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2010年股东大会 · 为什么说伯克希尔拥有全世界最好的股东群体

51 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 5:43
M1
M10:00

我认为,Berkshire 拥有所有上市公司或者 mutual fund 里最优秀、也最忠诚的股东群体。

Berkshire has, in my opinion, the best and most loyal shareholders of any publicly traded company or mutual fund.

你们是怎么吸引并留住这样一批股东的?尤其是,很多会导致证券被错误定价的行为倾向,也同样会造就那些动作特别快、说走就走的股东。

How, how do you attract and retain a shareholder base, particularly when many of the same behavioral tendencies that produce mispriced securities also produce fleet-footed shareholders?
M2
M20:24

marketable securities 有意思的一点在于,基本上任何人都可以买。

The interesting thing about marketable securities is that basically anybody can buy them.

我的意思是,你也许会选择跟别人一起去买一家 McDonald's franchise,或者一个农场,或者一栋公寓楼之类的;但是如果你经营的是一家上市公司,那你的股东可以是任何人,呃,你知道,可以从 Osama bin Laden 到 Pope。

I mean, you might elect to join somebody in buying a McDonald's franchise or a farm or an apartment house or something, but if you're running a public company, you know, you can have anybody from, uh, you know, from Osama bin Laden, you know, to, to, uh, uh, the Pope as your shareholder.

我的意思是,是他们选择你——不是你选择他们,是他们选择你。

I mean, they elect—you don't elect them, they, they elect you.

所以,如果你希望你的股东群体能和你同频,在我看来,很重要的一点就是,你得让他们清清楚楚地知道,你打算经营一家什么样的机构。

Now, if you want a shareholder body that is going to be in sync with you, it's important that you—in my view, it's important that you let them know exactly what sort of institution you plan to run.

我们有 annual reports,也有电视采访,还有各种方式来向大家传达 Berkshire 到底是个什么样的地方。

And we've got the annual reports, we've got television interviews, we've got various ways of conveying to people what kind of a place Berkshire is.

对有些人来说,这传递的信息是“欢迎进来”;而对另一些人来说,意思就是“请别来”。

And to some, that says come in, and to others, it says stay out.

Phil Fisher 在上世纪六十年代 very early 的时候写过一本很棒的投资书,他是这样描述这种情况的。

Phil Fisher wrote a great book on investing back in the very early 1960s, and he described the situation this way.

他说,你看,你可以开一家餐厅,招牌上写着 French food;如果你里面提供的也确实是 French food,那你知道,来的顾客就会满意,也会一再回来。

He said, look, you can have a restaurant and it can say French food, and if you have French food inside, you know, people are going to— you're going to get a satisfied and returning clientele.

你也可以开另一家,招牌上写 hamburgers;但你不能做的是,外面的招牌写着 hamburgers,结果里面端出来的是 French food。

And you can have another one that says hamburgers, but what you can't do is have hamburgers on the outside, on the marquee, and deliver French food inside.

可很多公司某种程度上就是在试图向所有人承诺一切。

And so many companies sort of try and promise everything to everybody.

他们的 investor relations department 会告诉他们,只要是能吸引来的股东,你知道,他们都想要。

Their investor relations department tells them that any shareholder they can get interested, you know, they want.

我们想要的是那些思维方式和我们一致的人。

We want people who think the way we do.

而且我们觉得,综合来看,我们也不会让他们失望太多。

And we don't— we think on balance we won't disappoint them too much.

但是如果我们吸引来一大批人,他们觉得出于某种原因,下个季度的 earnings 会涨百分之十,而这就是他们持有这只股票的原因,那最后就会有很多失望的人。

But if we get a bunch of people that think that the earnings next quarter are going to be up 10% for some reason, and that's the reason they own the stock, we're going to have a lot of disappointed people.
M1
M12:19

对。

Yeah.
M2
M22:19

而我们人生的目标,可不是把时间花在和那些注定会对我们失望的人打交道上。

And our, our goal in life is not to spend our time associating with people that are going to be disappointed with us.

如果我们打出了错误的广告,那就是我们的错。

And if it's our— it's our fault if we give out the wrong advertisement.

所以我们会尽量把我们到底是什么样,宣传清楚,然后我们也努力真正做到。

So we try to advertise what we are, and then we try to deliver on that.

而且我确实认为,在大型上市公司里面,我们拥有全世界最好的股东群体。

And I do think we have the best group of shareholders in the, in, in the world, you know, among large publicly traded companies.

我觉得这是因为,这么多年来,买入我们、成为我们合伙人的这些人,基本上都是在用买一家企业的眼光来看这件事,而且他们知道,我们会像对待合伙人一样对待他们。

And I think it's because we've got people that basically look into buying a business, becoming our partners over the years, and they know we'll treat them like partners.

反过来,他们也给了我们很大的安心感,让我们拥有一个稳定的股东基础,也让我们在经营整个 Berkshire 的时候,整体感觉都很好。

And they in turn give us a lot of comfort in having a stable shareholder base and a good feeling about just, just running the whole place.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M33:06

嗯,这里发生的事情,在某种程度上算是个意外。

Well, what happened here is to some extent an accident.

Warren 和我一开始是替家人和朋友管理资金的,而那些在我们年轻、还没什么名气的时候就信任我们的人,我们当然会对他们产生很深的感情。

Warren and I started out investing money for our families and friends, and the people who trusted us when we were young and unknown, of course, we developed a strong affection for.

然后,在这个基础之上,我们慢慢演变成了控制上市公司的人。

And, and we morphed into controlling public companies from that base.

所以我们倾向于把我们的股东——包括新的股东——都看作家人。

And so we tend to regard our shareholders, including the new ones, as family.

这不是装出来的。

And that's not put on.

这就是我们看待你们的方式。

That's, that's the way we regard you.

别人做不到那样,因为他们走到今天这个处境的路径不一样。

Other people can't do that because they morphed into their situation in a different way.

如果你是个 CEO,打交道的又是那种普通的机构投资者,只关心接下来六个月怎么让自己的投资组合管理看起来更漂亮,那你就很难去喜欢自己的股东。

And if you were a CEO and dealt with the average institutional investor who was interested in having his portfolio management look good the next 6 months, you'd find it hard to love your shareholders.

他们有点像一种带着敌意的力量,给你施加不合理的期待。

They're sort of a hostile force that are putting unreasonable expectations on you.

所以我不觉得 Warren 和我应该因为我们跟股东关系更好这件事,得到那么多美好的赞誉。

And so I don't think Warren and I deserve such wonderful credit for the fact that we have better relations with our shareholders.

我们走到今天,完全是另一种路径。

We came up in a totally different way.

当然,我们也算有足够的判断力,当我们发现这是一件这么好的事、这么让人满足的时候,我们就坚持了下来。

Now, we did have enough sense when we saw that it was such a good thing and so satisfying that we stayed with it.

不过,不过我们当初不是——我们其实是误打误撞进来的,对吧?

But, but weren't we— we got into this by accident, didn't we?
M2
M24:28

对,我们是误打误撞进来的。

Yeah, we got in by accident.

而且我们也很幸运,我们没有一个 Investor Relations 部门,老想让我们出去吹捧——

And we also were blessed with the fact that we did not have an investor relations department that wanted us to go out and pump up—.
M3
M34:35

不过那是故意的。

But that was on purpose.
M2
M24:38

对,对,是这样。

Yeah, yeah, it is.

我见过这种部门怎么运作,在我以各种方式参与过的几十家公司里都见过。

I've seen them in operation at dozens of companies I've been involved in one way or another.

我是说,那真的是很荒唐。

I mean, it is really ridiculous.

我是——那种做法,就是你跑出去迎合那些人的预期,而他们期待你做到的事,你靠经营其实做不到,但也许能靠会计手法短时间做出来一点,这会把行为带偏,变得更糟。

I'm— the idea that you go out and try and, and cater to the expectations of people that are expecting you to do things you can't do by operations, but maybe you can do by accounting for a short period of time, it leads to worse behavior.

而且到最后,总会有人持有你全部的股票。

And in the end, somebody's going to own all your shares.

你知道,不可能,不可能让股票在股东名单上一直空着,没人持有。

You know, there's no way, there's no way that shares remain empty, you know, in the shareholder list.

所以为什么不找一群愿意长期跟着你、跟你同频的人呢?

So why not get a bunch of people who are going to stick with you, who are in sync?

而他们之所以会跟你同频,办法就是,你得比较准确地告诉他们你的预期是什么、你打算怎么做到,也要告诉他们你什么时候犯了错,诸如此类。

And the way they're going to be in sync is if, you know, if you've told them rather accurately what you expect, how you expect to do it, and tell them when you make mistakes, all of that.
M3
M35:25

不过,对于那些走的是另一条路、面对的是另一类股东基础的人,我们大概也不该这么苛刻。

But we probably shouldn't be as critical of people who came up a different way dealing with a different shareholder base.

如果我们当初也是以同样的方式一步步上来的,那我们最后会不会多少也变成那样,其实一点也说不准。

It's not at all clear that we wouldn't have ended up somewhat the same way if we'd had the same manner of rising.

当然。

Sure.