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1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特趣谈GEICO公司及汽车保险行业的历史

78 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 9:09
M1
M10:00

我叫 Hugh Stevenson。

My name is Hugh Stevenson.

我是来自 Georgia 州 Atlanta 的股东。

I'm a shareholder from Atlanta, Georgia.

我的问题跟 GEICO 有关。

My question involves GEICO.

如果我没记错的话,去年 GEICO 大概占了保险市场百分之二的份额,而且大约有四十亿美元的 float。

If I remember correctly from last year, GEICO had about 2% of the insurance market and had approximately $4 billion in float.

我的问题是,随着它的市场份额扩大,照你的预期,它的 float 会不会也大致按一种线性的方式增长?

My question is, as their market share expands, will their float, in your expectation, expand in a somewhat linear fashion?

还有相关的一点,你觉得它的上限大概会在哪里?

And related to that, what is your guess might be the top end?

它最终会不会像 Gillette 或者 Coke 在各自行业里那样占据主导地位,还是说这个行业的性质决定了,你知道,它到了市场百分之十或者百分之十五的时候,就会开始碰到一个很大的障碍?

Could they ultimately become as dominant as a Gillette or a Coke in their businesses, or is the nature of it such that, you know, they might stop at 10% of the market or 15% when they start to hit a significant hurdle?

第二个问题,接着这位先生刚才的问题,如果你不用更高的折现率来做风险调整,那你是怎么调整风险的,还是说你根本不调整?

And second, to follow up on this other gentleman's question, if you don't adjust for risk by using higher discount rates, how do you adjust for risk, or do you?
M2
M20:57

嗯,第二个问题,我们的调整方式其实很简单,就是尽量用一个比按无风险利率算出来的现值低很多的价格去买。

Well, the second question, we adjust by simply trying to buy it at a big discount from that present value calculated using the risk-free interest rate.

所以,如果利率是百分之七,而我们把那些现金流折现回来——Charlie 说我反正从来不这么做,他说得也对——不过理论上,如果我们按百分之七来折现,那么我们会要求相对于那个现值数字有一个相当大的折扣,这样才值得买。

So, if interest rates are 7% and we discounted back the flows, which Charlie says I never do anyway, and he's correct, but in theory, if we discount them back at 7%, then we would look at a substantial discount from that present value number in order to warrant buying.

关于 GEICO 的问题。

Question about GEICO.

float 会或多或少按保费规模成比例增长。

The float will grow more or less proportionately to premium volume.

我们的 float 里有一小部分,实际上是很小的一部分,是过去一些已经停掉的业务线带来的,当然那部分不会按同样的方式增长。

There's a moderate amount of our float, a very small amount of the float, that's accounted for by some discontinued lines from the past, and of course that won't grow the same way.

但是如果我们把 GEICO 的保费规模做到原来的两倍,float 的规模也会接近翻倍。

But if we double the size of GEICO on premium volume, we'll come close to doubling the size of the float.

这个,呃,你知道,汽车保险的历史其实挺有意思的。

The, uh, you know, the history of auto insurance is quite interesting.

这东西商学院并不怎么研究,但其实应该研究,因为二十世纪初那些伟大的保险公司,呃,不管是 Aetna、Hartford 还是 Travelers,它们在全国都有自己的代理人队伍,当时做的更多还是财产险业务。

It's something that isn't studied at business schools and should be studied, because the great insurance companies of the early 1900s were, uh, you know, whether it's Aetna, Hartford, Travelers, they had these agency forces nationwide and wrote what was then more property business.

那时候它们做了很多火险业务,当然,汽车也是到二十世纪初才出现的。

They wrote a lot of fire business in those days, and of course the automobile only came in, you know, in the early 1900s.

所以它们的取向是财产险业务,但它们在全美国都有非常庞大的代理人队伍。

And so their orientation was to property business, but they had this huge agency force throughout the United States.

全国各地都有代表这些大公司的财产险代理人。

There were property insurance agents representing these big companies throughout the country.

而且它们资本很雄厚。

And they had lots of capital.

如果你现在看一九九七年的这个行业,保险里的个人汽车险和房主险业务,有远远超过百分之二十、很可能接近百分之二十五,是由一家叫 State Farm 的公司承保的。

And now if you look at the business in 1997, something well over 20%, probably close to 25% of the personal auto and homeowners business in insurance is written by a company called State Farm.

我记得 State Farm 是在二十年代由 Illinois 州 Bloomington 的一个人创办的。

And State Farm was started, I believe, in the '20s by a fellow in Bloomington, Illinois.

几乎谈不上有什么资本,一开始也没有代理人队伍,而且它是以 mutual company 的形式起家的。

With no capital to speak of, no agency force initially, and started as a mutual company.

没有激励机制。

No incentive.

我的意思是,没有 stock options,也没有投入资本让他能因为把公司做大就变成亿万富翁之类的。

I mean, no stock options, no capital invested where he could become a billionaire if he built the business up or anything.

所以,这家公司在创办时没有任何我们被教导说对企业成长至关重要的那种资本主义激励,却在一个巨大的行业里成了主导者。

So here this company starts without any of the capitalist incentives that we are taught are essential to a business growing, and in a huge industry becomes the dominant player.

它的市场份额是第二名 Allstate 的两倍还多。

It has more than twice the market share of Allstate, the second player.

面对这些根基极深、分销体系强大、而且资本雄厚的竞争对手,它最后成了这个行业里最有统治力的公司。

Becomes the dominant company against these extremely entrenched competitors with great distribution systems and loads of capital.

我之所以这么说——顺便提一句,State Farm 在 Fortune 500 的公司名单里,按净资产算,是全美国第三大的公司。

Now I say that's—and incidentally, State Farm on the Fortune 500 list of companies has the third largest net worth of any company in the United States.

全美第三,来自 Illinois 州 Bloomington,而且是一个自己根本没什么钱投进去的人创办的。

Number 3 from Bloomington, Illinois, with a guy with no money in it.

那这怎么会发生呢?

Now, how does that happen?

嗯,我得说,这个题目很值得研究,你知道——很适合拿到 business school 里去研究,因为——你知道,Darwin 以前说过,每当他得到任何跟自己原先信念相冲突的证据时,他都得在前三十分钟内把它记下来,不然人的头脑会自动把这种和自己珍视信念相反的证据给排斥掉。

Well, I would say that's a subject worth studying, you know, for— in, in, in business schools, because it— you know, Darwin used to say that anytime he got any evidence that, that flew in the face of his previous convictions, he had to write it down in the first 30 minutes, or the mind was such that it would reject contrary evidence to cherished beliefs.

而 business school 里显然就有一些被人深信不疑的观念,所以研究一下,一家公司在一开始看起来并没有明显优势的情况下,怎么会变成全国按净值算第三大的公司,至少会让人发现一些很有意思的地方。

And certainly there's some cherished beliefs around business schools that, that might at least find some interesting aspects in studying how a company could become the 3rd largest company in net worth in the country with no apparent advantage going in.

Texas 那边还有另一家公司,叫 USAA,全称是 United Services Automobile Association,它也取得了极大的成功。

There's another company down in Texas called USAA, which stands for the United Services Automobile Association, and it's been enormously successful.

它有几十亿美元的净值,大量非常满意的保单持有人,而且它的保单续保率是全国最高的。

It has billions of net worth, loads of satisfied policyholders, the highest renewal ratio among policyholders in the country.

据我所知,也没人去研究它。

Nobody studies that, to my knowledge, either.

创办 GEICO 的那些人,就是从那家公司出来的。

The people who started GEICO came from that company.

一九三六年,Leo Goodwin 和他的太太,当时他们都在 USAA 工作,后来转出来——

In 1936, Leo Goodwin and his wife, who had worked for USAA, went over

创办了这个小小的 GEICO 公司,几乎没什么资本。

and started this little GEICO company with practically no capital.

而现在,嗯,我们大概有百分之二点七的市场份额,而且——我们今年大概会承保三十五亿美元的 voluntary auto 业务。

And now it's, uh, we have about 2.7% of the market, and we're— we'll write, uh, probably $3.5 billion of voluntary auto this year.

想追上 State Farm 会非常困难,所以我不想预测我们能做到。

Catching State Farm is going to be very difficult, so I wouldn't want to predict we do that.

不过我可以预测,在未来十年里,我们的市场份额会有非常显著的提升,而且,嗯,今年就会有明显增长。

I will predict that we will gain very materially in market share over the next 10 years, and, uh, we'll gain materially this year.

我们会的,我们会的,我们一定会的。

But we will, we will, we will.

我们手里有一个非常好的 mousetrap。

We have got a, we have got a very good mousetrap.

我在报告里说过,你们当中有百分之四十的人,如果到我们这里投保会省钱——我没说百分之百,也没说百分之八十或者百分之六十,因为,嗯,确实有些地区、某些职业类别里,别人给出的价格会比我们更低。

I said in the report that 40% of you would save money in insuring with— I didn't say 100% or 80% or 60%, because, uh, there are areas and professions where somebody else is going to have a lower price than we are.

但是如果放到全国范围来看——而且对各种各样的人群来说——我们会比其他任何公司更经常地给出低价,给出那个最低价。

But if across the country we are going— and for all classes of citizens, we are going to have a low price, the low price, more often than anyone else.

我们能做到这一点,是因为我们的成本低,而且我们的成本还会继续降低。

And we've got that because we've got low costs, and our costs are going to get lower.

而且——这件事正在形成一个自我强化的良性循环。

And it— we've got a virtuous circle going in terms of it feeding on itself.

所以,GEICO 会增长很多。

So, GEICO will grow a lot.

不过——State Farm 真的很强,所以我不会预测我们能追上 State Farm。

But I— State Farm is plenty tough, so I'm not going to predict catching State Farm.

我甚至也不会预测我们能追上 Allstate,但我们总会追上某个人。

I'm not even going to predict catching Allstate, but we'll catch somebody.

那么,Charlie,你还想再说点什么吗?

And, uh, Charlie, you want to say anything more?
M3
M36:42

嗯,我很喜欢你拿 State Farm 举的这个例子。

Well, I love your example of State Farm.

我的意思是,挑一个特别极端的案例,然后问我最喜欢的那个问题:这到底他妈的是怎么回事?

I mean, the idea of picking some extreme example and asking my favorite question, which is, what in hell is going on here?

这就是在这个世界上通向智慧的方法。

That is the, the way to wisdom in this world.

而且,嗯,这挺可惜的。

And, uh, it is too bad.

现在很多 mutual company 都在一帮 consultants 之类的人帮助下,试图 demutualize。

A lot of the mutual companies are now trying to demutualize, helped by a bunch of consultants and so forth.

可他们不是在看 State Farm,他们在看别的模式。

And they are not looking at State Farm, they're looking at some other model.

而且不是每个人都能成为 State Farm。

And everybody can't be a State Farm.

那家公司把一些根本性的价值观真正融进了它的运营机制里,体现在它怎么挑选员工,怎么挑选 agents,以及怎么淘汰 agents。

That place got some fundamental values into its operating mechanics, the way it selected personnel, the way it selected agents, the way it discarded agents.

那种运营里的纪律性非常强,对吧?

It was huge discipline, wouldn't you agree, in that operation?
M2
M27:37

对啊,你会说,肯定是有人把某些事情做得特别对。

Yeah, somebody— you would say somebody had to do something very right.

但问题是——我没听谁真正说清楚他们到底什么地方做对了。

But the question— I don't know anybody saying what they did that was right.

你知道,他们不愿意这么说,因为这不符合原来的那套模式。

You know, they don't want to because it doesn't fit the pattern.

你知道,当这个世界上出现像 State Farm 这样的事情时,你应该试着去——你应该试着去理解它。

You know, when something like a State Farm happens in this world, you should try to get— you should try to understand it.

当这个世界上出现像 GEICO 这样的事情时,你也应该试着去理解它。

When something like a GEICO happens in this world, you should try to understand it.

一九四八年,我记得是三分之二还是四分之三——我想应该是 GEICO 有三分之二的股份要出售,因为当初支持这两个来自 USAA 的人的那位先生去世了。

In 1948, I think it was 2/3 or 3/4— I think it was 2/3 of GEICO was for sale because a fellow that originally backed these 2 people from USAA died.

然后那个遗产在一九四八年要把这些股票卖掉。

And the estate had the stock for sale in 1948.

结果根本卖不出去。

You couldn't sell it.

Ben Graham 后来就是这样替 Graham-Newman 把它买下来的。

That's how Ben Graham ended up buying it for Graham-Newman.
M3
M38:16

嗯。

Hmm.
M2
M28:17

他们到处兜售了整整六个月。

They hawked it all over for 6 months.

他们去找了所有大型保险公司,而那些保险公司明明看到,这家公司虽然规模非常非常小,却能用低得多的价格提供产品,而且还赚很多钱,但他们就是摆脱不了过去那些神话般的老观念,所以没有站出来把它买下来。

They went to all the big insurance companies, and the insurance companies who could see this company on a very, very tiny scale offering a product for way less money and making lots of money doing it, they simply couldn't shake themselves loose from the myths of the past to step up and buy it.

照我记得,他们当时只要花一百二十万美元,就能把整个公司买下来。

They could have bought it for $1,200,000, as I remember, you know, and owned the whole company.

结果呢,这么多年下来,他们眼看着自己的分销体系一次次被打得落花流水,而与此同时,他们脑子里始终还装着过去的那些老想法。

And instead, they've watched their own distribution system get their heads beaten in, you know, over the years, and all the time, you know, with these ideas from the past.

所以你必须非常小心,得认真看清楚到底真正发生了什么。

So you have to be very careful to look hard at what's really happening.

你知道,就像 Yogi Berra 说的,很多事情你光靠看,就能观察出来。

You know, as Yogi Berra said, you can observe a lot just by looking.

好,Zone 1。

Okay, Zone 1.