2010年股东大会 · 金融危机期间，巴菲特为何更倾向选择债权投资？ — 文稿

M10:00

这个问题来自 Victor 和 Amy Liu，他们是来自 California 州 Santa Monica 的股东。他们问的是，二零零九年二月金融危机期间你做投资的时候，为什么你更倾向于债务工具，而不是股票？

This question comes from Victor and Amy Liu, who are shareholders from Santa Monica, California, and they ask, when you made investments during the financial crisis in February of 2009, why did you lean towards debt instruments rather than equity?

比如说，Harley-Davidson 的股价当时是十二美元，你为什么是以百分之十五的利息投了三亿美元给它，而不是直接买它的股票？

For example, why did you invest $300 million in Harley-Davidson at 15% interest instead of buying equity when the shares were at $12?

今天它已经涨到三十三美元了。

Today they're at $33.

M20:27

嗯，我会这么说，如果我是现在来写这个问题，我可能还是会写同样的问题；但是我不太确定，如果是在二零零九年二月，你还会不会问我同样的问题。

Well, I would say that if I were writing that question now, I might write the same question, but I'm not so sure you would have written me the same question in February.

很明显，不同的投资有不同的风险特征。说实话，我也不知道 Harley-Davidson 的股票到底值三十三美元、二十美元，还是四十五美元。

Now, there were different risk profiles, obviously, in investing, and, and, and the truth is I don't know whether Harley-Davidson equity is worth $33 or $20 or $45.

这个我就是没有看法。

I, I just have no view on that.

我不——你知道，我是挺喜欢那种客户会把公司名字纹在自己胸口上的生意之类的；但是要判断这种东西的经济价值，你知道，我也不确定，就算我去找那些家伙聊一圈，能不能从他们那儿学到多少。

I don't— you know, I kind of like a business where your customers tattoo your name on their chest or something, but figuring out the economic value of that, you know, I'm not sure even going and questioning those guys I'd learn much from them.

但我知道，或者说我当时觉得我知道，而且我认为我是对的：第一，Harley-Davidson 不会倒闭。

But I do know, or I thought I knew, and I think I was right, that A, Harley-Davidson was not going out of business.

第二，百分之十五看起来会非常非常有吸引力。

And that B, 15% was going to look pretty damned attractive.

而事实是，我们大概现在就可以把那些债券卖掉——我不知道，我得再看看——不过可能能卖到一百三十五块左右。

And the truth is, we could probably sell those bonds— I don't know, I'd have to— probably at $135 or something like that.

所以我们既可以有一笔相当可观的资本利得，也拿到了很多收益。

So we could have a very substantial capital gain, a lot of income.

我懂得够多，足以把钱借给他们。

I knew enough to lend them money.

但我懂得还不够多，不足以去买他们的股票。

I didn't know enough to buy the equity.

而这种情况其实很常见。

And that's frequently the case.

你知道，我们很喜欢买股票，但我们也很喜欢买 Goldman 那个百分之十的优先股。

And, you know, we love buying equities, but we love buying— we love buying the Goldman preferred at 10%.

现在假设 Goldman 当时不是给我百分之十的优先股加 warrant，而是说，你可以拿一个百分之十二、不可赎回的优先股。

Now let's say Goldman, instead of offering me the 10% preferred and warrants, had said you can have a 12% preferred non-callable.

那我可能反而会选那个。

I might have taken that one instead.

我的意思是，callable——所以这些证券之间总是存在取舍。

I mean, the callable— so there's a trade-off involved in all these securities.

很显然，如果我觉得我能用一个非常简单的判断赚到很不错的钱，就像我们在 Harley-Davidson 上做的那样，只需要判断他们会不会破产；而不是去做一个更难的判断，比如摩托车市场会不会明显萎缩，他们的利润率会不会被挤压，诸如此类。

And obviously, if I think I can make very good money, as we did on Harley-Davidson, with a very simple decision, just a question of are they going to go broke or not, as opposed to a tougher decision, is the motorcycle market going to get diminished significantly and, you know, are their margins going to get squeezed somewhat and all of that.

那我，我，我就会选那个简单的判断。

I'll, I'll, I'll go with a simple decision.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M32:34

嗯，当然，你那个回答很好：你只是对买股票这件事了解得还不够，但你对买债券已经了解得够多了，这本身就是个很好的回答。

Well, of course, your one good answer, that you simply didn't know enough to buy the stock, but you did know enough to buy the bonds, is a very good response.

另一面是，毕竟我们是很多人的受托人，其中也包括一些有永久性伤害的人，诸如此类。

The other side of that is, after all, we are a fiduciary for a lot of people, including people with permanent injuries, et cetera, et cetera.

所以在某种程度上，我们在买股票到底能有多激进、还是去买别的东西这件事上，是会受到约束的。

And to some extent, we are constrained by how aggressively we buy stocks versus something else.

这些因素加在一起，就形成了我们的投资政策。

And when you mix those together, why, you get our investment policy.

不过我觉得，总的来说，你提的是一个非常好的问题。

I think, generally speaking, you raise a very good question.

我觉得很多时候，当你看到一个困境中的标的然后去买它的债券，其实你本来应该买的是它的股票。

I think very often when you're looking at a distressed situation and buy the bonds, you should have bought the stock.

所以我觉得你看的这个方向很有前景。

So I think you're looking in a promising area.

M23:22

对，Ben Graham 其实早在一九三四年就在《Security Analysis》里写过这个：在分析高级证券的时候，次级证券通常反而表现更好。

Yeah, Ben Graham wrote about that in 1934, actually, in Security Analysis, that, that in the analysis of senior securities, the junior securities usually do better.

不过，持有高级证券，你可能会睡得更安稳一点。

But you may sleep better with the senior securities.

而且，正像 Charlie 指出的那样，我们在保险业务这边，对客户承担着六百亿美元的负债，有些负债的期限会延续到五十年，甚至更久。

And we, as Charlie points out, we have $60 billion of liabilities to people in our insurance operation that in some cases extend out for 50 years or more.

所以我们绝不会把所有的钱都投在股票上。

And we would never have all of our money in stocks.

我的意思是，我们可能会持有规模非常大的股票仓位，但是——但是我们经营这个地方的方式，是要让它不管遇到什么情况都能扛得住。

I mean, we might have very significant amounts, but— but we are running this place so that it can stand anything.

而且，几年前，我们对这种理念让我们所处的位置感觉非常好。

And, and a couple years ago, we felt very good about where that philosophy left us.

我的意思是，在大多数人都动弹不得的时候，我们实际上还能出手做一些事情，而且我们以后也会继续这么经营下去。

I mean, we actually could do things at a time when most people were paralyzed, and we'll keep running it that way.