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2014年股东大会 · 巴菲特:用1.2倍市净率回购BRK股票,是求之不得的好机会

53 段 · 3 位说话人 · 原片 6:40
M1
M10:00

Warren,这个问题是关于 Berkshire 的内在价值。

Warren, this question is on Berkshire's intrinsic value.

在年度股东信里,你看起来是在非常明确地传递一个信号:Berkshire 的股票被低估了,尤其是相对于内在价值来说。

In the annual letter, you appear to strongly signal that Berkshire shares are undervalued, especially relative to intrinsic value.

除了回购股票之外,Berkshire 还能采取什么行动,来缩小当前股价和内在价值之间的折价?

Aside from share buybacks, what actions can Berkshire take to narrow the discount between the current share price and intrinsic value?

比如说,你会不会考虑让 Berkshire 旗下单独的运营业务去做 IPO?

For example, would you ever consider an IPO of Berkshire's individual operating units?
M2
M20:24

最后那部分的答案是否定的。不过我想,我们一直都在努力解释——按我的猜测,我从没见过哪家公司的年报,像 Berkshire 这样频繁使用“内在价值”这个词,或者这么多地谈到各个业务单元、各项业务的内在价值。

The answer to the last part is no, but I think we try to explain— my guess is I've never seen an annual report that uses the term intrinsic value or even talks about the intrinsic value of its units or business as much as Berkshire does.

所以 Charlie 和我,确实花了相当多的精力,去解释我们哪些业务在账面价值,也就是 book value——也可以叫 carrying value——和这个业务的真实价值、或者说内在价值之间,存在非常大的差距。

So Charlie and I really devote considerable effort to explaining which of our businesses where there's really a significant discrepancy between what carrying value is, or book value— call it carrying value— and the true value or the intrinsic value of the business.

比如在过去一年里,我就拿 GEICO 讲得非常具体。我说过,GEICO 在账上相对于有形资产大概只多记了十亿美元,但它的价值也许高达两百亿美元。

And I got very specific in the case of GEICO in the past year, for example, and I said that GEICO, which is carried at about $1 billion over tangible assets, may be worth as much as $20 billion.

是高于有形资产的那部分。

Over tangible assets.

而且如果五年或者十年之后,这个数字本身变得大得多,我也一点都不会惊讶。

And I wouldn't be surprised if 5 years or 10 years from now that that figure itself will be a lot larger.

所以我们一直都有在谈这个。

So we've talked about it.

我们说过,我们愿意买——不只是愿意,而是非常想在 book value 的百分之一百二十这个价格回购股票。

We've said we are willing to buy— not only willing, but eager to buy stock at 120% of book value.

现在的 book value 已经接近两千三百亿美元了,所以这显然意味着,我们认为如果只比这个数字高出大约四百五十亿美元就能买到,那相对于内在价值来说,我们就是捡了便宜。

Well, with book value being close to $230 billion now, that obviously means we think that at $45 billion, roughly, over that figure, we are getting a bargain in relation to intrinsic value.

但我们永远不会试图给出一个精确数字,因为我们并不知道一个精确数字。

But we're never going to try and put out an exact number because we don't know an exact number.

而且——第一,它每天都会变化,虽然日与日之间变化不大,但它当然会随着季度、随着年份发生变化。

And it's— A, it changes from day to day, although not a lot day to day, but it certainly changes, you know, over the quarters and over the years.

第二个原因是,如果你现在让 Charlie 和我各自写下一个数字,作为 Berkshire 的内在价值,我们大概会落在彼此百分之五以内,但很可能不会在百分之一以内。

And the second reason is, if you ask Charlie and me to write down a figure as we sit here as to the intrinsic value of Berkshire, we'd probably be within 5% of each other, but we probably would not be within 1% of each other.

所以我们会继续努力,向股东提供关于那些重要业务单元的信息。

So we will continue to try to give shareholders information about the important units.

这并不是说那些小业务对我们不重要,只是它们对整体内在价值的影响没那么大。

It isn't— the small ones are not unimportant to us, but they do not have a big impact on the overall intrinsic value.

我们手上有少数几个业务。

We've got a few businesses.

我的意思是,我们会有一些业务,账面上可能只记了几亿美元,但它们也许值十亿美元,甚至可能值二十亿美元。

I mean, we'll have some businesses that may be carried at a few hundred million that might be worth a billion or maybe $2 billion even.

但资产负债表没有披露出来的那些巨大价值,并不在这些业务里。

But that isn't where the big undisclosed-by-the-balance-sheet values are.

你知道,它们是在铁路业务里,在保险业务里,也在我们的公用事业业务里。

You know, they're in the railroad, they're in the insurance business, they're in our utility business there.

而这些加起来,就是相当巨大的数字。

And they add up to some pretty big numbers.

我们会尽量把数字原原本本地告诉你们,而且会用我们自己在思考这些业务时真正会用的那些词。

We try to tell you exactly the numbers and really use the words that we use when we're thinking about those businesses ourselves.

在估算它们价值这件事上。

In terms of estimating their value.

但我们不想再往前多走一步了。

But we don't want to go further than that.

这个百分之一百二十,显然就是一个非常明确的强烈信号,说明在我们看来,这个价格远远低于内在价值,否则我们不会拿它来回购股票。

The 120% obviously is a loud shout-out as to a figure that we think is very significantly below intrinsic value, or we wouldn't use it to repurchase shares.

我们只有在能够以明显低于内在价值的价格买回股票时,才认为回购是合理的。

We only believe in repurchasing shares when we can do so at a significant discount from intrinsic value.

有些公司会说——Coca-Cola 就这么说过——他们买回股票是为了对冲期权。

Some companies talk about— Coca-Cola does— they talk about buying in shares to cover options.

但这其实并不是回购股票的最佳理由。

That actually isn't the best reason to buy in shares.

我的意思是,股票本身可能被高估了;即便这些股票之前是通过期权发出去的,你也不应该把它们再买回来。

I mean, the stock could be overpriced, and even though you issued it on options, you shouldn't be buying it in.

但这已经有点成了整个 American corporate America 里的一个口头禅了:只要你回购股票来覆盖期权行权,对股东的稀释就算被抵消了。

But that's become sort of a mantra throughout corporate America, that if you buy shares to cover the option exercises, you've negated the dilution to shareholders.

但还是那句话,如果你买股票——如果你用九毛钱买到一张一美元钞票,那你是在帮股东的忙。

But again, if you buy shares—if you buy a dollar bill for 90 cents, you're doing your shareholders a favor.

可如果你花一块一买它,那对股东就一点好处都没有。

And if you buy it for $1.10, you are doing them no favor at all.

Charlie?

Charlie?
M3
M34:40

嗯,我不认为我们什么时候曾经想过,把股价抬到远远高于 intrinsic value,然后再把股票发给别人,好让我们自己占便宜。

Well, I don't believe we've ever wanted to get the stock way over intrinsic value so that we can issue it to other people and get an advantage for ourselves.

让他们吃亏。

Disadvantage for them.

我觉得,那些希望股价涨到非常接近 intrinsic value,甚至高于 intrinsic value 的人,真是有点太贪心了。

And I think the people that want the stock up very close to intrinsic value or higher really want egg in their beer.

稍微低一点其实挺好。

It's okay if it's a little below.
M2
M25:07

对。

Yeah.
M3
M35:07

而且我们不是那种会拼命把股价吹到越高越好、好让我们能以对自己有利的价格多发股票的人。

And we're not in the game of ballooning our stock up as high as we can get it so we can issue more of it at a profit, profit to ourselves.

我觉得从长期来看,我们这套做法会运作得相当不错;而且不管我们愿不愿意,我觉得这只股票最终都会涨到高于 intrinsic value。

I think over the long term, our system will work pretty well, and I think the stock will eventually go above intrinsic value whether we like it or not.
M2
M25:27

对,不过这些年来,我们确实看过很多管理层,想方设法让自己的股票卖到远高于其真实价值,好拿它去换别的公司。

Yeah, but we have—we really watched a lot over the years of certain managers attempting to get their stock to sell for way more than it was worth so they could use it to trade for other companies.

我是说,那在六十年代末可是风靡一时。

I mean, that was all the rage in the late '60s.

我后来结束自己的 partnership,其中一个原因就是那种做法当时太普遍了,而且它影响了所有其他资产的估值。

One of the reasons I wound up my partnership was that that activity was going on so much, and it affected all other values.

这实际上就是一场游戏,而且有些人玩得还算半真半假地诚实,另外一些人就真的是疯狂作弊。

And it was really a game, and it was a game that some people played sort of halfway honestly, and other people really cheated like crazy.

因为如果你想让自己的股票被高估,你就很可能会在 earnings 上作弊,在 projections 上作弊,什么都作弊。

Because if you're trying to get your stock to be overpriced, you're very likely to cheat on your earnings and cheat on projections, cheat on everything.

而且顺便说一句,这招是管用的。

And it works, incidentally.

不会永远管用,但它确实管用。

It doesn't work indefinitely, but it works.

有些你们叫得出名字的公司,某种程度上就是靠这个原则建立起来的。

Some companies whose names you know were, to some extent, built on that principle.

这是一种我们不但不想玩的游戏,而且我们确实非常反感,因为我们见过很多这种人是怎么操作的。

That's a game that we not only don't want to play, we really found it very distasteful because we saw a lot of these people in action.

而且这东西是一阵一阵来的,我们就是——我们一点都不想沾边。

And it comes in waves, and we just—we don't want to come close to playing it.

我要是不小心点,Charlie 就要点名了,所以我们最好还是转到股东提问。

Unless I'm careful, Charlie will name names, so we better move on to shareholders.

好,我们来看二号提问点。

Well, let's go to station number 2.