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2001年股东大会 · 为什么巴菲特不会推荐买或者卖出伯克希尔股票

33 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 4:13
M1
M10:00

嗨,我叫 Richard Marable,来自 Washington, D.C.。我的问题跟 Berkshire Hathaway 的内在价值有关。

Hi, my name is Richard Marable from Washington, D.C., and my question has to do with the intrinsic value of Berkshire Hathaway.

你之前说过好多次,你希望这只股票既不要被高估,也不要被低估,这样大家持有这只股票这段时间里的回报,就能反映这只股票本身在这段期间的表现和成果。

You've stated several times that you would prefer the stock to be neither overvalued nor undervalued so that the time people spend owning the security represents a gain from what the security did, the results during that period of time.

不过,这确实是一只很难估值的股票。

However, it's a very difficult security to value.

因为它是由很多不同的业务板块拼在一起的。

Because of the disparate pieces.

而且我们去年也看到了,当你稍微给一点指引的时候——你在去年的 annual report 里说过,当股价涨到每股四万五千美元的时候,你考虑过回购,但觉得在 annual report 发布之前这么做不太公平,因为你希望大家掌握的是同样的信息。

And as we saw last year, when you provide a little bit of guidance— in last year's annual report, you said that when the stock price hit $45,000 a share, you considered buying but thought it was unfair until the annual report came out so everyone had the same information.

另外,我也明白,你并不认为这里面存在一个所谓特别“正确”的数字,但你以后会不会考虑在这个方向上给一些指引呢?

And while I also realize that you don't feel there is a particular, quote-unquote, correct number, would you ever consider giving any guidance in this direction?
M2
M20:55

对,答案是,我们确实不会。

Yeah, the answer is we really wouldn't.

我的意思是,如果我们要回购股票,那你当然可以把这理解为:从继续持有股票的股东角度看,我们认为这么做是有吸引力的。

I mean, to the extent that we were going to repurchase shares, you could certainly interpret that as indicating that we thought it was attractive from the standpoint of remaining shareholders to do so.

而且我们肯定不会——至少按我们的判断——用高于内在价值的价格去回购,让要退出的股东受益,却损害继续持有的股东。

And we certainly wouldn't be paying over intrinsic value, at least in our judgment, and benefiting the exiting shareholders to the disadvantage of the continuing shareholders.

所以,到那个时候,你也许可以得出这样的结论。

So you might draw that conclusion at that point.

但除此之外,我们——你知道——我们其实希望 Berkshire 的股价波动能比现在小得多,因为我们希望——理想情况下——每一位投资者在持有股票期间的体验,都能和公司业务的进展,或者没有进展,保持完全成比例。

But other than that, we, you know, we would prefer Berkshire shares to fluctuate far less than they do because we would like the— ideally, we would like the experience of every investor during the time they held the shares to be exactly proportionate to the progress or lack thereof of the business.

我觉得这些年来,跟大多数公司相比,我们已经相当接近这一点了,不过市场的本质就是这样,能做到相当接近,大概也已经是极限了。

And I think we've come over the years reasonably close to that compared to most companies, but the nature of markets is such that reasonably close is probably as good as it's going to get.

显然,我们并不知道 Berkshire 精确的内在价值。

We don't know the exact intrinsic value of Berkshire, obviously.

如果你去看我们这些数字——假设我们从一九六五年开始就一直写下一些不对外公开的数字——那其中有些现在看起来会很可笑。

And if you looked at the figures we— if we'd written down secret figures ever since 1965, some of them would look silly now.

因为现实中实际发生的情况就是这样。

In terms of what has actually transpired.

不过我们会尽量把信息提供给你——我不这么认为——我实际上觉得 Berkshire 比大多数企业更容易估值,因为我们把那些至少对我们自己做估值来说重要的信息,都提供给你了。

But we try to give you— I don't think— I think Berkshire is easier to value than most businesses, actually, because we give you all the information that at least is important to us in valuing it.

然后,你要做的最大判断,就是未来资本会被配置得怎么样。

And then you— the biggest judgment you have to make is how well capital will be deployed in the future.

因为要算出我们大多数业务当前的价值,其实不算太难,或者说相对比较容易;真正的问题是,钱进来以后,我们拿这些钱去做什么?

Because it's easy, it's relatively easy to figure out the present value of most of our businesses, but the question becomes, what do we do with the money as it comes in?

而这会对十年后的价值产生巨大的影响。

And that will have a huge impact on the value 10 years from now.

这又会在很大程度上取决于未来十年我们的经营环境。

And that will depend a lot on the environment in which we operate over the next 10 years.

这里面会有很多运气成分。

There'll be a lot of luck in it.

我觉得,你知道,我觉得有相当大的机会会有好运,但我不——

I think, you know, I think there's a reasonable chance of good luck, but I don't—.
M1
M13:06

但谁知道呢?

But who knows?
M2
M23:10

如果我们去做任何这种事——我的意思是,严重的错误——去建议大家买入或者卖出这只股票,那都会是个错误。

It would be a mistake for us to do anything— I mean, a big mistake— to ever recommend buying or selling the stock.

我的意思是,你怎么可能让所有人同时都这么做呢?

I mean, how would you tell everybody to do it at once?

你知道,那样你自己的建议马上就失效了。

You know, you'd negate your own advice.

你当然不可能只告诉某一个人,让他占别人的便宜,或者吃别人的亏。

You're certainly not going to tell one person, you know, to the advantage or the disadvantage of somebody else.

所以,我们其实根本没法去谈,我们到底觉得这只股票该买还是该卖。唯一接近能表达这种意思的情况,就像我刚才说的,是回购股票,因为那里面显然包含了一个传递给股东的隐含判断。

So, there's really no way for us to ever talk about whether we think the stock— whether we think it's a buy or a sale, except to the extent, like I say, on repurchases where there's obviously an implicit judgment being given the shareholders.

Charlie?

Charlie?

对,我还挺喜欢现在这样子的。

Yeah, I rather like the way it's worked out.

如果把我们经历过的这段时期平均来看,我们的股票表现,已经相当接近让它跟内在价值同步这个目标了。

If you average out the period that we've been through, we've come within hailing distance of the objective of having our stock track its intrinsic value.

有时候它会稍微跑在前面一点,有时候又会稍微落后一点,但平均下来,效果还是相当不错的。

It gets a little ahead sometimes and a little behind other times, but averaged out, it's worked pretty well.

四区?

Area 4?