2005年股东大会 · 衡量企业护城河深度的重要指标：提价能力 — 文稿

M10:00

早上好，先生们。

Good morning, gentlemen.

我叫 Matt Sauer，来自 North Carolina 的 Durham。

My name is Matt Sauer, and I'm from Durham, North Carolina.

很多企业都在报告说，像燃料、金属和木材这类投入品的成本在上涨，还加收了附加费。

Many businesses are reporting rising costs and surcharges on such inputs as fuel, metals, and wood.

而且他们往往没法把这些成本转嫁给消费者。

They are often unable to pass along these costs to their consumers.

如果大宗商品的价格稳定在高于过去十年的水平上，那未来企业的利润率会不会受到损害？

If commodities stabilize at price levels above those of the past decade, will corporate margins be compromised into the future?

M20:29

嗯，这是个很好的问题。我会说，这很大程度上取决于你说的是哪个行业。

Well, it's a great question, and I would say that that would depend very much on the industry you're talking about.

不过拿我们的地毯业务来说吧，就像我在年报里提到的那样，我们一次又一次地受到原材料涨价的冲击，因为这里面有很大的 petroleum derivative 因素。

But in our carpet business, for example, we've just been hit time after time, as I mentioned in the annual report, with raw material increases because there's a big petroleum derivative factor there.

而我们在把这些涨价传导给客户这件事上，是有些滞后的，主要是因为我们想在一段合理的时间内保护 Nebraska Furniture Mart，或者那些已经下了订单的客户。

And we have lagged in terms of being able to put through those increases to our customers simply because we want to protect the Nebraska Furniture Mart, or those that have ordered, for a reasonable period of time.

这就挤压了地毯业务的利润率。

And that squeezed margins in carpet.

我们在 Johns Manville 用很多 natural gas，在 Acme Brick 也用很多 natural gas。

We use lots of natural gas at Johns Manville, use lots of natural gas at Acme Brick.

这也在一定程度上压缩了利润率。

And that's tended to squeeze margins some.

我觉得从长期来看，呃，这些基础材料的通胀确实高了很多。

I think over time, uh, I think there has been a lot more inflation in these basic materials.

Steel 的涨幅简直离谱。

Steel has been off the chart.

我觉得，我觉得，呃，从长期来看，那些竞争地位强的企业，能够把原材料成本的上涨转嫁出去，就像它们能把劳动力成本的上涨转嫁出去一样。

I think, I think, uh, over time, the businesses with strong competitive positions managed to pass through increases in raw material costs just as they passed through increases in labor costs.

但是会出现这种暂时性的情况，就是有时候成本上涨得更快。

But you get these temporary situations where sometimes the costs are increasing faster.

我，我不认为 Amer— 我不认为 American industry——我的意思是，当我们每天进口一千万桶甚至更多的 oil，如果我们每桶要比一两年前多付大约二十美元，那就等于每天多了一笔两亿美元的税。

I, I don't think Amer— I don't think the American industry— I mean, a higher cost for oil when we import 10 million barrels a day or more of oil, if we're paying $20 or so more per barrel than we were a year or two ago, that's $200 million a day as a tax.

但这笔税更大程度上可能是压在 American consumer 身上，而不是 American business 身上。

But it's more of a tax on the American consumer probably than on American business.

American business 很可能还是能够把成本转嫁出去。

The American business will probably be able to pass through.

这些原材料成本上涨里的大部分，应该都能转嫁。

Most of those raw material cost increases.

值得指出的是，企业利润占 GDP 的比重，目前正处在历史最高位附近，撇开少数几个异常时期不算。

It is worth pointing out that corporate profits as a percentage of GDP are right at the all-time high, leaving out a few aberrational periods.

而且你知道，如果让我赌未来五年企业利润占 GDP 的比重会往哪个方向走，我会押它会稍微下降一些。

And I would ex— you know, if I had to bet on the direction of corporate profits as a percentage of GDP over the next 5 years, I would bet they would go down somewhat.

但那是因为它现在本来就处在一个非常非常高的水平。

But that's because they're right at this very, very high level.

很有意思的是，企业利润占 GDP 的比重虽然处在这么高的水平，但企业税占美国全部税收的比重却非常接近历史最低点。

Interestingly enough, while corporate profits as a percentage of GDP are at this very high level, corporate taxes as a percentage of total taxes raised in America are very close to an all-time low.

所以美国企业实现了一种局面：它们赚着非常丰厚的利润，但从这个国家历史的衡量标准来看，它们承担的总税负占比却很小。

So American businesses managed to pull off a situation where they're making extremely good profits and paying a very small percentage of the total tax bill as measured in this country historically.

我不确定这种情况能不能、应不应该、或者会不会继续下去，但现在对 corporate America 来说，确实是一个非常非常有利的时期。

And I'm not sure whether that could or should or will continue, but it's a very, very favorable period right now for corporate America.

不过这也没什么值得特别看多的，因为你可能会预期，多少会出现一点均值回归。

But that, that's nothing to get bullish about because you might expect some— something of a reversion to the mean.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M33:30

嗯，我没什么可补充的，不过我可以换个说法再讲一遍。

Well, I can't add to that, but I can restate it.

很难知道，到底哪些公司能够把 commodity prices 上涨带来的成本增加转嫁出去，而且，呃，这一点也很重要，要搞清楚。

It's hard to know just which companies can pass through the increases in costs that come from higher commodity prices, and, uh, it's also important to know.

M23:51

我们喜欢收购那种我们觉得还有一些尚未挖掘出来的 pricing power 的企业。

We like buying businesses where we feel that there's some untapped pricing power.

我们最近一直没怎么能做到这一点。

We haven't been able to do much of that lately.

不过早在一九七二年，我们买 See's Candy 的时候，我记得好像是——当时是一磅一块九毛五，是吧？

But back in 1972, when we bought See's Candy, I think it was either— was it $1.95 a pound?

M34:07

差不多是那个价，没错。

Something like that, yeah.

M24:09

他们当时一年卖一千六百万磅糖果，税前赚四百万美元，收购价大概是两千五百万美元，而我当时还非常愚蠢地一分钱都不肯再往上加。

And they were selling 16 million pounds of candy a year, making $4 million pretax, with about a $25 million purchase price, which I would have very foolishly refused to budge on.

回头看，这在历史上让我们少赚了很多钱。

And in history, it cost us a lot of money.

不过我们当时问过自己一个问题，而且我们觉得答案很明显，那就是，你知道，如果我们每磅提价一毛钱，销量会不会断崖式下跌？

But one of the questions we asked ourselves, and we thought the answer was obvious, was, you know, if we raised the price 10 cents a pound, would sales fall off a cliff?

当然，至少在我们看来，答案是否定的，也就是说，这个产品其实还有一些尚未挖掘出来的提价能力。

And of course, the answer, in our view at least, was that no, there was some untapped pricing power in the product.

如果一家企业每涨一分钱价之前都得先去祈祷一番，那这肯定不是什么好生意。

And it's not a great business when you have to have a prayer session before you raise your prices a penny.

我的意思是——那样的话，你所在的就是个很难做的行业。

I mean, it— you were in a tough business then.

而且，嗯，我会说，你几乎可以用一家企业在决定提价能不能撑得住时要经历多大痛苦，来衡量它长期的业务强度。

And, um, I would, uh, I would say you can almost measure the strength of a business over time by the agony they go through in determining whether a price increase can be sustained.

坦白说，现在一个很好的例子就是报业。

And frankly, a good example of that is the newspaper business right now.

因为在三十年前，不管当地那家日报是哪一家，它都几乎完全掌控着这个社区的经济命脉，因为它握着那个扩音器——商家如果想把信息传递给受众，就必须通过它来说话。

Because 30 years ago, when the— whatever the local daily would be had an absolute lock on the economics of the community because it had the megaphone through which merchants had to talk if they were going to get their message across to their audience.

那个时候，无论是发行价格还是广告价格，上调费率这件事，对大多数报纸出版商来说几乎都不值一提，根本不当回事。

At that time, rate increases, both circulation and advertising, were something that were almost a big yawn to most publishers.

他们每年都涨。

They did it annually.

他们根本不担心 Sears、Walmart、Penney's 之类的公司，或者别的什么客户，会撤掉广告。

They did not worry about the fact that Sears or Walmart or Penney's or whomever would pull their advertising.

他们也不担心人们会取消报纸订阅，于是就一路轻轻松松地涨价；新闻纸价格上涨时他们涨，新闻纸价格下跌时他们也涨。

They did not worry that people would drop their subscriptions to the paper, and they went merrily along increasing prices, and they increased them when newsprint went up, and they increased them when newsprint went down.

而且这一套还真行得通。

And it worked.

于是你就会看到非常丰厚的利润率，看上去简直像是你能想象到的最强势的生意之一。

And you got these very fat profit margins, and it looked like about as strong a business as you can imagine.

而现在，出版商发现自己处在这样一种处境里：无论是广告还是发行，他们一想到涨价就非常痛苦，因为他们担心广告主会被赶到其他媒体去；他们也担心读者在发行价格每个月涨个两毛钱之类的时候，就会想，算了，我干脆不订了。

Now publishers find themselves in a position where they agonize over rate increases, either— both in advertising and in circulation, because they're worried about driving away advertisers into other media, and they're worried about people, when they get a 20-cent increase, you know, per month or whatever it may be in their circulation price, just deciding, well, I think I'll just drop it.

而一旦他们不订了，通常也就不会再重新订回来。

And when they drop it, they don't usually take it up again.

所以，那个世界已经变了。

So that world has changed.

而且，你只要能钻进出版商的脑子里，看看他们是怎么感受提价这件事的，你就能识别出那个世界发生了什么变化。

And you could recognize the change in that world simply if you could get inside the mind of the publisher in terms of how they felt about price increases.

你可以从价格行为里看出很多东西——通过观察价格方面的表现，你能学到很多关于一家企业经济特性能持续多久的信息。

You can learn a lot about— you learn a lot about the durability of the economics of a business by observing the price behavior.

我的意思是，你现在也能看到这一点——我们刚才在说啤酒行业，你知道，啤酒这些年每年都在涨价，但是去年在某些地区也出现了一些回调，这就意味着，怎么说呢，提价正变得稍微更难了一点，尽管他们的提价幅度还低于通胀。

I mean, you're seeing that— we're talking about the beer business, you know, the beer has moved up in price every year, but, but there have been some rollbacks in certain, in certain areas in the last year, which means that, you know, it's getting a little bit more difficult to increase prices, even though they increase them at rates below inflation.

而且，呃，这可不是什么好的经济信号。

And, uh, those are not— that's not a good economic sign.

Charlie？

Charlie?

M37:40

呃，这个我没什么可补充的。

Uh, I have nothing to add to that.

没什么可补充的。

Add to that.

M27:45

好，那我们来看第七个问题。

Okay, we'll go to number 7.