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伯克希尔的内在价值与账面价值的关系

29 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 3:18
M1
M10:00

这个问题是关于 Berkshire 的内在价值。

This question is on Berkshire's intrinsic value.

公司价值里有相当大的一部分,来自运营业务,而不是证券投资组合的表现。

A substantial portion of the company's value is driven by operating businesses rather than the performance of the securities portfolio.

另外,以前收购来的那些业务,它们的价值也没有按经济价值上调入账,包括 GEICO、MidAmerican 和 Burlington Northern。

Also, the values of previously acquired businesses are not marked up to their economic value, including GEICO, MidAmerican, and Burlington Northern.

基于这些因素,每股账面价值对给 Berkshire 估值,是不是仍然是一个有参考意义的指标?

Based on these factors, is book value per share still a relevant metric for valuing Berkshire?
M2
M20:28

嗯,它还是有一些参考价值的,但跟以前比,相关性已经小多了。

Well, it's got some relevance, but it's got a whole lot less relevance than it used to.

所以这就是为什么——我不想放弃每股账面价值这个因素,但随着几十年过去,市场价值往往变得更有意义。

And that's why I've— I don't want to drop the book value per share factor, but the market value tends to have more significance as the decades roll along.

它是一个起点,而且很明显,我们持有的证券在当时不可能比账上记录的价值还低。

It's a starting point, and clearly our securities aren't worth more than we're carrying them for at that time.

另一方面,我们有你提到的那类业务,不过我们也有一些小企业,它们的实际价值大概是账面记录价值的十倍左右。

And on the other hand, we've got the kind of businesses you mentioned, but we've got some small businesses that are worth 10 times or so, you know, what they're carried for.

当然,我们也有一些表现不怎么样的业务。

We've also got some clunkers too.

但我觉得,最好的方法当然还是直接去计算企业的内在价值,只不过这个数字不可能特别精确。

But I think the best method, of course, is just to calculate intrinsic business value, but it can't be precise.

我们知道——我们认为,百分之一百二十这个数字大概率还是低估了它。

We know— we think the probability is exceptionally high that 120% understates it.

不过如果全都是证券的话,那百分之一百二十又会显得太高了。

Although if it was all in securities, you know, 120% would be too high.

但是随着这些业务不断发展,随着我们在运营业务里积累了那些会计上没有体现出来的价值——呃,没有被会计确认出来的价值——我觉得账面价值还是有些用处的,可以算是我们采用的一个基础数字。

But as the businesses have evolved, as we built in unrecognized, uh, value at the operating businesses, unrecognized for accounting purposes, uh, I think it still has some use as being kind of the base figure we use.

如果这是一家私营公司,在座我们十个人共同持有它,那我们每年只要坐下来,把这些业务一个一个算一遍,然后把那个结果当成基础价值就行了。

If it were a private company and 10 of us here owned it, instead we'd just sit down annually and calculate the businesses one by one and, and use that as a base value.

但如果业务数量像我们这么多,这件事就会变得相当主观。

But that gets, that gets pretty subjective when you've got as many as we do.

所以,呃,我觉得最简单的做法还是继续用我们现在采用的这些标准,同时也要承认它们本身的局限性。

And, uh, so I think the easiest thing is to use the standards we're using now, recognizing the limitations in them.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M32:15

对,我觉得,在一家保险公司里,用来对应公司股东权益的那些 equities,其实并不值全部的市场价值,因为它们被锁在一个高税负的体系里。

Yeah, I think that equities in an insurance company offsetting shareholders' equity in the company are really not worth the full market value because they're locked away in a high-tax system.

所以基本上,我们那些可交易证券下跌的时候,我反而挺喜欢。

And so I basically like it when our marketable securities go down.

我们自己的业务会上升。

Our own businesses go up.
M2
M22:47

对,我们一直就在朝这个方向努力。

Yeah, we're working to that end.

我们这样干已经有三十年了,差不多吧。

We've been working that way for 30 years now or something like that.

而且我们干得还相当不错。

We've done a pretty good job too.
M3
M32:56

对,我们已经用很多价值高得多的非上市证券,替换掉了很多可交易证券。

Yeah, we have a lot of— we've replaced a lot of marketable securities with unmarketable securities that are worth a lot more.

对。

Yeah.
M2
M23:07

而且说真的,这样经营起来也更有意思。

It's actually a more enjoyable way to operate too, beyond that.
M3
M33:09

不过对,这也让我们认识了很多原本不会接触到的人——对,能和他们打交道。

But yeah, we know a lot of people we wouldn't otherwise— yeah, be with.

都是很好的人。

Good people.
M2
M23:17

好,三号麦。

Okay, station 3.