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1997年股东大会 · 巴菲特:股市波动性是投资者的朋友,它可以让你赚大钱

64 段 · 2 位说话人 · 原片 6:25
M1
M10:00

现在我们回到你的第一个问题。

Now let's go back to your first question.

来,再把它说一遍。

Give it, give it to me again.

第一部分是,你会不会定义——

The first part was, would you define—.
M2
M20:04

请你给我们说说,你对股市风险的定义是什么,它和标准定义有什么不同?

Give us your definition of stock market risk and how it differs from the standard definition?
M1
M10:10

对,我们不——我们不是从——嗯,我们首先是从企业风险的角度来想。

Yeah, we don't, we don't think in terms of— well, we, we think first in terms of business risk.

你知道,我们——Graham 投资方法的关键,就是不要把股票当成股票,或者当成股市里的一小部分来看。

You know, we, we— the key to Graham's approach to investing is not thinking of stocks as stocks or part of a stock market.

股票是企业的一部分。

Stocks are part of a business.

这个房间里的人,都拥有一家企业的一部分。

The people in this room own a piece of a business.

如果这家企业经营得好,他们最终也会过得不错,前提是他们当初为了加入这家企业,没有付出高得离谱的价格。

If the business does well, they're going to do all right, as long as they don't pay way too much to join into that business.

所以我们看待——我们想的是企业风险。

So we look at— we're thinking about business risk.

那么,企业风险可能以各种方式出现。

Now, business risk can arise in various ways.

一种情况是来自资本结构:如果有人给一家企业塞进了大量债务,那么企业一旦打个小喷嚏,放贷的人就可能来取消赎回权。

It can arise from the capital structure when somebody sticks a ton of debt into some business, and so that if there's a hiccup in the business, that the lenders foreclose.

它也可能只是来自这个行业本身的性质。

It can come about just by the nature of the business.

有些行业天生就非常有风险。

Certain businesses are just very risky.

以前商用飞机制造商更多的时候,Charlie 和我会觉得,造一架商用飞机、一架大型客机,某种程度上就是一种拿整个公司去下注的风险,因为在你真正有客户之前,你就得先把几亿几亿美元不断投进去。

Back when there were more commercial aircraft manufacturers, Charlie and I would think of making a commercial airplane, a big airliner, sort of as a bet-your-company risk because you would shove hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars out into the pot before you really had customers.

然后如果飞机出了问题,你知道,公司可能就完了。

And then if you had a problem with the plane, you know, the company could go.

有些行业本身就带着很大的风险,因为周期很长,因为资本投入很重,基本上就是风险很高。

There's certain businesses that inherently, because of long lead times, because of heavy capital investment, that basically have a lot of risk.

大宗商品类企业也是有风险的,除非你是最低成本生产者,因为最低成本生产者可以把你挤出市场。

And commodity businesses have risk unless you're the low-cost producer, because the low-cost producer can put you out of business.

我们的纺织业务就不是最低成本生产者,虽然我们的管理层很好,而且每个人都很努力。

Our textile business was not the low-cost producer, and we had fine management, and everybody worked hard.

我们的工会也很合作,很多方面都不错。

We had cooperative unions, all kinds of things.

但我们不是最低成本生产者,所以那就是个高风险行业。

But we weren't the low-cost producer, so it was a risky business.

那个能比我们卖得更便宜的人,就让我们处在风险之中。

The, the guy who could sell it cheaper than we could made it risky for us.

所以企业会有风险的方式有很多。

So there's a lot of ways businesses can be risky.

我们倾向于进入那些本身风险就低、而且资本结构安排也能让这种低企业风险转化成低整体企业风险的行业。

We tend to go into businesses that inherently are low risk and are capitalized in a way that that low risk of the business is transformed into a low risk for the enterprise.

再往上的风险是,就算你识别出了这样的企业,你——你可能还是为它们付得太贵了。

The risk beyond that is that even though you identify such businesses, that you, you pay too much, uh, for them.

这种风险通常更多是时间上的风险,而不是本金损失的风险,嗯,除非你进入了那种特别离谱的情况。

That risk is usually a risk of time rather than loss of principal, uh, unless you get into a really extravagant situation.

但到了那一步,风险就变成了你自己的风险。

But then the risk becomes the risk of you yourself.

我的意思是,这取决于你能不能继续相信这家企业真正的基本面,而不要太被股市牵着走。

I mean, it's whether you can retain your belief in, in, in the real fundamentals of the business and not get too concerned about the stock market.

股市是为你服务的,不是来指导你的。

The stock market is there to serve you and not to instruct you.

而这——这就是持有一家好企业、并且消除市场中原本可能存在的那种风险的关键。

And that's, that's a key to owning a good business and getting rid of the risk that would otherwise exist in the market.

你提到了波动性。

You mentioned volatility.

对我们来说,股市的波动性到底是平均每天百分之零点五、百分之零点二五,还是每天百分之五,其实根本没什么区别。

It doesn't make any difference to us whether the volatility of the stock market, you know, is, is that average is a half a percent a day or a quarter percent of a day or 5% a day.

实际上,如果波动性更高,我们反而会赚更多钱,因为那会在市场上制造更多错误。

In fact, we'd make a lot more money if volatility was higher because it could create more mistakes in the market.

所以,波动性对于真正的投资者来说,是个巨大的加分项。

So volatility is a huge plus, uh, to the real investor.

Ben Graham 举过一个 Mr. Market 的例子,就是——我们也一直在用,我还把它照搬到了报告里。

Ben Graham used the example of Mr. Market, which is the— and we've used it, I've copied it in the report.

我会抄所有优秀作者的东西。

I copy from all the good writers.

Ben 说,你可以这样想:当你买入一只股票的时候,实际上等于你买进了一门生意,而且你有这么一个很配合的合伙人,他每天都会上门,给你报一个价格,让你按这个价要么买、要么卖,而且买价和卖价是一样的。

And Ben said, you know, just imagine that when you buy a stock that you, in effect, you've bought into a business where you have this obliging partner who comes around every day and offers you a price at which you'll either buy or sell, and the price is identical.

在私人企业里,没人能遇到这种事,不会每天都有人跑来给你一个买卖报价。

And no one ever gets that in a private business where daily you get a buy, sell offer by a party.

但在股票市场里,你就能得到这个。

But in the stock market, you get it.

这是一个巨大的优势。

That's a huge advantage.

而且——如果你的这个合伙人还是个酗酒的躁郁症患者,那这个优势就更大了。

It's the— and it's a bigger advantage if this partner of yours is a heavy-drinking manic depressive.

我的意思是,你知道,他越疯狂,你赚的钱就越多。

I mean, you know, the crazier he is, the more money you're going to make.

所以,作为投资者,你应该喜欢波动性。

So you should, as an investor, you love volatility.

当然,前提不是你在用保证金。

Not if you're on margin.

但如果你是真正的投资者,你就不会用保证金。

But if you're an investor, you aren't on margin.

如果你是投资者,你就会喜欢那种剧烈波动的局面,因为这意味着会有更多东西被错误定价。

And if you're an investor, you love the idea of wild swings because it means more things are going to get mispriced.

其实,最近这些年,波动性比起过去已经减弱了。

Actually, volatility in recent years has dampened from what it used to be.

之所以看起来更大,是因为大家都用 Dow 的点数来思考,所以他们看到加五十点、减五十点之类的大数字,就觉得波动很大。

It looks bigger because people think in terms of Dow points, and so they see these big numbers about +50 or -50 or something.

但很多年前的波动性,其实比现在要大得多。

But volatility was, was much higher many years ago than, than it is now.

而且,那个时候涨跌的幅度真的是非常夸张,也就给了你更多机会。

And, uh, you had the amplitude of the swings was really wild, and, and that, that gave you more opportunity.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M2
M24:51

后来在大学的 corporate finance 系里,这就成了一个契机,他们发展出了一套所谓风险调整后收益的概念。

Well, it got to be the occasion in corporate finance departments of universities where they developed a notion of risk-adjusted returns.

我给你们大家最好的建议就是:彻底无视这套发展。

And my best advice to all of you would be to totally ignore this development.

Risk 这个词本来有一个非常好的日常含义,就是某件事有相当大的可能会严重出问题。

Risk had a very good colloquial meaning, meaning a substantial chance that something would go horribly wrong.

而那些金融学教授把波动性跟一大堆愚蠢的数学混在了一起。

And the finance professors sort of got volatility mixed up with a lot of foolish mathematics.

而且,呃,在我看来,那比我们做的事还不理性,我也不觉得我们会改变。

And, and, uh, to me, it's less rational than what we do, and I don't think we're going to change.
M1
M15:32

对,金融系教的是,波动性就等于风险。

Yeah, the finance department teaches that volatility equals risk.

他们现在想衡量风险,但他们不知道别的方法。

Now, they want to measure risk, and they don't know any other way.

说到底,他们基本上就是不知道该怎么衡量。

They don't know how to do it, basically.

所以他们就说,波动性能够衡量风险。

And so they say that volatility measures risk.

而且,你知道,我经常举这个例子:我们最早买 The Washington Post 股票的时候,在一九七三年,它跌了差不多百分之五十。嗯,整个公司的估值从接近一亿七千五百万到一亿八千万美元,跌到了大概八千万到九千万美元。

And, you know, I've often used the example that The Washington Post stock, when we first bought it, had gone—in 1973—had gone down almost 50%, uh, from a valuation of the whole company of close to, say, $180 or $175 million down to maybe $80 million or $90 million.

而且因为这件事发生得非常快,这只股票的 beta 实际上还上升了。

And because it happened very fast, the beta of the stock had actually increased.

按教授的说法,如果你用八千万美元买这家公司,它反而比你用一亿七千万美元买的时候风险更大。

And a professor would have told you that the stock—the company was more risky if you bought it for $80 million than if you bought it for $170 million.

这件事是他们二十五年前告诉我的,从那以后我就一直在想,到现在我还是没想明白。

Which is something that I've thought about ever since they told me that 25 years ago, and I still haven't figured it out.