显眼。

And certainly looking back on 10 years of a bull market, it really jumps out at you.

不过我会说,如果你操作的是更小规模的资金,这么做会很有道理。

But I would argue that if you were working smaller numbers, it would make a lot of sense.

而如果你操作的是大规模资金,那 Berkshire 未来也很可能适合用这种方式来运作。

And if you're working with large numbers, it might well make sense in the future at Berkshire to operate that way.

你知道,我们一周前刚刚承诺投出了一百亿美元;而且在某些情况下——这些情况不是完全不可能,虽然在任何一个具体的星期、月份或者年份里都不算大概率——但在某些情况下,我们可以非常非常快地花出去一千亿美元。

You know, we committed $10 billion a week ago, and there are conditions under which— and they're not remote, they're not likely in any given week or month or year, but there are conditions under which we could spend $100 billion very, very quickly.

如果真出现了那种情况,如果那些条件存在,那这些资本就会被配置得非常好,比放在指数基金里要好得多。

And if we did, if those conditions existed, it would be capital very well deployed and much better than in an index fund.

所以我们一直是按这样一个前提在运作:我们终究会等到配置资本的机会。

So we've been— we're operating on the basis that we will get chances to deploy capital.

这些机会很可能会成批出现,而且会出现在别人都不想配置资本的时候。

They will come in clumps in all likelihood, and they will come when other people don't want to allocate capital.

Charlie,你怎么看?

Charlie, what do you think about it?
M2
M23:18

嗯,我承认,跟别人比起来,我在现金这件事上是稍微更保守一点——不过我觉得这样也没什么问题。

Well, I plead guilty to being a little more conservative with the cash than other people, and— but I think that's all right.

事后诸葛亮地看,我们当然可以把所有钱都投进很多证券里,而且那些证券的表现会比 S&P 更好。

We could have put all the money into a lot of securities that would have done better than the S&P with 20/20 hindsight.

要记住,在那段时间里,我们之所以一直留着那么多额外现金,是为了万一有机会出现,等等这些情况。

Remember, we had all that extra cash all that period if something had come along in the way of opportunities and so on.

像我们这么大的公司,现金头寸稍微多一点,我不觉得这是什么罪过。

I don't think it's a sin to be a little strong on cash when you're as big a company as we are.

我们没必要那样——我亲眼看着 Harvard 把最后一点现金都用上了,连家长预付的学费都算进去,然后在一个完全错误的时点一头扎进市场,还对 private equity 做了大量远期承诺。

We don't have to— I watched Harvard use the last ounce of their cash, including all their prepaid tuition from the parents, and plunge it into the market at exactly the wrong moment and make a lot of forward commitments to private equity.

结果他们整整经历了两三年的极度煎熬。

And they suffered like 2 or 3 years of absolute agony.

我们可不想变成 Harvard 那样。

We don't want to be like Harvard.
M1
M14:10

还有 timber,以及一大堆别的东西。

Plus timber and a whole bunch of things.

还有 timber,另外——我是说——

Plus timber and— I mean—.
M2
M24:13

对,对,我们不会改的。

Yeah, yeah, we're not going to change.
M1
M14:22

我们确实喜欢手里有很多钱,这样我们就能动作非常快,而且出手非常大。

We do like having a lot of money to be able to operate very fast and very big.

也许我们不会——我们知道,这种机会不会经常出现。

And maybe we won't— we know we won't get those opportunities frequently.

我觉得——当然了,你知道,未来二十年或三十年里,肯定会有两三次那种像天上掉金子一样的时刻,你要做的只是走到外面去。

I don't think— certainly, you know, in the next 20 or 30 years, there'll be 2 or 3 times when it'll be raining gold and all you have to do is go outside.

但我们不知道那会在什么时候发生,而我们有很多钱可以投入。

But we don't know when they will happen, and we have a lot of money to commit.

我会这么说,如果你告诉我,我必须要么拿着短期 Treasury bills,要么持有 index funds,让这笔钱就这么广泛地投资在 America,我会选 index funds。

And I would say that if you told me I had to either carry short-term Treasury bills or have index funds and just let that money be invested in America generally, I would take the index funds.

但我们还是抱有希望。

But we still have hopes.

还有一点你们一定要非常明确地理解,关于 Berkshire,我们经营这家公司的一种方式,是我们认为这符合那些几乎把自己全部净资产都放在 Berkshire 里的股东的利益。

And the one thing you should very definitely understand about Berkshire is that we run the business in a way that we think is consistent with serving shareholders who have virtually all of their net worth in Berkshire.

我自己刚好就是这种情况,但不管在什么情况下,我都会这么做。

I happen to be in that position myself, but I would do it that way under any circumstances.

有很多人信任我们,他们——他们持有的 Berkshire,在他们净资产中的占比,实际上高得不成比例。

We have a lot of people who trust us, who, who really have disproportionate amounts of Berkshire compared to their net worth.

如果你按标准的投资程序来做的话。

If you were to follow standard investment procedures.

我们当然希望为每个人赚钱,但我们也非常非常希望确保,凡是一开始在接近企业内在价值的位置买入我们股票的人,不会因此遭受永久性的亏损。

And we want to make money for everybody, but we want to make very, very sure that we don't lose permanent money for anybody that buys our stock somewhere around intrinsic business value to begin with.

我们就是不愿意看到,我们有一百万以上的股东,甚至可能两百万股东,而其中很多人只要愿意跟我们待上一段时间,到头来却真的亏了钱。

We just have an aversion to having a million-plus shareholders, maybe as many as 2 million, and having a lot of them ever really lose money if they're willing to stay with us for a while.

而且我们知道,当整个世界都陷入不安的时候,人们会怎么表现;他们会想和某种东西待在一起——我觉得,他们想和那种让他们觉得像 Gibraltar Rock 一样稳的东西待在一起。

And we know how people behave when the world generally is upset, and they want to be with something— I think they want to be with something that they feel is like the Rock of Gibraltar.

而我们确实非常倾向于照顾这类人。

And we have a real disposition toward that group.
M3
M36:35

在彩虹的某个彼岸,蓝鸟在飞翔。

Somewhere over the rainbow, bluebirds fly.

鸟儿飞过彩虹。

Birds fly over the rainbow.

那为什么,哦为什么,我不可以呢?

Why then, oh why can't I?

在彩虹的某个彼岸。

Somewhere over the rainbow.

蓝鸟在飞,鸟儿飞过彩虹。

Bluebirds fly, birds fly over the rainbow.

为什么,哦为什么,我不可以呢?

Why, oh why can't I?

如果快乐的小蓝鸟都能飞到彩虹那一边,那为什么,哦为什么,我不可以呢?

If happy little bluebirds fly beyond the rainbow, why, oh why can't I?

晚安,Susan。

Good night, Susan.

晚安。

Good night.