M21:24
其实，这种方法最早是 Ben Graham 在二十世纪二十年代中期做 hedge fund 的时候用过的。
And actually, that technique was employed first by Ben Graham in the mid-1920s when he had a hedge fund.
我经常看到一些文章，把 hedge fund 这个概念的起源归功于 A. W. Jones，说是他在四十年代后期首创的，但 Ben Graham 在二十年代中期就已经有一个了，而且他当时确实做了 pairs trading。
Oftentimes I read articles all the time that credit A. W. Jones with originating the hedge fund concept in the late '40s, but Ben Graham had one in the mid-1920s, and he actually engaged in pairs trading.
后来他发现，这个方法只能算效果还算过得去，因为他五次里大概能对四次，但一旦错的那一次，往往会把前面那四次都给吃掉。
And he found out it worked very modestly well because he was right about 4 times out of 5, but the time he was wrong tended to kill him on the other 4.
我们当年在合伙企业里，也有大概五年时间在某种程度上把整体市场给做空对冲掉了。
We did, we shorted out the general market, um, for about 5 years in the partnership to a degree.
我们直接从一些大型大学那里借股票。
We borrowed stocks directly from some major universities.
我觉得我们可能算是挺早这么干的人。
I think we were probably quite early in that.
我们去过 Columbia、Harvard、Chicago，还有其他一些地方，真的去安排直接借股票。
We went to Columbia and Harvard and Chicago and different places and actually arranged for direct borrowing.
那时候不像现在这么容易操作。
There weren't the—it wasn't as easy to facilitate in those days as it is now.
所以我们会看他们的投资组合，然后就说，你们随便拿你们想持有的股票给我们，我们过一阵子再还给你们，再付你们一点费用。
And so we would, we would take their portfolios and we would just say, give us any of the stocks you want to own, and then we'll return them to you after a while and we'll pay you a little fee.
然后我们去做多那些我们觉得有吸引力的东西。
And then we went long things that we thought were attractive.
我们并没有去做空那些我们觉得没吸引力的东西。
We did not go short things that we thought were unattractive.
我们只是把整个市场大致上做空对冲掉。
We just shorted out the market generally.
每次我去见 Columbia 的财务主管之类的人时，这事对我来说总是挺有意思的。我会说，你知道，我们想借你们的股票来做空。
It was always kind of interesting to me when I would visit the treasurer of Columbia or something like that, and I'd say, you know, we'd like to borrow your stocks to short.
而且，你知道，在那个时候，他还觉得他那些股票都挺不错的。
And, you know, he thought his stocks were pretty good at that point.
他会说，那你想借哪些？
And he'd say, well, which ones do you want?
我就说，随便给我哪些都行。
I said, just give me any of them.
你知道，我很乐意把你整个该死的投资组合都拿来做空。
You know, I'm happy to short your whole damn portfolio.
这种场面，我得靠 Dale Carnegie 的课程才能撑过去。
It, I needed the Dale Carnegie course to get me through that kind of thing.
我们心里并没有设定什么具体的比例。
We didn't have any specific ratios in mind.
我们心里并没有设定什么具体的比例。
We didn't have any specific ratios in mind.
我们一直都受限制，主要是看有多少机构愿意把股票借给我们去做空。
We were always limited by the, the number of institutions that would give us the stocks to short.
所以这不算——这不是什么大事，不过在六十年代，我们大概确实从这里面多赚了一点钱。
So it was not a— it was not a big deal, but we probably made some, some extra money out of it in the '60s.
这完全不是——不是我们现在的做法会采用的东西。
It's not something that would fit our— what we do these days at all.
而且一般来说，我觉得如果你手上已经有一些对被低估企业的很好的投资想法，那其实根本没必要再去做什么市场上的做空。
And generally speaking, I think if you've got some very good ideas on businesses that are undervalued, it's really unnecessary to do any shorting out of the market.
这里有个——对你们这些在这个行业里的人来说，我是说，现在有一种挺流行的说法。
There's a— for those of you who are in the field, I mean, there's, there's a kind of a popular proposal.
Money managers 总是会有一些流行的提案，拿去卖给那些潜在投资人。
Money managers always have some popular proposal that's being sold to the, to the potential investors.
现在还有个东西叫 130/30，也就是你做多百分之一百三十，做空百分之三十。
And now there's something called 130/30, where you're long 130%, short 30%.
这些东西基本上都是一堆包装出来的玩意儿，就是想把当下这个热门概念卖给你。
That stuff's all basically a bunch of stuff just to try and sell you the idea of the day.
它其实并没有什么特别强的统计学依据，不过——不过就像 Charlie 说的，鱼总会上钩。
It doesn't really have any great statistical merit, but, but the fish bite, as Charlie says.
Charlie 可以展开讲讲这个。
Charlie can elaborate on that.
对，我们赚到钱，是因为我们长期持有了一些很棒的企业。
Yeah, we made our money by being long some wonderful businesses.
我们不是靠 long-short strategy 赚到这些钱的。
We didn't make it by a long-short strategy.
第三个问题。
Number 3.