M10:59
嗯，这个嘛，我——不，我可不愿意把我投资 Energy Future Holdings 这个决定的功劳，分给任何其他人。
Yeah, well, I— no, I would be unwilling to share the credit for my decision to invest in Energy Future Holdings with anybody else.
我觉得，要是有人暗示他们跟这个决定有任何关系，那对他们来说都太不公平了。
I think that's very unfair of anyone to insinuate that they had anything to do with that decision.
那就是我自己的一个错误。
That was just a mistake on my part.
而且这是个相当重大的错误，我们以后还会犯错。
It was a significant mistake, and we will make mistakes.
在未来也是一样。
In the future.
所有企业都应该不断去想，什么东西可能会把自己的商业模式搞垮。
All businesses should constantly be thinking about what can mess up their business model.
而在 Energy Future Holdings 这个案例里，当时做了一个相当简单的假设，结果证明那个假设是错的。
And with Energy Future Holdings, it was a fairly simple assumption that was made that just turned out to be wrong.
我的意思是，当时的假设是，天然气价格会大致维持在当时那么高的水平，或者还会更高，结果呢，它反而跌了很多很多。
I mean, the assumption there was that gas prices would stay roughly as high as they were or go higher, and instead they went a whole lot lower.
到了那个时候，整个公司就垮掉了。
And at that point, the whole place toppled.
他们手上有不少储备资产，也有一些 futures 仓位，让他们勉强多撑了一阵子，但根本错误就在那儿。
They had a lot of reserve holdings, and they had some futures positions which kept them alive for a while, but that was a basic error.
我们看待自己所有业务时，都会认为它们随时可能受到变化的影响。
We look at all of our businesses as subject to change.
一个很典型的例子就是 GEICO。
A classic case would be GEICO.
我是说，GEICO 在一九三六年创立的时候，就是要靠低成本运营，然后把这种低成本通过更低的价格让利给客户，卖的是一种必需品——auto insurance。
I mean, GEICO set out in 1936 to operate at low costs and pass on those low costs to the customer through lower prices for something that was a necessity— auto insurance.
他们最开始是通过邮寄方式来做的，用的是 U.S.
And they originally did it by mail offerings, U.S.
Postal Service，面向的是政府雇员。
Postal Service, to people who were government employees.
GEICO 这个名字就是这么来的——Government Employees Insurance Company。
That's where the name comes from— GEICO, Government Employees Insurance Company.
这些年他们一直得不断适应变化，他们最先是扩大承保人群分类，之后主要渠道也从 U.S. mail 转到电话，后来又转到 internet，再到 social media。
And they had to adapt over the years, and they adapted first to widening classifications, but they went from the U.S. mail primarily to the telephone and later went to the internet and onto social media.
不过在这个适应过程中，他们也有一次栽了跟头，而且他们——那是什么时候来着？
But in there, they stumbled one time too as they went to adapt, and they— What was that?
当他们不再局限于政府雇员这个分类之后，有一段时间他们在扩张上变得过于激进，差一点——其实是真的——破产了。
When they left the government employees classification, at one point they became too aggressive about expanding and they almost— they really did go broke.
所以变化一直都在发生，而且我们所有业务都在经历这种变化。
So there's changes going on all of the time, and it's going on with all of our businesses.
我们希望经理人一直都在思考这些变化，以及接下来需要做什么。
And we want managers that are thinking about change and what's going to be needed.
为了他们未来的商业模式。
For their business model of the future.
而且我们知道，我们知道，五年或者十年之后，它们肯定不会还是现在这个样子。
And we know, we know they're not going to look the same 5 or 10 years from now.
我是说，BNSF，像铁路这么基础的行业，都在大力研究让机车使用 LNG。
I mean, BNSF, something as basic as railroads, is looking big at LNG for its locomotives.
一切都会变。
Everything is going to change.
我们的企业总体来说都是在有优势的情况下经营，而且通常不会受到那种特别快速的变化冲击，但它们全都会发生变化。
Our businesses generally deal from strength and they're generally not subject to rapid change, but they're all subject to change.
当然，缓慢的变化有时候反而更难察觉，也更容易让你放松警惕、昏昏欲睡；相比之下，快速变化摆在眼前时，反倒更容易看到。
And of course, slow change can be much harder to perceive and can lull you to sleep easier sometimes than when rapid change is clearly in sight.
所以我对那个问题的回答是，第一，我会犯错。
So I would say, in answer to that question, A, I will make mistakes.
以后也会。
In the future.
我是说，这个是肯定的。
I mean, that's guaranteed.
我们不会做那种拿整个公司去赌的决策，所以永远不会让我们陷入真正痛苦的局面。
We do not make anything like bet-the-company decisions that will ever cause us real anguish.
这种事在 Berkshire 不会发生。
That just doesn't happen at Berkshire.
但是，如果你要做很多决策，就不可能偶尔不犯一些相当严重的错误。
But you're not going to make a lot of decisions without making some significant mistakes occasionally.
不过最后结果会很好。
They work out very well.
Charlie、Sandy Gottesman 和我，在一九六六年买下了 Baltimore 的一家百货商店。
Charlie and I and Sandy Gottesman in 1966 bought a department store in Baltimore.
说真的，在六十年代中期去买一家百货商店，大概没有比这更蠢的事了。
Now, there's probably nothing dumber than buying a department store in the mid-1960s.
一九六六年，Baltimore 的 Howard 街和 Lexington 街那个街角有四家百货商店，现在一家都不在了。
There were 4 department stores on the corner of Howard and Lexington Street in Baltimore in 1966, and none of them are there.
而当时排名第一的那家店，Hochschild's，也是在比我们那家店晚一点的时候破产了。
And the number one store, Hochschild's, went broke a little later than our store went broke.
不过很幸运，Sandy 在把它卖掉这件事上做得非常出色。
But fortunately, Sandy did a great job of selling it.
所以，当初投在那家百货商店里的六百万美元，后来随着我们一路把这笔钱拿去做别的事情，最终变成了大概四百五十亿美元的 Berkshire Hathaway 股票市值。
So the $6 million invested in that department store became worth about $45 billion in Berkshire Hathaway stock as we did other things with the money as we went along.
所以你确实必须对自己企业里正在发生的事情保持高度警觉，我们也希望我们的经理人这么做。
So you do have to be, you have to be very alert to what is going on in your businesses, and we want our managers to do that.
但实际上，这也是 Charlie、我，还有我们的董事们会去思考的事，不只是经理人要想。
But actually, it's something that Charlie and I and our directors are going to think about, as well as our managers.
Charlie？
Charlie?