M11:34
是的，顺便说一下——而且这其实很重要——我之前关于回购的那些评论，大多得追溯到很多年前，那时候股票相对于内在价值来说，通常是，或者经常是，很便宜的。
Yeah, incidentally, the— and this is important actually— the comments I made about repurchasing overwhelmingly, those go back a lot of years when stocks generally were, or frequently were, cheap in relation to intrinsic value.
我没有在那之后再那么说——你在过去 10 年左右也没看到我写过这类东西，因为我会说，近些年大多数回购，我都觉得是愚蠢的，因为人们付得太多了。
I did not make that— you haven't seen me writing about that in the last 10 years or so because I would say most of the repurchasing done in recent years, I've thought it's been foolish because people have been paying too much.
而且很多公司，他们在很多情况下从来不会承认这一点，但他们之所以买，是因为他们本质上很喜欢这么做，他们是在试图给出买入建议，可那时候并没有理由给出买入建议。
And companies got, in many cases, they would never acknowledge this, but they were buying because they basically liked, they were trying to give out buy recommendations when a buy recommendation wasn't justified.
在 70 年代和 80 年代初，Charlie 和我经常会敦促人们回购股票，因为这比他们拿钱去做其他任何事情都更有吸引力。
In the '70s and early '80s, Charlie and I would frequently urge people to repurchase shares because it was so much more attractive than other things they could do with their money.
我们唯一一次强烈认为 Berkshire 应该回购自己股票，大概是在 2000 年左右，反正就是我们觉得它明显低于内在商业价值的时候；但后来我们写了不会这么做，结果这件事确实变成了自我挫败。
The only time we felt strongly that Berkshire should repurchase its shares was in roughly 2000, whenever it was that we thought it was demonstrably below intrinsic business value, and then we wrote we wouldn't do it, and it did become self-defeating.
很明显，如果我们认为它明显低于保守估计的内在商业价值，而我们又通知股东我们要这么做，那我们就会去做。
There's clearly a point where if we thought it was demonstrably below conservatively estimated intrinsic business value and we notified the stockholders we were going to do it, we would do it.
我觉得，那样做在很大程度上又会变成自我挫败。
I think, again, would largely be self-defeating.
我觉得现在没有这种情况。
I don't think that situation exists now.
我想——我不会给任何买入或卖出建议，但我觉得这应该会非常有说服力。
I think— I won't give any buy or sell recommendations, but I think it ought to be quite compelling.
就像我说的，我——我觉得过去 5 年里我看到的大概 90% 的回购行为，我都不认为是在为
Like I say, I don't— I think probably 90% of the repurchase activity I've seen in the last 5 years I did not think was serving the cause
股东服务。
of the shareholder.
我觉得他们这么做，是因为管理层觉得这就是该做的事，而他们的 investor relations 部门也告诉他们这就是该做的事，结果他们实际上是在用有点傻的价格买股票。
I thought it was being done because management thought it was the thing to do, and their investor relations department told them the thing— it was the thing to do, and they were actually buying stock at kind of silly prices.
Charlie 和我很多年前看 Teledyne、Washington Post 或 Cap Cities Broadcasting 这么做时，可不是这种情况，但近些年我没有再看到过那样的情形，呃，没有了。
That was not the case when Charlie and I looked at Teledyne or the Washington Post or Cap Cities Broadcasting doing it many years ago, but I haven't seen situations like that, uh, in recent years.
Charlie？
Charlie?
我也没什么要补充的。
I've got nothing to add to that either.
第一个——有意思的是，有多少公司曾经在现在价格的两倍时回购自己的股票，而现在却不回购了。
Number— it's interesting how many companies were buying in their stock at twice present prices that aren't buying it now.
我是说，这样的公司很多。
I mean, there are lots of those.
我们绝不会在一个愚蠢的价格回购自己的股票。
We will never buy in our stock at a silly price.
如果我们没有在便宜的价格回购，那也许会犯错；但我认为，我们绝不会因为在一个愚蠢的价格回购而犯错。
We may make a mistake by not buying it at a cheap price, but we'll never make a mistake, I don't think, by buying it at a silly price.
而且我们觉得，过去这些年里，美国企业界里有相当大一部分公司都这么干了，其中还包括几只我们自己也持有过的股票。
And we think a significant percentage of corporate America has done that in recent years, including a few stocks that we've owned ourselves.
第十三个。
Number 13.