1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特是如何判断美股指数是否过高的 — 文稿

F10:00

Mr. Market 给 Dow Jones 的估值是七千点，超过七千点，S&P 大概是八百点。

Mr. Market is valuing Dow Jones at 7,000, above 7,000, and S&P at about 800.

按照你的估值模型，在当前的利率、当前的通胀率，还有当前的增长率之下，这两个指数合理的估值分别应该是多少？

By your valuation model, at the current interest rate and current inflation rate and current growth rate, what is the fair valuation of both these, both these indices?

M10:17

对，这个，这个，这个问题问得很好，但也很难回答。

Yeah, well, that's, that's, that's a good question but a tough question.

不过我会这么说，如果你相信 American business 整体上还能继续赚到过去这——或者说过去这几年一直赚到的那种 return on equity，而且你再假设利率不变，那你就可以为 Dow 的七千点和 S&P 的八百点找到理由。

But I would say that if you believed American, the American business in aggregate could earn the kind of returns on equity that they have been earning in the last— or it has in the last couple of years, and then you postulate no change in interest rates, you can justify, uh, 7,000 on the Dow and 800 on the S&P.

当然，你知道，我这里面加了几个前提；如果利率上升，估值就会自动往下掉。

Now, you know, there's, there's a couple ifs I threw in there, and if interest rates go higher, the valuation goes down automatically.

F10:51

对。

Right.

M10:52

而且更重要的是，如果 American industry 的 return on equity——现在是在历史高位，而按照某种经典经济学的说法，这种水平是很难长期维持的——如果这些回报率平均下来开始下降，那也会把估值拉下来。

And more importantly, if the returns on equity of American industry, which are at historic highs, uh, and which sort of classical economics would tell you would be hard to maintain, if those returns go down on average, that also would pull it down.

但是，如果你愿意接受当前这个 return on equity 水平，把它看成 American business 未来的常态，同时你也愿意假设现在的利率会维持在较低水平，那你就可以为 Dow 和 S&P 的这个估值找到依据。

But if, if, if you're willing to accept the current level of returns on equity as being typical of the future case for American business, and you're willing to assume present interest rates are lower, then you can justify a valuation on the Dow and S&P.

这很有意思，我——

And it's interesting, I—.

F11:27

这——

It—.

M11:29

因为我在报告里写下那句话之后，才收到所有那些评论；就像我刚才说的，那句话本来其实是为了另外一点目的写的。

Because I got all that commentary after I wrote that line in the report, which was, as I said earlier, designed for a little something else.

我给你出个小小的冷知识题。

I'll give you a little trivia quiz.

这个世纪里，Dow 总体涨幅最大的两个年份是哪两年？

What 2 years in this century has the Dow had the greatest overall gain?

二十世纪里这两年分别是一九三三年——你们大多数人可能不会把它看成特别辉煌的一年——还有一九五四年。

The 2 years in the 1900s are 1933, which most of you don't think of as a banner year, but, uh, and 1954.

这两年里，Dow 的涨幅都超过了百分之五十，算上股息也是这样。

And in both of those years, the Dow was up over 50%, counting dividends.

到了一九五五年三月，也正因为这个，因为 Dow 涨上去了——要记住，Dow 在一九二九年的高点是三百八十一点，而这个高点过了二十五年才被突破。

In March of 1955, because of that, the fact that the Dow had gone up— bear in mind that the high on the Dow was 381 in 1929, and it took 25 years before that was surpassed.

而在一九五四年，Dow 大概是从二百八十点涨到四百零四点，差不多就是这样，略高于百分之五十。

And in 1954, the Dow went from, say, 280 up to 404, something like that, just a little over 50%.

所以他们决定怎么做呢？

So what did they decide to do?

他们决定为这件事举行国会听证会，而且他们真的这么做了。

They decided to have congressional hearings about it, and they did.

一九五五年三月，他们在 Senate Banking and Currency Committee 举行了听证会。

In March of 1955, they had hearings in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.

Fulbright 主席，还有我的老板 Ben Graham，都被叫去作证。

Chairman Fulbright and my boss, Ben Graham, was called down to testify.

那份内容读起来特别有意思。

And it's fascinating reading.

Bernard Baruch 也在场，还有各种各样的人。

Bernard Baruch was there, all kinds of people.

那些听证会资料我家里就有。

I've got the hearings at home.

Ben 当时开场对市场的评价是：市场看起来很高，确实也很高，但没有看上去那么高。

And Ben's opening comments about the market at that time were, the market looks high, it is high, but it's not as high as it looks.

嗯，这跟现在的情况挺像。

Well, that's about the present situation.

我是说，它看上去确实非常高。

I mean, it looks very high.

尤其是把七千点跟 Ben 作证时，也就是一九五四年年底的四百零四点一比，就更是这样。

Just by comparing 7,000 certainly to the 404 at the end of 1954 when Ben was testifying.

但是，American business 整体的 earnings 和 return on equity 已经发生了巨大的变化，另外利率也经历了这么大的一轮变动。

But there are— there have been huge changes in earnings and return on equity on American business in general, and then you've had this big move in interest rates.

而这些就是支撑这轮大牛市的底层基本面。

Now, those are underlying fundamentals that have powered a huge bull market.

过了一阵子，就像我前面提到的那样，人们会只是被价格上涨这个概念本身给迷住了，却不再回头看背后的基本逻辑，这种时候，从可能形成泡沫的角度来说，就会出现非常危险的情况。

After a while, as I mentioned earlier, people get captivated simply by the notion of rising prices without going back to the underlying rationale, and that's when you get very dangerous conditions in terms of possible bubbles.

而且这也会——你知道，这个——我根本不知道市场接下来会怎么走，但如果你遇到那种可能引发真正过度狂热的条件，就会像一九七三年和七四年那样出现过度，也会回到那种你能用一美元买到价值二十美分东西的时候。

And it would, you know, it— I have no idea where markets will go, but if you, you have the kind of conditions that could cause real excesses, just like you had excesses in 1973 and '74, going back to when you could buy things at 20 cents on the dollar.

那时候是朝着另一个方向的过度。

You had excesses in the other direction.

你知道，这个国家又没有消失，也没发生那种事。

You know, the country didn't disappear or anything.

只不过人们在市场里会表现得很极端，而从长期来看，这对那些能保持清醒头脑的人来说，反而是很好的。

It's just people behave in extreme ways in markets, and over time, that's very good for people that keep their heads.

Charlie？

Charlie?

我没什么要补充的。

I've got nothing to add.

好，再来一个。

Okay, get one more.