1998年股东大会 · 巴菲特芒格从资本支出角度，谈什么是好的生意 — 文稿

M10:01

我的问题跟你前面提到的一点有关，就是公司每年都必须把一定数量的现金重新投入业务里，才能只是维持原地不动。

My question has to do with what you mentioned earlier about how companies have to reinvest a certain amount of cash in their business every year just to stay in place.

如果可以说，最好的生意不光能吐出很多现金，还能把这些现金再投入到更多产能里；但我想这里有个悖论，就是一家公司扩张性资本支出的机会越好，它看起来就越像是现金的消耗者，而不是现金的创造者。

And if one could say that the best businesses are the ones that not only throw off lots of cash but can reinvest it in more capacity, but I suppose the paradox is that the better a company's opportunities for making expansionary capital expenditures, the worse they appear to be as consumers of cash rather than generators of cash.

你们具体用过哪些方法，来判断一家企业为了维持经营所需要的 maintenance capital expenditures，从而算出这家公司到底能吐出多少现金？

What specific techniques have you used to figure out the maintenance capital expenditures that you need to do in order to figure out how much cash a company is throwing off?

你们在 Gillette 或者其他你们研究过的公司身上，用过什么方法？

What techniques have you used on Gillette or other companies that you've studied?

M20:50

嗯，如果你看像 Gillette 或者 Coke 这样的公司，你不会发现它们的 depreciation——先别管 amortization——但 depreciation 和那种维持经营所必需的资本支出之间，会有特别大的差别。

Well, if you look at a company such as Gillette, or Coke, you won't find great differences between their depreciation—forget about amortization for the moment—but depreciation and, and sort of the required capital expenditures.

如果我们进入超级通胀时期，或者——我的意思是，你当然可以举出一些不成立的例子——但总的来说，在大多数公司里，用 depreciation 作为必需资本支出的一个大致替代指标，并不算不合适。这也是为什么我们认为，账面盈利再加上无形资产的 amortization，通常能相当不错地反映企业的 earning power。

If, if we got into a hyperinflationary period, or—I mean, you can find—you can set up cases where that wouldn't be true, but by and large, the depreciation charge is not inappropriate in most companies to use as, as a, uh, a proxy for required capital expenditures, which is why we think that reported earnings plus amortization of intangibles usually gives a pretty good indication of earning power.

至于 Gillette 为了维持它的竞争地位，到底需要比 depreciation 多花一亿美元，还是少花一亿美元，我从来没认真去想过这个问题。

And I don't—I've never given a thought to whether Gillette needs to spend $100 million more, $100 million less than depreciation in order to maintain its competitive position.

但我猜，实际波动区间相比它账面记录的 depreciation，甚至还要小得多。

But I would guess it's—the range is even considerably less than that versus its recorded depreciation.

真正需要你操心的是另外一些生意——比如说，航空业就是个很好的例子。

Businesses you have to worry about—I mean, an airline business is a good case.

在航空业里，你就是得拼命不停地花钱；行情好的时候，你得拼命花钱；行情不好的时候，你还是得一样拼命花钱。

In airlines, you know, you just have to keep spending money like crazy, and you have to spend money like crazy if it's attractive to spend money, and you have to spend it the same way if it's unattractive.

这就是这个行业的一部分规则。

You just—it's part of the game.

即使在我们的纺织业务里，为了保持竞争力，我们也得投入大量资金，而花完这些钱之后，能不能赚到钱并没有什么必然性——甚至连明确的前景都没有。

Even in our textile business, to stay competitive, we would have needed to spend substantial money without any necessary—any clear prospects of making any money when we got through spending it.

那种生意真的是陷阱，虽然最后也可能这样那样地做成，但它们很危险。

And those are real traps, those kind of businesses, and they may work out one way or another, but they're dangerous.

而像 See's Candy 这种生意，我们巴不得能投入一千万、一个亿、五个亿，只要还能拿到类似的回报。

And in a See's Candy, we would love to be able to spend $10 million, $100 million, $500 million and get anything like the return.

M32:41

对。

Right.

M22:41

就是我们过去拿到过的那种回报。

Returns we've gotten in the past.

但不幸的是，并没有什么好的办法能这么做。

But there aren't good ways to do it, unfortunately.

我们会继续找机会，但这不是那种资本投入会直接产生利润的生意。

We'll keep looking, but it's not a business where capital produces the profits.

呃，FlightSafety 就不一样，资本投入会带来利润。

Uh, FlightSafety, capital produces the profits.

随着业务发展，你需要更多 simulators，要培训更多飞行员，所以必须投入资本，利润才会产生。

You need more simulators as you go along, and more pilots are to be trained, and, and so capital is required to produce profits.

但 See's 就不是这样。

But it's just not the case at See's.

至于 Coca-Cola，尤其是当新市场出现的时候，比如 China 这样的地方，或者 East Germany 之类，Coca-Cola Company 自己往往会先做那些必要的投资，把装瓶体系的基础设施建起来，好迅速抓住这些市场。

And at Coca-Cola, uh, particularly when new markets come along, you know, the Chinas of the world or East Germany or something of the sort, the Coca-Cola Company itself would frequently make the investments needed to build up the bottling infrastructure to rapidly capitalize on those markets.

还有以前的 Soviet Union。

The old Soviet Union.

所以这种支出，你甚至都不会去认真算。

So those are expenditures you don't even make the calculation on.

你就是知道你非做不可。

You just know you've got to do it.

你手里有一个极好的生意，你希望它铺向全世界，也希望把它的价值发挥到最充分。

You've got a wonderful business and you want to have it spread worldwide and you want to capitalize on it to its fullest.

你当然也可以去算投资回报率，但在我看来那是在浪费时间，因为反正你无论如何都会去做。

And you can, you can make a return on investment calculation, but as far as I'm concerned, it's a waste of time because you're going to do it anyway.

而且你知道，随着时间推移，你就是想在那些市场里占据主导地位。

And, and you know you want to dominate those markets over time.

最后，随着市场逐渐发展起来，你大概会把这些投资并入其他装瓶系统里。

And eventually, uh, you'll probably fold those investments into other bottling systems as the market gets developed.

但你不会想等那些传统装瓶商慢慢去做。

But you don't want to wait for conventional bottlers to do it.

你得在场。

You want to be there.

顺便说一句，有个挺讽刺的事，可能在座一些年纪大一点的听众会觉得挺有意思：柏林墙倒下那天，Coke 也在现场，给东德送去了 Coca-Cola，而那些 Coke 其实是从 Dunkirk 的装瓶厂出来的。

One of the ironies, incidentally, that might get a kick out of some of the older members of the audience, is that when the Berlin Wall went down and Coke was there that day with Coca-Cola for East Germany, that Coke came from the bottling plant at Dunkirk.

所以这里面有一种很有诗意的讽刺意味。

So there was a certain poetic irony there.

Charlie，你对这个有什么要补充的吗？

Charlie, do you have anything on that?

M14:23

没有。

No.

M34:26

我很早就听 Warren 说过，好的生意和坏的生意之间的区别，通常就在于：好的生意会一个接一个地冒出很容易做的决定；而坏的生意给你的却是那种糟糕透顶的选择，让你这个决定特别难下。

I've heard Warren say since very early in his life that the difference between a good business and a bad business is usually that the good business just throws up one easy decision after another, whereas the bad business gives you a horrible choice where the decision is hard to make.

这事到底真的能行吗？

And is this really going to work?

值不值得花这个钱？

Is it worth the money?

如果你想有个办法来判断什么是好生意、什么是坏生意，那你就看看，究竟是哪一种生意在一次又一次、不断地把管理层往失误里送。

If you want a system for determining which is a good business and which is a bad business, just see which one is throwing the management bloopers time after time after time.

轻松的决策。

Easy decisions.

对我们来说，要决定在 California 一个明显会成功的新购物中心里开一家新的 See's 门店，这根本不难。

It's not very hard for us to decide to open a new See's store in a new shopping center in California that's obviously going to succeed.

那才叫失误。

It's a blooper.

反过来说，也有很多生意，摆到你桌上的那些决策都糟糕得很，而这种生意通常来说都运转得不怎么样。

On the other hand, there are plenty of businesses where the decisions that come across your desks are just awful, and those businesses by and large don't work very well.

M25:35

我现在在 Coke 的董事会已经待了十年了，这期间一个项目接一个项目地提上来，而且每个项目都会有 ROI，但老实说，这对我并没有太大影响。因为归根结底，在一个全球范围内都在增长、而且底层盈利能力天生就很强的行业里，只要你做的几乎任何决定，能够巩固并扩大 Coke 在全球的主导地位，那这些决定大概率就是对的；而且那边也有人会把这些事执行好。

I've been on the board of Coke now for 10 years, and we've had project after project come up, and there's always an ROI, but it doesn't really make much difference to me because in the end, almost any decision you make that solidifies and extends the dominance of Coke around the world in an industry that's growing by a significant percentage and which has great inherent underlying profitability, the decisions are going to be right and you've got people there that will execute them well.

M36:05

你的意思是，你们碰到的是一个接一个的失误？

You're saying you get blooper after blooper?

M26:06

对。

Yeah.

然后 Charlie 和我也一起在 USAir 的董事会待过，那时候冒出来的那些决策，都会变成这样的问题：比如说，你要不要去买 Eastern Shuttle，或者别的什么东西？

And then Charlie and I sat on USAir, and the decisions would come along and it would be a question of, you know, do you buy the Eastern Shuttle or whatever it may be?

当时你的钱已经快花光了，可为了把这游戏继续玩下去、为了维持客流，比如中转旅客之类的，你又不得不不停地做这些决定，比如要不要再往某个机场多投一亿美元。

And you're running out of money, and yet to play the game and to keep the traffic flows, such as with connecting passengers and everything, you just have to continually make these decisions, whether you spend $100 million more on some airport.

而这些决定让人特别痛苦，因为还是那句话，你其实并没有真正的选择，但同时你也并没有真正的把握，觉得这些选择——或者说没有选择——以后真的能转化成实实在在的钱。

And they're agony because, again, you don't have any real choice, but you also don't have a real conviction that it's going to translate—those choices are going to—or lack of choices are going to translate themselves into real money later on.

所以一种游戏是在逼着你不断往赌桌上加钱，可你根本不知道自己手里拿的是什么牌；另一种则是你有机会继续加注，而且你知道自己从头到尾拿的都是一手稳赢的牌。

So one game is just forcing you to push more money into the table with no idea of what kind of a hand you hold, and the other one you get a chance to push more money in knowing that you've got a winning hand all the way.

弃牌。

Throw in.

先生，我们当初为什么要买你呢？

Why'd we buy you, sir?

还不如多买点 Coke。

Could have bought more Coke.

呃，7 区。

Uh, Area 7.