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1994年股东大会 · 巴菲特:我如何理解金融交易中的风险观

36 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 4:55
M1
M10:01

大家好,我叫 Charles Pyle,来自 Michigan 的 Ann Arbor。

Hello, my name is Charles Pyle from Ann Arbor, Michigan.

我想请您详细讲讲,您是怎么看金融世界里的风险的。我这么问,是因为您的风险观,跟通常那种传统的风险观之间,好像有不少不一致的地方。

I'd like to ask you to expound on your view of risk in the financial world, and I ask that against the background of what appear to be a number of inconsistencies between your view of risk and the conventional view of risk.

我提到过,您在最近的一篇文章里指出过一个不一致的地方,就是大家常用 beta 来衡量风险,但这个用法本身有问题。我也提到,derivatives 很危险,可您却觉得通过 Salomon Brothers 去做 derivatives 很自在;拿飓风来下注很危险,可您又觉得通过保险公司去承接飓风相关的业务也很自在。

I mentioned that in a recent article you pointed out an inconsistency in the use of beta as a measure of risk, which is a common standard, and I mentioned that derivatives are dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing in derivatives through Salomon Brothers, and betting on hurricanes is dangerous, and yet you feel comfortable playing with hurricanes through insurance companies.

所以看起来,您对风险有一套自己的看法,而这套看法表面上跟传统的风险观并不一致。

So it appears that you have some view of risk that's inconsistent with what would appear on the face of it to be the conventional view of risk.

对。

Yeah.
M2
M20:53

嗯,我们确实把风险定义为发生伤害或损失的可能性。从这个角度来说,我们认为它和你持有一项资产的时间跨度是分不开的。

Well, we do define risk as the possibility of harm or injury, and in that respect, we think it's inextricably wound up in your time horizon for holding an asset.

我的意思是,如果你的做法是今天上午十一点半买入 XYZ Corporation,然后在今天收盘前就卖掉,那在我们看来,这就是一笔风险非常高的交易,因为我们认为有百分之五十的概率,你会遭受某种伤害或者损失。

I mean, if your risk is that you're going— if you intend to buy XYZ Corporation at 11:30 this morning and sell it out before the close today, I mean, that is, in our view, that is a very risky transaction because we think 50% of the time you're going to suffer some harm or injury.

呃,如果你看待一门生意的时间跨度够长,那我们会认为,像几年前我们买入 Coca-Cola 时那个价格,从我们预期的持有期来看,风险基本上——基本接近于零。

Uh, if you have a time horizon on a business, we think the risk of buying something like Coca-Cola at the price we bought it at a few years ago is essentially— is so close to nil in terms of our prospective holding period.

但如果你问我,今天早上买 Coca-Cola,然后明天早上就卖掉,这个风险大不大,我会说,这——这就是一笔风险很高的交易。

But if you ask me the risk of buying Coca-Cola this morning and you're going to sell it tomorrow morning, I say that is a— that's a very risky transaction.

正如我在年报里指出的那样,后来在学术界,把风险定义成波动性,一度变得非常时髦,而这套看法后来又扩散到了金融市场里,beta 就成了其中一个衡量指标。

Now, as I pointed out in the annual report, it became very fashionable in the academic world, and then that spilled over into the financial markets, to define risk in terms of volatility, of which beta became a measure.

但这种衡量——这并不是——对我们来说,这根本不算风险的衡量。

But that measure— that isn't— that is no measure of risk to us.

拿我们的 super-cat 业务来说,风险并不在于我们某一年会不会亏钱。

The risk in terms of our— in terms of our super-cat business is not that we lose money in any given year.

我们知道,在某些年份我们一定会亏钱,这一点是确定的。

We know we're going to lose money in some given years, that is for certain.

而且我们在某一个特定年份亏钱的可能性还非常高。

And we're extremely likely to lose money in a given year.

但我们做这类业务的时间跨度,至少会是十年。

Our time horizon of writing that business, you know, would be at least a decade.

而我们认为,在十年的时间里总体亏钱的概率是很低的。

And we think the probability of losing money over a decade is low.

所以从我们的投资期限来看,那——那并不是一种高风险业务,而且它比起一些看上去可预测得多的业务,风险还要小得多。

So we feel that in terms of our horizon of investment, that, that is not a risky business, and it's a whole lot less risky than writing something that's much more predictable.

有意思的是,按照传统的风险衡量标准来看,一个回报率每年在正百分之二十到正百分之八十之间波动的东西,会被定义得比另一个每年都稳定回报百分之五的东西更危险。

Interesting thing is that using conventional measures of risk, something whose return varies from year to year between plus 20% and plus 80% is riskier, as defined, than something whose return is 5% a year every year.

这个——呃,我们就是觉得,金融世界在风险衡量这件事上已经彻底跑偏了。

It, uh, we just think the financial world has gone haywire in terms of measures of risk.

我们会看自己到底在做什么。

We, we look at what we do.

对于单笔交易亏钱,我们完全可以接受,arbitrage 是一个例子,任何一张保险保单也是另一个例子。

We are perfectly willing to lose money on a given transaction, arbitrage being an example, any given insurance policy being another example.

我们完全愿意在任何一笔单独的交易上亏钱。

We are perfectly willing to lose money on any given transaction.

但如果一类彼此独立、却又性质相似的事件,重复做很多次之后,我们认为它的期望值是亏损的,那这种交易我们就不愿意参与。

We are not willing to enter into transactions in which we think the probability of doing a number of mutually independent events of a— but of a similar type has an expectancy of loss.

而且,我们也希望自己进入这些交易时,对那些概率所做的计算是站得住脚的。

And, and we hope that we are entering into our transactions where our calculations of those probabilities have validity.

为了做到这一点,我们会尽量把范围缩小。

And to do so, we try to narrow it down.

有一大堆事情我们就是不会做,因为我们觉得自己没法把那个方程式写出来。

There are a whole bunch of things we just won't do because we don't think we can write the equation on them.

但总的来说——Charlie 和我,天性上都相当厌恶风险,不过我们也非常愿意去做一些交易。

But we basically— Charlie and I, by nature, are pretty risk-averse, but we are very willing to enter into transactions.

比如说,如果我们知道那是一枚绝对公平的硬币,有人愿意在一次抛硬币上给我们七比五之类的赔率,那 Berkshire 的净资产里,我们会拿出多少去押这一把?

If we knew it was an honest coin and someone wanted to give us 7 to 5 or something of the sort on one flip, how much of Berkshire's net worth would we put on that flip?

嗯,我们不会。

Well, we wouldn't.

那个数字说出来,对你来说会是个很大的数。

It would sound like a big number to you.

它不会占净资产里特别大的比例,但会是一个相当可观的数字。

It would not be a huge percentage of the net worth, but it would be a significant number.

当概率对我们有利的时候,我们就会去做。

We will do things when probabilities favor us.
M1
M14:36

Charlie?

Charlie?
M2
M24:37

对,我们——我会说,我们会尽量像 Fermat 和 Pascal 那样去思考,就好像他们从来没听说过现代金融理论一样。

Yeah, we— I would say we try and think like Fermat and Pascal, as if they'd never heard of modern finance theory.

我真的觉得,很多现代金融理论只能用“令人作呕”来形容。

I really think that a lot of modern finance theory can only be described as disgusting.

只能用“令人作呕”来形容。

Can only be described as disgusting.