M10:20
他不会喜欢它们的。
He would not have liked them.
嗯，他可能——我觉得他大概会说，跟我在二零零二年说的差不多，也就是它们会给整个系统带来真正的风险。
Um, he probably— I think he probably would have said pretty much what I said back in 2002, that they pose a real risk to the system.
它们会让杠杆失控。
They, they cause leverage to run wild.
它们会让人们，也就是交易对手，签下一些在某些情况下可能很难履行的东西。呃，而且它们会让本来就脆弱的经济体系承受额外压力，而这些压力会以不可预测的方式爆发出来。
They cause people, counterparties, to sign up for things that may be difficult to, to achieve under certain circumstances, uh, that they place an already fragile economic system under added strains which can pop up in unpredictable ways.
不过他大概也会说，如果他看到有些东西被错误定价了，他会据此采取行动；但他不会让自己陷入这样一种处境：那些做事不谨慎的人出了问题，也会连带给他造成麻烦。
But he would probably also say if he saw some that were mispriced, he would act accordingly, but he wouldn't get himself in a position where the problems of the people who didn't act prudently could cause him any problems.
然后，呃，我想这大概就是答案。
And, uh, I think that probably would be the answer.
关于衍生品，有一个——一个根本性的问题——其实有好几个问题。
The one of the— one basic problem about derivatives— there's several problems.
我是说，一九二九年之后，Congress 开会了。
I mean, back in after 1929, Congress met.
当时有 Pecora Committee 之类的调查，他们认定，让人们拿证券去借很多钱是非常危险的，而且这助长了大萧条。
There was a Pecora Committee and so on, and they decided that it was very dangerous to let people borrow a lot of money against securities and that it contributed to the, the Great Depression.
因此，他们说 Federal Reserve 应该监管人们拿证券能借多少钱，这对社会很重要。
And therefore, they said the Federal Reserve should regulate how much people could borrow against securities and was important for society.
于是 Federal Reserve 开始要求保证金——他们设立了保证金要求。
And the Federal Reserve started requiring margin— they had margin requirements.
这些要求到现在还存在。
Those requirements still exist.
按规定，你拿自己的证券去抵押，借款不应该超过百分之五十。
You are not supposed to be able to borrow more than 50% against your securities.
实际上，有一段时期他们甚至——Federal Reserve 完全不允许借款。
Actually, during one period, they went to where they didn't— the Federal Reserve allowed no borrowing whatsoever.
他们把保证金要求提到百分之百。
They went to 100% margin.
但衍生品一出现，就把这一切——把这些规则变成了笑话。
But derivatives came along and just turned that into a— made those rules a laughingstock.
你有一种他们叫 total return swaps 的东西，这意味着你可以借到百分之百。
You have what they call total return swaps, which means you can borrow 100%.
对着你所持有的资产来借。
Against what you own.
这远远超过了一九二九年时存在的任何情况。
That goes way beyond anything that existed in 1929.
所以，衍生品成了绕开市场杠杆监管的一种方式。而这一点，正如我说的，Congress 认为很重要，Federal Reserve 至今也仍然有责任去执行。
So derivatives became a way around regulation of leverage in markets, which, like I say, Congress felt was important, and the Federal Reserve still has a responsibility for enforcing.
衍生品还意味着，结算日期被往后推了。
Derivatives also meant that settlement dates got pushed out.
证券市场里的一个问题是这样的：如果你今天做了一笔交易，
One of the problems in securities markets comes about when you have a trade today.
要是你——不需要在一年内结算它，你有时候就会发现，很难找到交易另一边的那个人。
If you had— didn't have to settle it for a year, you'd find it very hard sometimes to find a person on the other side.
而衍生品允许这种非常长的结算周期，但证券市场要求在三天内结算。
And derivatives allow these very long settlement periods, whereas security markets demand them in 3 days.
它们要求三天结算，是有原因的。
There's a reason they demand them in 3 days.
结算周期拖得越长，违约就会越来越多。
As you extend out periods, you get more and more defaults.
所以它们是个危险。
So they're a danger.
它们对整个系统都是个威胁。
They are a danger to the system.
这一点毫无疑问。
There's no question about that.
我们在 Bookworm 那边有一本书，叫 Galbraith 写的《The Great Crash》。
We have a book in the Bookworm called The Great Crash by Galbraith.
那是一本非常了不起的书。
It's one of the great books.
嗯，你们真的应该买来看看。
Uh, you really ought to buy it.
它讲的是二九年的那场危机，也谈到了保证金要求。
It tells the story of '29, and it gets into margin requirements.
所以 Ben Graham 不会喜欢一个大量使用衍生品的体系，但是——我觉得他也不至于说，如果他看到什么东西价格偏离得非常离谱，而且他知道自己能应付，我想他会很愿意去买进或者卖出那种定价错误的合约。
So Ben Graham would not like a system that used derivatives heavily, but he would—I don't think he would have been above, uh, if he saw something that looked way out of line and he knew he could handle it himself, I think he would have been quite willing to buy or sell one that was mispriced.